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1
I am not a feminist per se nor a bleeding heart liberal, though many
people think I am. I am an opportunist, a pragmatist to the nth degree.
There is no benefit in this company that we don’t feel doesn’t have a bot-
tom line advantage or payback.
—Company owner whose family-owned firm operates an on-site
child care center for 85 employee children and grandchildren,
including his own grandchild.
1
Introduction
Policy Issues and Research Questions
The last 25 years have witnessed a decline in the growth rate of the
U.S. population. There have also been economic and social forces,
such as welfare reform, an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and the continuing stagnation of wages of men with less than a college
education, which have encouraged women to enter the labor market in
ever-increasing numbers. As a result, much of the growth in the U.S.
labor market has come from women and, in recent years, from a dra-
matic increase in the labor force participation of mothers with young
children. The increased participation of this segment is also expected to
be a substantial component of growth in the labor force for the next
two decades. This trend has created a rising demand for child care and
a greater level of work/family conflict for U.S. families with young
children. All indications are that these effects of increasing women’s
labor force participation will continue in the near future.
Firms in the 1990s faced an inherently tighter labor market than
they had in the past because of changing demographics in the United
States and due to the strong economy. To satisfy their staffing needs,
employers strove to entice those not in the labor force to enter. Among
the groups consciously targeted have been the elderly and women with
young children. In terms of the latter group, one strategy used by a
small but growing number of firms is to provide employer-sponsored
child care (ESCC) as part of a menu of employee benefits. In 1978, the
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U.S. Department of Labor identified 105 ESCCs among U.S. compa-
nies. Since then, this number has increased dramatically. A 1998 sur-
vey found approximately 8,000 firms with on-site centers (McIntyre
2000).
These trends, which are presented in more detail in Chapter 2, raise
important questions about the benefits of on-site child care. Why do
some firms choose to offer ESCC while most do not? What is the value
to the firm of offering ESCC? What is the value to employees of work-
ing for a firm with on-site child care? While we cannot answer all of
these questions fully in this study, we take important steps in that direc-
tion. Chapter 3 explores economic theory with an eye to understanding
why some firms choose to offer employer-sponsored on-site child care
while others do not. The theoretical analysis is a general one that is
widely applicable in the U.S. economy. Our empirical work, however,
is limited to a case study approach in which we analyze two firms with
on-site child care centers and one that does not have an on-site center,
all in the same industry. The analysis provides some evidence as to
why these companies have made the choices that they have about ben-
efits, but we cannot generalize more widely from three firms the set of
characteristics that lead some firms to offer ESCC while others do not.
Similarly, while we explore the issue of the value to the firm of offer-
ing ESCC, the challenge of measuring the full benefits of on-site child
care for employers is great, given the complex interaction between
working conditions, productivity, compensation, and the makeup of
one’s labor force. Employers offering child care benefits often report
positive impacts of child care programs on workers’ performance, as
well as reductions in turnover, absenteeism, and recruitment costs.
Indeed, there has been substantial media coverage of employer and
employee perceptions about these potential benefits of some of the
higher-visibility programs. We review the literature on such cost sav-
ings in Chapter 3 and provide some anecdotal evidence from the firms
we studied that points to benefits in these areas. However, given the
information available at our study sites, we are not able to systemati-
cally analyze potential effects on productivity, turnover, or recruitment
that may lead to cost savings for firms offering ESCC. 
The primary contribution of this study is to analyze the value of
employer-sponsored on-site child care to the employee. This is not
often mentioned in firms’ public rhetoric, but we expect that it is a sub-
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stantial part of the cost savings of ESCC: the value to the employee of
the benefit should translate directly into wage savings on the part of
firms (Woodbury 1990). Chapter 3 explores the theoretical model that
points to the importance of employee valuation in assessing the benefit
of ESCC to the firm. Chapter 5 provides an indirect measure of
employee valuation by analyzing who is using (or not using) the on-
site center. If parents choose on-site center care when it is available
over other options, consumer choice theory tells us that they must be
better off with the on-site center. Which employees are more likely to
select the on-site option? This information is important to human
resource managers considering an on-site center and to policymakers
evaluating possible approaches to helping parents with child care
expenses. The next section of this chapter outlines the basic research
questions of this indirect approach and previews our findings from
Chapter 5. 
We also offer a second approach to estimating employee valuation
of ESCC, which is detailed in Chapter 7. This method uses a contin-
gent valuation technique for eliciting the worth of the benefit directly
from employees. Again, human resource officers and policymakers
should be interested in the answer to the question, “What value does
the average employee or recent hire place on the benefit of having an
on-site center?” Both approaches expand our understanding of the ben-
efit of employer-sponsored on-site child care to the employee and,
therefore, to the employer as part of a compensation package. Both
methods of analysis lead to the conclusion that employees derive sub-
stantial benefits from on-site centers, beyond what they would receive
from a community-based child care center, and that the benefits from
ESCC accrue to employees beyond the users of the on-site center.
Given the difficulty firms have in assessing the value of ESCC, we
believe our strategy makes an important contribution in providing an
example that any medium-sized or large firm could follow to assess the
potential value of ESCC to its employees. 
The valuation of ESCC is also important from a public policy per-
spective. Child care has become a topic of intense public debate in the
United States. In 1976, Congress enacted the Child and Dependent
Care Tax Credit, and since then there has been a dramatic increase in
federal spending on child care.1 However, the Dependent Care Credit is
only one of a wide variety of government programs subsidizing child
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care expenditure.2 Welfare reform has also increased the pressure on
states to coax low-income mothers into the labor market. In recent
years, a number of proposals before Congress have involved tax breaks
for companies offering ESCC.3 This raises the question of why the
government would need to encourage employers to do something that
is in the firm’s interest. If firms were better able to measure the benefits
of ESCC, perhaps the tax incentive would not be necessary. On the
other hand, if the positive externalities of a child receiving quality care
and the reduction of work/family conflict are large enough, govern-
ment incentives in this area might be justified, whatever the value to
firms.4 Regardless of one’s perspective on this issue, a better measure
of the value of ESCC to employees would inform decisions about opti-
mal levels of provision and of tax incentives. 
AN INDIRECT APPROACH TO VALUING EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED ON-SITE CHILD CARE: PARENTAL CHOICE 
WHEN AN ON-SITE CENTER IS AVAILABLE
Hard to find good day care that you can trust. 
—A 48-year-old female production worker explaining why she
values her employer’s on-site center.
Convenient for people who use it. 
—A 22-year-old female production worker with no children yet,
but who plans to use the company on-site center when she does
have children.
While there is extensive literature that analyzes women’s participa-
tion in the labor force and the type of child care selected by parents in
the United States,5 very little is known about parental choice of on-site
center care. This is not surprising because most studies make use of
nationally representative samples of households and the incidence of
on-site center use, while increasing, is still so small as to be practically
invisible, even in relatively large samples. However, ESCC is too
important to ignore simply because it cannot be studied with conven-
tional data sets. Instead, we have elected to use a case study approach,
analyzing the child care arrangements of employees at three firms in
the same local labor market and in the same industry.
Introduction 5
Firms that offer on-site child care seem to be of two types. One
does so as part of a corporate culture of “caring,” a culture that is
reflected by many aspects of the firm’s benefits package and working
conditions. The other offers child care as a response to a particular tar-
get employee population and/or as a response to a very tight labor mar-
ket. We specifically looked for the latter type, without a full menu of
family-friendly benefits because, while they have received less atten-
tion than some high-profile family-friendly firms, we feel that they
hold more insights into “typical” firm behavior. Also, for companies
that do not offer a wide array of family-friendly benefits, the effect of
on-site child care is less intertwined with the impacts of other benefits. 
Employees at two of the three firms we study have access to on-
site child care, while employees at the third firm do not, allowing us to
make comparisons of child care choice across these two scenarios. In
addition, we collected from the employees of these three firms more
detailed information than is often available about alternative sources of
child care in the respondent’s area, particularly the availability of rela-
tives as potential care givers. This provides an opportunity to evaluate
how the employee’s individual menu of child care options affects his or
her child care choice, a dimension of analysis that is often missing.
Furthermore, household-level surveys usually are not extensive enough
to gather information about the multiple strategies that parents often
have in place to guard against the breakdown of child care arrange-
ments and other unanticipated circumstances that create conflict
between employment and caring for one’s young children. The data we
collected also address this gap in the literature on the determinants of
child care choice.
Our findings on the use of on-site centers are quite clear. The pres-
ence of the on-site center option makes a substantial difference in the
child care choices made by families with young children. A much
higher percentage of parents employed at the two firms with on-site
child care enrolled their children in a day care center in comparison to
the employees of the firm without an on-site center. Thus, the presence
of the on-site center did not simply divert attendance from community-
based centers, but rather moved children out of home day care and rel-
ative care into center-based care. Also important is our finding that par-
ents of infants are likely to use the on-site center, as are those with
older children. This suggests that at least some of the national differen-
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tial between modes of care for infants and preschoolers comes from a
lack of slots for infants at child care centers rather than from parental
preference, or that parents may value ESCC differently than other cen-
ter care for infants. Although those with relatives available for provid-
ing child care are less likely to use the on-site center, there are still a
number of families that reported using the center despite the availabil-
ity of relatives.
Users of the on-site center are also less likely to have secondary
child care arrangements, suggesting less concern about breakdown in
the primary arrangement. When secondary arrangements are used, they
are almost always unpaid and with relatives. Workers at the firm with-
out an on-site center are more likely to be juggling two regular child
care arrangements, which might be expected to add to the stress of the
work/family balancing act.
For the two firms with on-site centers, employee job tenure is
found to be positively related to on-site center use. This relationship
between job tenure and center use may be evidence of a lower turnover
rate for center users, but it also could be the result of the allocation of a
limited number of slots on a first-come, first-served basis. Education is
also found to be positively related to the use of the on-site center,
which substantiates company officials’ claims that having the center
has been especially important for recruiting and retaining young man-
agers, especially young women managers. 
It is important to note that the cost of the on-site centers to parents,
while somewhat lower than the average cost of other center-based care
in the area, was about equal to the average cost for all paid child care in
the area at the time of our survey. Thus, enrolling one’s child in the on-
site center did not represent a significant saving for most parents and
may have resulted in a substantial increase in expenses for those with
no-cost relative care available. This suggests that quality, reliability,
and convenience are important factors in the decision making of work-
ing parents; parents get extra value from the employer-sponsored and
on-site aspects of ESCC. The added value of these characteristics
seems to be enough for many more employees to use the on-site center
than would ordinarily use center-based care. This extra value is a part
of the benefit of ESCC to the employee and, thus, to the employer. 
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A DIRECT APPROACH TO EMPLOYEE VALUATION OF 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED ON-SITE CHILD CARE
Benefit to society.
—Non-user of center who voted yes.
I took care of my kids. 
—Non-user who voted no.
Convenience of location, I trust people here, inexpensive. 
—User of center who voted yes.
Not fair—Don’t think everyone should have to pay for it. 
—User who voted no.
Turning to the direct estimation of the benefit of ESCC to employ-
ees, we apply a contingent valuation strategy. Chapter 6 discusses
some of the vast body of literature on using contingent valuation for
nonmonetized commodities in the environmental and natural resources
field and discusses its application to the case of employer-sponsored
on-site child care. The contingent valuation technique has seldom been
applied to employee benefits; nonetheless, we argue that it is appropri-
ate for determining the value that employees derive from a benefit.
Like many environmental amenities, there may be a non-use or exist-
ence value to individuals of working for a company that offers an
ESCC, as well as a use value to parents who have children enrolled in
the center. We test this hypothesis using data collected from the three
sample firms. 
The findings presented in Chapter 7 indicate that price is a signifi-
cant determinant of employees’ votes on whether they would be will-
ing to pay for the continued existence of the on-site center in the case
of the firms that have a center, or would be willing to pay part of the
cost of running a center in the case of the firm that does not have a cen-
ter. We find substantial evidence of a non-use value even for employ-
ees with no young children. The results also indicate a greater
valuation among recent hires than among longer-term employees, as
expected. Using the statistical results, we calculate the total value that
employees receive from the center, as well as the value to subgroups of
employees. Any firm engaging in this exercise could then compare the
cost of the benefit with the direct value to its employees, recalling that
other gains such as reduced turnover, absenteeism, or recruitment costs
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that accrue to the firm but not directly to the employees are not
included in these calculations.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Our empirical analysis is based on a case study approach involving
three firms in the same labor market and in the same industry. Two of
the firms offer on-site child care to employees, while the third does not.
This case study approach has important advantages. Because the firms’
employees live in the same area, their market child care options are
identical; their menus of child care choices differ only in the availabil-
ity of on-site care, and of relatives willing to provide child care, and in
their access to means-tested government subsidy programs. Sampling
within a relatively small geographic area also controls for other unob-
servables such as differences in the cost of living and regional unem-
ployment rates. Furthermore, very simply, the concentration of
sampling within firms that have on-site child care renders this type of
analysis feasible when the incidence of on-site child care use is still
almost imperceptible in the population as a whole.
We recognize, however, that there is also a disadvantage to using
firms in the same local labor market in that employees may choose
among firms based on the benefits available at each company. This
might be exactly a firm’s intention in offering on-site child care, but it
introduces endogeneity between who works for which firm and paren-
tal choice of child care. Accounting for the endogeneity of firm choice
is beyond the limits of a three-firm case study. Instead, we try to be
cautious in the interpretation of results, emphasizing the unique aspects
of these data while exploring the effects of an on-site center in parental
decision making and deriving estimates of the value of ESCC. 
An employee survey, which is discussed more fully in Chapter 4,
was used to gather information about current child care arrangements
for employees with young children, alternative child care options,
basic socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of all sample
employees and their households, and contingent valuation responses.
Our survey includes 904 employees of whom 259 have a child under
age six. The employees represented by our data all work for one of
Introduction 9
three light manufacturing firms in the same industry in the area of a
midsized city in the Southeast of the United States. Women represent
the vast majority of the production workers in this industry. Survey
responses were collected through in-person interviews on company
time. We spent time in each firm during working hours, interviewed
workers on all shifts, and talked informally with supervisors and plant
managers. We spoke extensively with the human resource officers and
top administrators at each of the three firms regarding their choices
about benefit spending and particularly about ESCC. Thus, with this
unique case study, we are able to contribute interesting insights about
several largely unexplored aspects of ESCC, most importantly, parental
decisions related to the use of on-site centers versus other child care
options, and the economic value to employees of ESCC.
The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information on trends in women’s labor force participation, the use of
nonparental child care, and employer sponsorship of child care in the
United States. Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for under-
standing why firms might choose to offer a benefit such as ESCC, and
for identifying the sources of employee benefits from employer-spon-
sored on-site child care. Chapter 3 also summarizes the limited
research that has focused on ESCC, providing an overview that cannot
be found elsewhere in the literature. The study sites and data collec-
tion, which are common to both of our analyses of ESCC, are dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the indirect analysis of
employee benefits from ESCC, a comparison of use patterns for
employees with and without an on-site child care option. Chapters 6
and 7 focus on the direct measurement of employee valuation of the
benefits of ESCC. Chapter 6 contains an overview of the contingent
valuation methodology and how we use it for our specific case. Chap-
ter 7 discusses the estimated contingent valuation equations for the
three firms in our study and describes the resulting willingness-to-pay
estimates. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the history of government
policy regarding child care funding, focusing particularly on ESCC and
concludes with recommendations to firms that are considering offering
ESCC and to government policymakers who are thinking about provid-
ing tax incentives or other interventions to encourage employer-spon-
sored on-site child care.
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Notes
1. In 1999, the cost of the Child and Dependent Care Credit was estimated to be $2.8
billion (Blau 2000).
2. See Blau (2000) for a history of major government programs that subsidize child
care.
3. There is currently no federal tax incentive for companies offering ESCC, but sev-
eral states give tax credits to employers for costs related to ESCC.
4. See Vandell and Wolfe (2000) for a full discussion of potential externalities of
child care quality.
5. See, for example, Blau and Robins (1988), Blau and Hagy (1998), Brayfield and
Hofferth (1995), Connelly and Kimmel (2003), Duncan and Hill (1977), Folk and
Beller (1993), Han (1999), Hofferth and Wissoker (1992), Johansen, Leibowitz,
and Waite (1996), Kimmel (1995, 1998), Lehrer (1983, 1989), Leibowitz, Waite,
and Witsberger (1988), Mason and Kuhlthau (1989), and Ribar (1992, 1995).
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2
The Labor Market and Child Care 
Context in the United States
TRENDS IN WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
The tremendous increase in women’s labor force participation in
the second half of the twentieth century has truly transformed the
American labor market. In 1962, 36.6 percent of women were
employed. By 2001, this percentage had increased to 59.7 (U.S. Census
Bureau 2002a, Table 561). Traditionally, married women’s employ-
ment had been well below the employment rates of never-married and
divorced women. The rates for all three groups increased over this
period, with the married women’s rate of labor force participation
growing the fastest. Today, divorced and never-married women still
have a higher level of labor force participation than currently married
women. Also, in recent years, a larger percentage of women fall into
those categories with higher rates of participation, given the older age
of first marriage and greater rates of divorce that women experience
today as compared to the past. The rise in women’s labor force partici-
pation from all sources of change, coupled with a slight decline in
men’s labor force participation, especially among very young and older
males, has caused the proportion of the labor force that is female to
increase from 33.3 percent in 1960 to 46.5 percent in 1999 (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau 1995, Table 631; 2000, Table 647).
While early in this “revolution” of women’s employment, older
women with grown children constituted the largest group among those
entering the labor market, during the 1980s and 1990s, one of the fast-
est growing segments of the labor force was women with young chil-
dren. The labor force participation rate of married women with
children under age six increased from 30.3 percent in 1970 to 45.1 per-
cent in 1980, to 58.9 percent in 1990, and to 63.5 percent in 1995 (U.S.
Census Bureau 2002a, Table 570). Employment rates for women with
even younger children have also increased. For example, the labor
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force participation rate of married women with children under age
three rose from 21.2 percent in 1966 to 32.7 percent in 1975, to 50.5
percent in 1985, to 59.7 percent in 1994, and remained at 59.4 percent
in 2001 (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998, p. 95; U.S. Census Bureau
2002a, Table 571). As the employment of women with young children
continues to grow, child care that can facilitate employment has also
gained in importance to American families and employers. 
In addition to entering the labor force in large numbers, women
have increased the number of hours they work in the labor market. For
example, in 1969, 27.5 percent of all women aged 25 to 54 worked
full-time; by 1997, this percentage had increased to 50.2 (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 1999a). Given that unemployment was very low for
most of the 1990s, firms seeking to expand or even maintain their
workforce simply could not ignore women workers or even women
workers with young children. 
The increase in the number of women workers and in the hours
they are employed has led to a variety of changes in the ways families
try to meet the custodial and developmental needs of young children.
While married fathers spend more time with their children than in ear-
lier decades and provide a substantial proportion of child care when the
mother works part-time, children of full-time women workers are less
likely to be cared for by their fathers while their mothers are at work
(Bianchi 2000). The percentage of children’s households with two par-
ents, one of whom is not in the labor force, has steadily decreased over
time and is now clearly a minority. For example, in 1999, 46.5 percent
of families with children under the age of 18 had two earners, 27.5 per-
cent were single-parent households (almost 20 percent of these were
father-only households), and only 26 percent of families with children
had two parents in residence with only one (or no, for a small percent-
age) employed parent (U.S. Census Bureau 2000, Table 655). Further-
more, for children under the age of 18 in two-parent households, the
ratio of father’s time to mother’s time spent with children has increased
from 0.51 to 0.65 between 1965 and 1998 (Bianchi 2000).1 Even where
the father is not providing child care, he may be involved in transport-
ing the child to day care or doing other household tasks that in the past
were handled by a stay-at-home mother. Consequently, men with
young children as well as women with young children may value
efforts by employers to help ease work/family tension. 
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TRENDS IN THE USE OF NONPARENTAL CHILD CARE
By the end of the 1990s, slightly fewer than one-fourth of pre-
school children aged three to five in the United States were regularly
cared for only by parents. The incidence of sole parental care for this
group declined by almost 8 percentage points from 1991 to 1999. In
conjunction with this trend, the regular use of some type of day care
center or preschool among this group increased from about 53 to
almost 60 percent during the same time period (U.S. Census Bureau
2001, Table 557). These statistics reflect an overall increase in the
demand for nonparental child care, regardless of the mother’s employ-
ment status. Evolving work patterns can be expected to result in even
greater changes in the pattern of child care used by employed mothers
with young children.
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of child care arrangements for pre-
school age children with employed mothers, as obtained from national
data for selected years from 1977 to 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau 1998;
Smith 2002, Table 3; U.S. Census Bureau 2003). The data used in
Table 2.1, with the exception of 1977, come from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative
survey conducted on a regular basis by the U.S. Census Bureau. Look-
ing at Table 2.1, we see that until 1994 the combined percentage of
children being cared for by a relative or by a nonrelative in a home-
based day care arrangement decreased over time, while the percentage
being cared for in a child care center or in a nursery school increased.
This may reflect the changing needs of employed mothers in that those
working full-time may prefer the regularized care of a center compared
to a relative, or may have fewer relatives available for care as families
become more geographically dispersed and more relatives may be in
the labor force themselves. In addition, it may also reflect an increased
demand for early childhood education. We know that a substantial
number of preschoolers are enrolled in early childhood education pro-
grams even if there is a parent at home (Hotz and Kilburn 1992). 
Data for 1995 and 1997 are difficult to compare with earlier years
due to several changes in the questionnaire and in the way the data
were collected. Taken at face value, we see that some of the earlier
trends in child care arrangements have been reduced or at least damp-
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Number of children  
(000s)              
4,370 8,168 8,849 9,124 9,483 9,629 9,854 9,937 10,288 10,047 10,116 10,587
% care:         
By father                        14.4 15.7 14.5 15.3 15.1 16.5 20.0 15.9 18.5 16.6 19.0 19.3
By grandparent                    15.9 15.4 13.8 13.9 14.3 15.8 17.0 16.3 15.9 18.4 21.7
By other relative                30.9d   8.2   9.9   7.9   7.2   8.8   7.7   9.0   9.0    5.5   7.4   8.4
By nonrelative                    29.4 28.2 29.5 28.5 28.9 25.1 23.3 21.6 20.5 28.4 22.1 21.1
Organized child care 
facilities and school- 
based activity                
13.0 23.1 22.4 24.4 26.0 27.5 23.1 29.9 29.6 25.1 21.7 25.9
Child cares for self  and 
other arrangementse                
1.0   0.8   0.8   1.3   1.4   1.3   1.6   1.1   0.9   2.9   8.1   4.8
Mother cares for child at 
workf     
11.4   8.1   7.4   8.9   7.6   6.4   8.7   6.2   5.5   5.4   3.3   3.2
a Data only for the two youngest children under 5 years of age.
b Survey design changes make comparison with previous years difficult. The number of categories was expanded, including the option of
saying “no regular arrangement.”
c Paper questionnaires of the past were replaced by computer-based surveying. Also time of year of survey changed and may contribute to
differences in the arrangement distribution. Column percentages may sum to more than 100 because of a small percentage of children
with two primary care arrangements listed.
d Data for 1977 include grandparents.
e Includes children in kindergarten/grade school and “no regular arrangement” for 1995 and 1997.
f Includes mothers working for pay at home or away from home.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (1998b); Smith (2002); U.S. Census Bureau (2003).
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ened, with relative care rebounding and center-based care losing 8 per-
centage points. Lest we attribute all of this to changes in the survey,
data from the National Survey of American Families show a similar
decline in center care and an increase in relative care. Sonenstein et al.
(2002) find that between 1997 and 1999, the child care arrangements of
children of employed parents shifted away from center-based care,
with the proportion cared for in centers declining from 32 percent to 28
percent of children four years old and younger. Care by relatives
increased from 23 to 27 percent during the same two-year period.
These changes are confined to children from two-parent families,
regardless of income. The pattern of child care arrangements for sin-
gle-parent families remained unchanged over the period, with close to
40 percent of these families using center care (Sonenstein et al. 2002).
It is unclear whether changes in government support or in availability
help to explain the reduction in the proportion of young children using
center-based care. It may reflect heterogeneity among the recent new
entrants into the labor market. As a result of the tight labor market,
which attracts individuals who otherwise would not be employed, it is
possible that many new entrants into the labor market are piecing
together relative care instead of using center care, either because they
are more committed to relative care, because they do not plan to stay in
the labor market very long, or because their incomes are lower on aver-
age.
As the statistics from Sonenstein et al. (2002) indicate, marital sta-
tus is one dimension across which child care usage clearly differs. Sin-
gle mothers rely more on center care and relative care and are much
less likely to use home-based care by nonrelatives. Part of their use of
centers may be because government subsidies such as those provided
by Title IA funds and the Child Care and Development Fund are more
often directed at center-based care. Smith (2002) shows the distribution
of types of arrangements used by children under age five, comparing
those for whom government assistance for child care costs is received
and those for whom it is not. Forty-three percent of children whose par-
ents receive government help with child care expenses were in center
care compared to 20 percent of those whose parents do not receive
government help with child care. Twenty percent of those who
received government help with child care expenses were cared for by
nonrelatives in the child’s or the caregiver’s home compared with 18
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percent of those not receiving government help (Smith 2002, p. 19).
Similarly, Connelly and Kimmel (2003, p. 769) find that only 71 per-
cent of single mothers who are employed full-time and are using cen-
ter-based care report paying for that care, compared to 81 percent of
the married mothers employed full-time and using center-based care.
On the other hand, they find that single mothers are much more likely
to pay their relatives who are providing care than are married mothers.
For married women, higher nonlabor income (which is largely hus-
band’s income) is correlated with a greater use of center care and a
reduction in care by relatives. While some of this difference may
reflect preferences, it may also indicate access to certain types of care.
Center care tends to be the most expensive. In addition, relatives of
high-income women are themselves more likely to be high-income
earners and, thus, the opportunity cost of them watching young chil-
dren is greater. 
Connelly and Kimmel (2003) also find using SIPP data that child
care arrangements differ by a number of other characteristics of the
family, including employment status of the mother, race and ethnicity,
education, and income. For example, mothers who work full-time are
more likely to use center care than mothers who work part-time. In
addition, characteristics of the children, particularly age and the num-
ber and ages of siblings, also affect the type of care arrangement cho-
sen. Consistent with other studies, Connelly and Kimmel (2003) find
that children under age two are less likely to be in center care than are
children aged three to five. They also find that, for single mothers, pre-
school children with siblings who are also preschoolers are less likely
to be cared for by relatives, and that, for married mothers, preschool
children with siblings who are of school age (6 to 12 years old) are less
likely to be cared for in centers. The presence of teenage siblings also
reduces the likelihood that a preschool child is cared for in a center
(Connelly and Kimmel 2003, p. 771).
CHILD CARE EXPENDITURES
Parents spend a substantial amount of money on child care. Table
2.2 shows the average price of full-time child care of various types for
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children of employed mothers in the United States in 1997 for those
respondents paying for care (Smith 2002). Many child care arrange-
ments with relatives are unpaid. Only 15 percent of grandparents who
provided child care were paid in 1997, and 28 percent of other rela-
tives. In comparison, 91 percent of home-based day care provided by
nonrelatives and 86 percent of day care arrangements overall were paid
(Smith 2002, p. 14). For all those paying for an arrangement, parents
spent, on average, about $70 per week on child care in 1997 (Smith
2002, p. 14). Day care centers appear to be the most expensive type of
care, whereas child care provided by grandparents and relatives costs
much less. 
For the average family that is not poor, child care expenses in 1997
represented about 7 percent of family income. For a poor family, child
care expenses, while lower absolutely, represented a larger proportion
of income, 20 percent in 1997 (Smith 2002, p. 17). For a single mother
with a minimum wage job, an average child care expenditure would
represent 30.6 percent of her income (Casper 1995). With expenses this
high, it is not surprising that the reservation wage of some women with
young children is above their offered market wage. In other words,
they are out of the labor force because it “does not pay” for them to be
employed. Therefore, companies may be able to bring these women
Table 2.2 Weekly Full-Time Child Care Costs for Children under Five 
Years of Age with Employed Mothers in the United States,a 
Spring 1997
Type of arrangement Mean weekly expenditureb
All children $70.13




Family day care $68.62
Other nonrelative $51.38
Day care center $86.44
Nursery/preschool $56.19
a Includes only respondents paying for care.
b Includes only children with a regular child care arrangement.
c Excludes fathers and siblings.
SOURCE: Smith (2002).
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into the labor market through subsidies for work-related child care
expenditures.2 We now describe to what extent firms have done so in
the form of providing employer-sponsored on-site child care.
TRENDS IN THE PROVISION OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
CHILD CARE (ESCC)
In 1978, the U.S. Department of Labor identified 105 companies in
the United States with ESCC programs. Since then, the number has
increased dramatically. According to the Conference Board, the total
grew to 600 in 1982, to 2,000 in 1984, to 2,500 in 1985, and to 3,500 in
1988 (Wash and Brand 1990). Ten years later, in 1998, approximately
8,000 firms provided on-site child care, and many others offered some
other form of child care assistance (McIntyre 2000). Despite this sub-
stantial growth, ESCC is still only provided by a small percentage of
firms. A study that surveyed 1,057 for-profit companies and not-for-
profit organizations with 100 or more employees found that child care
was provided by just 9 percent of the total surveyed (McIntyre 2000).
These statistics raise two questions: what caused the upturn in the
number of companies offering ESCC, and simultaneously, why is the
percentage of companies offering ESCC still so small? We believe that
the increase in the number of companies offering ESCC is related to
the trends in women’s employment previously outlined. A greater per-
centage of the workforce is female, and many of these women have
young children. The tight labor markets of the 1990s also, undoubtedly,
contributed to the search for new benefits to draw women not in the
labor force into employment. For example, consider the situation of
Lancaster Laboratories, a firm of 150 employees in 1986, which found
that it was losing skilled workers who left the company after having a
baby. Its employees were mainly young and mostly women, and a sur-
vey found that many of them planned to have a child in the next five
years but, also, that they planned to continue being employed if they
could find child care. The company responded by opening an on-site
center. The firm now reports an annual turnover rate of only 8 percent,
which is half of the average for this industry (U.S. Department of Trea-
sury 1998).
The Labor Market and Child Care Context in the United States 19
Beginning in the mid 1980s, publications aimed at human resource
managers urged corporate officers to consider child care benefits as
part of their new efforts to address work/family conflict (see, for exam-
ple: Adolf and Rose 1985; Galinsky 1986; and Ribaric 1987). In 1994,
Creed, Allen, and Whitney listed on-site day care and flexible working
hours as the two biggest areas for growth in benefits plans. Further-
more, there has also been limited evidence of public support for such
initiatives. For example, a 1996 Gallup Poll indicated that almost 60
percent of workers surveyed would be willing to contribute some per-
centage of their income to support on-site child care, with little differ-
ence in results between those with and without young children
(McIntyre 2000).
The answer to why the number is still so small is, in part, that
employer-sponsored on-site child care does not make sense for every
firm. The value of ESCC will depend on firm size, employee demo-
graphics, and location. Some areas may have adequate supplies of
community-based child care or may find themselves with plenty of job
applicants. Even firms that might benefit from ESCC may not adopt it
because they find it difficult to measure the benefits and, thus, they
cannot evaluate whether it would be cost effective. In a survey of over
1,000 firms, each with more than 100 employees, one-third of them
cited cost as the main business obstacle to implementing ESCC. Also
listed were administrative hassles, competitive pressures, and a belief
that the programs are not cost effective (U.S. Department of Treasury
1998). However, the majority (76 percent) of firms that reported offer-
ing ESCC believed that these programs are either cost neutral or have
benefits to the firm that outweigh the costs (Families and Work Insti-
tute 1998).
There is also a reluctance to experiment with benefits because it is
more costly to employee morale to eliminate an existing benefit than it
is advantageous to add one. Flynn (1995) reflects this reluctance as he
cautions human resource managers to move carefully on child care. He
states that while such programs are popular with employees, many
companies are reluctant to invest in them because there is not a clear
understanding of the return they will bring. In terms of on-site centers,
the primary concern is that the benefit affects only a small proportion
of most workforces. Therefore, according to Flynn, an on-site child
care program may be most effective for organizations with a large
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number of employees with dependent children. Similarly, Benson and
Whatley (1994) and Sprague (1998), urge human resource managers to
carefully determine which child care option best satisfies their firm’s
requirements. According to Benson and Whatley (1994), Sprague
(1998), and McIntyre (2000), the advantages of on-site child care are
its convenience, reliability, high visibility, and ability to control. The
disadvantages include limited capacity and options, potential inequal-
ity, and relatively high costs. Many of the articles we surveyed suggest
a need for more systematic studies of child care benefits to assess
whether they have the expected effect on recruitment, retention, absen-
teeism, and productivity in order to better understand their value to
firms and, implicitly, to employees.
Notes
1. See Presser (1988, 1989, 1995) for an analysis of couples working at different
times of the day to cover their child-care needs with less or no use of nonparental
child care.
2. The emphasis here is on the word may. Child care costs are only one of the rea-
sons young mothers may not be in the labor market. Some will choose to stay at
home even if offered free child care because of other costs of employment, the
opportunity cost of home production foregone, and/or the value they receive from




Economic Framework for the 
Valuation of ESCC 
Child care is not for everybody in every location. The things that make
child care work for us are the low turnover rate, the high female work
population, the fact that most of these jobs, the line jobs, require a great
level of energy and appeal to women that are in their childbearing age.
When they get beyond their childbearing age, it is hard for them to do
some of the production jobs that are here. So, our work population stays
currently in that group that needs child care. 
—Action Industries human resource officer
In this chapter, we first develop a theoretical framework for ana-
lyzing firm behavior regarding employer-sponsored on-site child care,
building on the economic theory of employee benefits. We then sum-
marize past research on the benefits of ESCC and briefly discuss how
the analysis presented here differs from previous work. The purpose is
to place the analysis presented in later chapters into perspective, in
terms of economic theory and of research in this field. 
MODELING THE FIRM’S CHOICE OF BENEFITS AS A 
COST-MINIMIZING STRATEGY
Economic models of employee benefits begin with the assumption
that firms seek to maximize profits by reducing costs of producing a
given quantity of goods. Given this cost-minimizing perspective, a
firm would choose to provide compensation in the form of benefits
rather than wages if there is some financial advantage to doing so.
Many types of financial advantages are possible. A given benefit may
increase work incentives, thereby reducing shirking or absenteeism
and/or increasing worker productivity per hour. There may be a tax or
cost advantage to the firm or to the employee of benefit versus wage
compensation. Finally, the benefit could reduce turnover costs or allow
the firm to attract similar workers with a lower-cost compensation
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package. Turnover would be reduced if the benefit increases the value
of the employer/employee match to the worker; examples include a
pension that takes years to be fully vested or health insurance that
excludes existing conditions and, thus, encourages workers to remain
with their current employer once covered. 
 A number of studies have focused on the effectiveness of ESCC in
reducing absenteeism or turnover and in increasing the level of com-
mitment the employee feels to the firm. These articles are reviewed in
the next section. There is also the tax advantage to the employer and to
the employee of providing compensation in the form of a benefit
instead of as money earnings. In addition to the standard tax advantage
of any benefit, in some states there are special tax advantages for
employers for ESCC, but these are typically small.1 Given the lack of
economies of scale in the provision of child care, it is unlikely that
there are important cost advantages to firms offering child care over
other providers in the child care market.2 However, other child care
providers offer a slightly different service than does an on-site center.
Only the employer can provide employer-sponsored child care, and
only the employer can provide child care that is located at the place of
work. Workers may value these two aspects of ESCC if they are
thought of as increasing the quality of the child care arrangement
through the employer sponsorship, or as lowering the cost per unit of
quality through the on-site location. If workers do value these aspects
of ESCC, then, holding everything else constant, an employer that pro-
vides ESCC could reduce its compensation package in other ways and
attract and retain similar workers. Our study of parental choice of on-
site child care focuses on the employer-sponsored and on-site nature of
ESCC provision.
In addition to providing the valued commodities of employer spon-
sorship and convenience of location, the employer that provides an
ESCC benefit in a tight labor market may be able to reap substantial
direct cost savings on their total compensation bill and recruitment
costs. The main argument here is that the firm saves money by target-
ing the benefit, which is a form of additional compensation, at the
group it most wants to attract into the labor market without having to
offer higher wages to all of its current employees. Consider a firm with
two types of workers, those with young children, YC, and those with-
out, N. Assume that YC and N are perfect substitutes in the production
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function so that the level of output, Q = f(YC + N, K), where K is capi-
tal equipment. In order to attract more women with young children into
the labor market, the firm must raise the compensation of workers with
young children, CYC. Other workers are already in the labor market and
thus do not require an increase in compensation, CN. However, in an
industry where workers are paid a common production wage, that is, a
payment per item produced, the firm cannot simply raise wages for one
group, wYC, without also increasing wages for the other group, wN. In
other words, the production wage, w, is such that w= wN= wYC. Thus, to
attract new workers into the labor market using higher money wages,
the firm would have to give all workers a raise. However, if CYC = wYC
+ BYC, where BYC is the per-hour value of employee benefits, and CN=
wN + BN, the firm could increase CYC without increasing CN by choos-
ing a benefit expenditure valued by workers with young children. It
seems reasonable that under some circumstances the fixed cost to the
firm of the benefit will be less than the cost of increasing the produc-
tion wage for all employees. 
Even in industries where wages are not production-based, a firm
may find it difficult to raise one group of workers’ wages without rais-
ing those of other workers. The firm may be concerned with antidis-
crimination laws or may be worried about loss of productivity of some
workers if they learn about the relative differences in their wages.
Research in this area often talks about the ripple effect that an increase
in the minimum wage can have on nonminimum wage workers. Simi-
larly, one could argue that firms trying to attract women with young
children into the labor market with higher money wage offers may be
concerned about bidding up their entire wage distribution. 
If a potential worker’s employment decision is affected by the cost
of child care, then employers should be able to entice some individuals
into the labor market by offering an ESCC. What evidence do we have
that the compensation level affects the decision of women with young
children to enter the labor market? Standard economic theory suggests
that the high costs of child care decrease the effective hourly return to
employment, thus reducing the probability that a woman with young
children participates in the labor market. Empirically, one of the most
stable results from studies of the determinants of women’s labor force
participation in the United States has been the negative effect of young
children on participation. This relationship continues to be significant
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for the presence of very young children despite the substantial increase
in the labor force participation of women with young children. In addi-
tion, a more recent set of empirical studies has focused on the effect of
child care costs on women’s labor market behavior and has consis-
tently found a significant negative effect of the cost of child care on a
woman’s decision to participate in the labor force.3
Our study of the contingent valuation of the ESCC benefit focuses
on the money savings to the firm for providing ESCC instead of raising
the money wage. The lower total wage bill is potentially one of the
most important benefits that a firm would expect to gain through an
ESCC, but it is not the benefit that firms publicize, nor one that has
been studied. Firms tend to talk about happier employees and better
cared-for children, with the inevitable picture of the company president
surrounded by a group of darling toddlers. The research we discuss has
tended to focus on reduced turnover and absenteeism, and on higher
levels of organizational commitment. To calculate the value to firms of
the savings in the wage bill, we must know what increase in wages the
firm would have had to offer to attract another worker, and by how
much other wages would have been bid up as a result of this increase.
To estimate the former, one must know the value the new hire receives
from the child care benefit. Although it is tempting, it is incorrect to
simply use the per-employee cost of the employer subsidy as a proxy
for the value to the employee (Samulari and Manser 1989). Some
employees may value the ESCC more than the subsidy if, for example,
the firm’s endorsement of the child care center gives them a greater
sense of trust about their child’s well-being or if the on-site location
adds significantly to the value of the child care. Other employees may
value it less than the subsidy if, for example, they could have used a
relative or a friend to provide lower cost child care than the full cost of
the ESCC, or if they do not have young children. 
The full savings to the total wage bill can be calculated by multi-
plying the value of the benefit to the new hire, BYC, by either the total
number of employee hours, YC + N, if we assume an across-the-board
pay increase would have been needed, or the total number of entry-
level employee hours, if we assume that only entry-level wages would
have had to increase to accomplish the goal of hiring new employees.4
Under the former assumption, which we argue is more appropriate in
this industry and labor market, the idea is that, were it not for the
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ESCC, wYC would have to be raised to attract the new hire, but then all
employees would receive the higher wYC because wYC= wN; that is, the
firm cannot distinguish between the employees in a way that is feasible
or perhaps legal. The full value to the employer of offering ESCC then
would be the sum of the savings in direct compensation and the cost
savings accruing to the firm from other positive effects of the benefit,
such as increased worker productivity through improved worker
morale, reduced absenteeism, and lower turnover rates, and savings in
direct recruitment costs. Thus, while the value that the new hire places
on the ESCC is not the only source of cost savings for the firm from
offering an ESCC, it is at least theoretically an important part of the
story. We use the results of the contingent valuation multivariate analy-
sis to estimate the value of the ESCC to individuals who have been
employed by the firm for less than two years and use this amount to
calculate the firm’s total savings in wage compensation. 
While the firm’s main concern may be new hires, from the work-
ers’ perspective, both new and long-term employees have the potential
to gain from the offering of an additional benefit. Firms (and govern-
ments) may also be interested in this information as indicative of the
level of externalities, both positive and negative, that would be gener-
ated by the benefit. Furthermore, employee valuation of the benefit
may give the firm some indication of the potential for accruing other
cost savings, as previously described, such as the reduction in absen-
teeism and lower turnover rates. One might conjecture that employees
who value a benefit highly will be less likely to leave the firm for
employment elsewhere. Thus, we argue that there is interest in calcu-
lating the value of ESCC to all employees, not just to newly hired
employees. The methodology for calculating that value is discussed in
Chapter 6, and the results are presented in Chapter 7.
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
ON THE BENEFITS OF ESCC 
In previous research on employer-sponsored on-site child care, the
primary benefit ascribed from this to the firm is increased productivity
of workers whose concerns about work/family conflict are eased. This
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improvement, it is argued, leads to savings on the part of the company
sponsoring the child care, savings that may be greater than the cost of
the program. In addition, the firm may save money in the area of
recruitment and training if ESCC helps the firm retain productive
workers.
Increased productivity is difficult to measure in the service sector,
but even in manufacturing, highly decentralized industrial processes
with large components of support services make it difficult to observe
marginal productivity directly. Instead, most studies of the effects of
employee benefits have focused on proxies for productivity, such as
turnover, absenteeism, performance levels, and tardiness. In addition,
some attempts have been made to include measurement of employee
attitudes, such as job motivation or satisfaction (Kossek and Nichol
1992; Rothausen et al. 1998; Rubin et al. 1989).
Past research can be divided into two types of analyses: employer-
based and employee-based. The former seeks to test theories of bene-
fits package selection by employers and looks at the choice to offer
family-responsive benefits as a function of observable characteristics
of the firm. The latter tries to measure employee response to the provi-
sion of family-friendly benefits. Both types of studies suffer from stan-
dard problems of statistical analysis: low response rates and the
potential biasing effects of unobservable variables and endogeneity. In
addition, sample sizes may be limited by the size of the firm itself. 
Employer-Based Research
Several researchers have tried to model what type of firm is most
likely to offer a child care benefit as part of its benefits package. Propo-
nents of the rational choice model argue that firms most likely to expe-
rience cost savings as a result of providing the benefit are the most
likely to offer it. Glass and Fujimoto (1995) test the rational choice
model against two alternative theories that can be characterized as
bureaucratic control and paternalism. The bureaucratic control theory
argues that employers offer family-responsive policies as a way to
maintain bureaucratic control of the employees. The theory of paternal-
ism suggests that family responsiveness is embedded in the individual
values and norms of the employer. Glass and Fujimoto attempt to test
among these three explanations for firms choosing ESCC and others
Economic Framework for the Valuation of ESCC 27
that have not. This is a difficult task owing to a lack of observable char-
acteristics of the firm that can differentiate among the three theories.
Our reading of their empirical evidence is that rational choice is at least
still in the running. 
One of the variables that significantly affects the probability that a
firm offers ESCC in Glass and Fujimoto’s study is whether the
employees are unionized. The researchers find that unionized firms are
less likely to provide ESCC and argue that because of the majority
rules aspect of union operations, such organizations are less likely to
support a benefit that directly affects only some of the employees.
Glass and Fujimoto also find that firm size is positively related to child
care benefits while, surprisingly, female concentration of the workforce
has no effect on child care benefits. In a similar study, Seyler, Monroe
and Garand (1995) find a significant positive effect of female concen-
tration on the probability of a firm offering family benefits. In this
study, in which human resource officers at 290 firms were surveyed,
the size of the company and the percentage of female employees are
consistently positively related to the offering of family benefits. Other
variables—the average age of employees, the firm’s level of invest-
ment in recruiting and training, and the educational level required for
employees—are not significant predictors. 
The Business Work-Life Study (Families and Work Institute 1998)
considered the question of what companies are most likely to provide
work-life programs, more broadly defined. Industry, company size, and
the proportion of the top executive positions filled by women and
minorities were found to be important predictors of work-life pro-
grams. Six times as many companies with a majority of women in top
executive positions provide on- or near-site child care as those with no
women in top management (Families and Work Institute 1998, p. XII).
The direction of causality is not clear because the availability of on-site
care may encourage women with children to take (and keep) jobs at the
company, or the presence of women in top positions may mean that
management is more aware of child care concerns.
Finally, Auerbach (1990) surveyed 90 employers in 1986 in a local
labor market in order to determine which firms are most likely to pro-
vide child care benefits. Firms with a higher concentration of women
employees, that are non-unionized, that offer other creative benefits,
and that have relatively progressive employment policies and philoso-
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phies are more likely to offer child care benefits. Five reasons were
given by employers for sponsoring child care: 1) recruitment and reten-
tion of personnel; 2) reduction of absenteeism and turnover; 3) sense of
social responsibility; 4) public relations; and 5) demand from current
employees. The first element, recruitment and retention, is the primary
reason stated. Barriers to providing child care include lack of perceived
demand, costs, equity concerns, liability, licensing, and space (Auer-
bach 1990). 
Employee-Based Research
Turning to employee response to family benefits, there have been
only a few studies that have tried to measure the effect of ESCC pro-
grams on proxies of productivity, e.g., labor force participation, absen-
teeism, turnover, and commitment to employer. Several others have
looked at family-friendly benefits more generally. Of the studies that
have focused on ESCC, most have shown its beneficial effects on turn-
over, recruitment, satisfaction, and morale (Auerbach 1990; Friedman
1989; Goff, Mount, and Jamison 1990; Marquart 1988; Milkovich and
Gomez 1976; Rothausen et al. 1998; Roth and Preston 1989; Shellen-
barger 1992; Youngblood and Chambers-Cook 1974). For example,
Roth and Preston (1989) found a decrease in turnover of 3 to 8 percent
after the adoption of an on-site child care center. They also found
greater job satisfaction and job commitment after the adoption of on-
site child care. Rothausen et al. (1998) measured employee attitudes
both toward the on-site center specifically, and more generally toward
the firm and the working environment. They found that the use of the
center is not related to general work attitudes, although it was related to
workers’ perceptions of a recruiting and retention effect of offering on-
site child care and to their satisfaction with the amount of support the
company provides for day care programs. Lehrer, Santero, and Mohan-
Neill (1991) looked at annual hours worked and attachment to
employer for registered nurses. They found that employer-sponsored
child care significantly increased both measures of labor supply.
The findings on the effect of ESCC on productivity, absenteeism,
and performance are more mixed. For example, Krug, Palmour, and
Ballassai (1972) find no statistically significant impact of ESCC partic-
ipation on tardiness and absenteeism. In contrast, Milkovich and
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Gomez (1976) find a statistically significant difference in the absentee-
ism and turnover rates for 30 participants in ESCC compared to that of
a group of 30 employees with children not participating in the program.
Miller (1984) argues that both of these early studies suffer from serious
statistical and research design flaws. Goff, Mount, and Jamison (1990)
surveyed 253 employees with children under age six of a large Mid-
western electronics firm.5 Comparing users of the on-site center to non-
users, they find no significant differences in the level of work/family
conflict, pre-treatment absenteeism, and post-treatment absenteeism.
On the other hand, they find more generally that the level of work/fam-
ily conflict experienced by employed parents is significantly related to
absenteeism. The level of work/family conflict is linked to supportive
supervision and satisfaction with one’s own child care arrangement. If
the level of satisfaction with the on-site child care center is greater than
the average level of satisfaction with child care arrangements in gen-
eral, then on-site centers would reduce absenteeism. Kossek and
Nichol (1992) used a matched supervisor/employee data set with 155
employee respondents. Like Milkovich and Gomez (1976), they find
the use of on-site child care to be unrelated to performance, but, unlike
Milkovich and Gomez, they also find no direct effect on absenteeism.
In addition, they find a “frustration” effect among those employees
whose children are on the waiting list for the center. These wait-listed
employees were less likely to perceive the child care benefit as fair and
had lower ratings of the attractiveness of the benefit to the firm. 
Looking at studies of family-friendly benefits more generally,
Greenberger et al. (1989) surveyed 321 employed parents of preschool
children. Their goal was to assess the contribution of informal social
workplace support and formal family-responsive benefits on job-
related attitudes and personal well-being of employed parents. They
find that women make significantly greater use of family-responsive
benefits than do men. In addition, greater formal workplace support
increases the level of organizational commitment among both married
and single women, and increases job satisfaction and well-being
among married women. Furthermore, they conclude that informal
social workplace support and formal benefits have an additive effect on
well-being and are not redundant. Using the same data, Goldberg et al.
(1989) report on the responses to questions about how much of which
employer benefit and policy would entice workers to leave their
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present employer for another who offered the particular benefit or pol-
icy. They find that working parents with young children look to the
workplace for assistance with child care. Thirty to 40 percent of men
and women indicate that they would leave their jobs to change to
another one that offered child care near the job site.
Grover and Crooker (1995) used data from the General Social Sur-
vey, 1991, to examine the impact of family-responsive policies on
employees’ level of work commitment, as measured by an eight-ques-
tion index of organizational commitment, and on turnover intention, as
measured in a single question: “How likely is it that you will try hard to
find a job in another organization within the next 12 months?” They
find that all employees at firms that offer child care benefits (not just
on-site child care) are more committed to the firm and are significantly
less likely to say that they intend to quit.
As has been noted in the literature reviews of studies attempting to
measure the relationship between employee benefits and employment
outcomes and costs, inadequate data and insufficiently rigorous
research methodologies have made it difficult to definitively establish a
link between ESCC and enhanced productivity, even as measured
through its proxies (Rubin et al. 1989; Friedman 1987; Miller 1984;
Williams and MacDermid 1994). Problems often cited include small
sample size, the absence of data from before the program was imple-
mented, the lack of an appropriate comparison group, the problem of
the self-selection of employees into the program, and the difficulty in
identifying the source of change when firms offer a large variety of
employee benefits, many of which are aimed at easing work/family
conflict. These problems are difficult to overcome, making the evalua-
tion of ESCC a challenging research task.
In this study, we propose two very different approaches to analyz-
ing the value of ESCC. The first approach, as discussed in Chapter 5, is
to look at who uses on-site center care in two manufacturing firms that
have such a center. Employee use of on-site center care is compared to
use of center-based child care by employee parents at another manufac-
turing firm in the same industry and general vicinity that does not have
an on-site center. We find that employees at the companies with on-site
centers are much more likely to use center care than are employees at
the company without an on-site center. Because the costs of the on-site
care are similar to the average cost of paid day care in the area, we
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argue that our finding is evidence of the value of “on-siteness” and
“employer sponsorship,” and of the perceived benefit of center care
more generally.
The second strategy for measuring the value of the benefit of an
on-site center is to simply ask employees the value that they receive (or
would receive) from an actual (or hypothetical) on-site center using the
contingent valuation technique. The contingent valuation methodology
(CVM) is explained in detail in Chapter 6, and the CVM results from
the employees of the three manufacturing firms are examined in Chap-
ter 7. One of the advantages of this approach is that it allows us to
observe the value of the benefit to non-users in addition to users. In
keeping with Grover and Crooker’s (1995) results, we find that non-
users, as well as users, ascribe substantial benefits to being employed
by a firm that sponsors an on-site center. 
The strategies we propose for studying the value of ESCC add to
the menu of techniques available to researchers and to the firms them-
selves. The contingent valuation technique can be used by any mid- or
large-sized firm, whether or not it has an on-site center. In addition, this
strategy can be used to value other family-responsive policies. Observ-
ing parental usage of on-site centers is also important for understanding
the value parents ascribe to “on-siteness” and “employer sponsorship”
because these are qualities that only an employer or set of employers
can provide. Given the increased demands on parents’ time, conve-
nience and reliability, in addition to quality, are predicted to be impor-
tant attributes, which parents will “shop” for as they choose child care. 
Notes
1. See Chapter 8 for further discussion of the government’s role in the provision of
child care in the United States.
2. This is quite different from health insurance, where there are clear cost advan-
tages of increasing the size of the risk pool.
3. See Connelly and Kimmel (2003) for a recent review of this literature.
4. An alternative way of calculating the wage savings to the firm would be to sum
individual employee values of the ESCC. In a perfectly competitive labor market,
where each worker is paid the value of his or her marginal revenue product, the
value of the employer-provided benefit to the worker results in a direct wage sav-
ings to the firm, equal in amount to the employee’s valuation of the benefit (Sum-
mers 1989). However, if firms offer compensation through a broadly known wage
structure in which all workers in the same category receive the same wages, and
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in which a hierarchical wage scale is maintained, then individual workers’ wages
will not be discounted by their own valuation of the ESCC.
5. Some caution is needed in interpreting the results as the response rate in this study
was only 28 percent.
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Description of Study Sites 
and Data Collection
DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY AND FIRMS
The three firms included in our study produce essentially the same
goods, using the same technology, and are each located within a rela-
tively small geographic area surrounding a mid-sized city in the South-
east of the United States. The three firms are all in the same Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and are within 20 miles or less
of each other. The industry can best be characterized as light manufac-
turing, with the majority of the workforce having at most a high school
education. The majority of nonmanagerial workers in the industry are
women, although there are specific steps of the production process,
such as loading, that are staffed primarily by men. Most of the produc-
tion workers are paid by the piece, rather than according to an hourly
wage rate. In recent years, many firms in the industry, including those
studied here, experimented with a team-based production wage where
two or three workers are paid for their joint output. Our discussions
with employees suggest that, overall, both workers and managers are
satisfied with this approach, and the firms continue to use it in some
situations.
The majority of U.S. companies in the industry are concentrated in
or near this SMSA. The domestic industry still manufactures the bulk
of the products sold in the United States but struggles with growing
competition from abroad. The industry faces increasing pressure from
the wholesale buyers of its products as consumer demand and the
nature of the retail market have changed. The regional labor market is
also highly competitive. Real hourly wages in this state for production
workers in the industry increased gradually but steadily during the
1990s, from about $8.20 to about $9.30. These average real wages
were consistently higher than those for the comparable industry classi-
fication nationally. The unemployment rate in the state tends to be
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lower than the national level, with the rate in this region of the state
lower still. For example, in 1998 the national unemployment rate was
4.5 percent, the unemployment rate in the state was 3.5 percent, and in
the SMSA where the industry is concentrated (and our three firms are
located), the rate was 2.7 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2002).
The forces of greater foreign competition, decreasing consumer
demand, increased market power of retailers, and an extremely tight
labor market have combined to create a sense of a struggle to survive in
the industry; firms are always looking for innovations that will help
them to meet their demand for labor and maintain or strengthen their
competitive position in the global market. Such innovations take many
forms, including the adoption of new technology, restructuring of work
times, and considering alternative packages of employee benefits.
There are approximately 60 firms in this industry in our study area,
and the industry is one of the primary employers in the region. Only 2
of the 60 firms have on-site child care, both of which are included in
the study. No other firms offer any type of child care benefit, although
several have considered doing so. Firms in the industry range in size
from a maximum of about 800 employees to fewer than 50. All three
firms studied here are larger than the average firm in the industry,
allowing us to gather sufficient information for multivariate statistical
analysis. At the time of our surveys, Action Industries had a workforce
of about 600, Bell Manufacturing had about 300 employees, and Cen-
tral Products had about 640 employees.1 Action and Bell had on-site
child care centers and Central did not.
Action Industries and Central Products are family-held companies.
Bell Manufacturing had recently gone public at the time of our inter-
views, although the child care center had been established before this.
Each company offers a modest set of benefits that includes a 401(k)
retirement plan and health insurance. Workers do not receive any paid
sick time or flexible vacation time. Each company shuts down for a
companywide vacation, typically for two weeks a year, and workers
receive their average earnings for those two weeks. Action also offers
flextime to its workers, and a subsidized fitness center and cafeteria.
Bell offers some employees flextime and a slightly discounted partici-
pation in community center fitness programs. Central has a subsidized
cafeteria, short-term disability insurance, and some flexibility in the
scheduling of work hours. These benefits packages, except for the
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child care centers, are similar to those available at other large compa-
nies in the industry. The smaller firms generally have less generous
401(k) matching and lower quality health insurance. Regarding wages,
because most workers are paid “by the piece” and piece rates vary
within the firm from one product to another, it is difficult to derive an
exact comparison of wages across firms. However, workers and man-
agement alike reported their perception that wages were very similar
across firms in this industry. Central’s human resource officer indicated
concern over the possibility that workers might leave his company for
another in the industry in response to a very small difference in wages.
Action and Bell administrators reported being less concerned about
small differences in wages, feeling that the on-site center provided
them some cushion. Still, at each firm we encountered employees who
had worked at several other firms in the area.
Because the three firms are located in the same geographic area,
employees with young children face the same market options for child
care (e.g., large day care centers, individuals who run small child care
facilities in their homes, and professional in-home care providers). Par-
ents, however, differ substantially in their access to low- or zero-priced
care by relatives and in their eligibility for state government child care
subsidies. In addition, of course, those working for Action Industries or
Bell Manufacturing have an on-site center available to them.
DESCRIPTION OF ESCC CENTERS
The descriptions of the Action and Bell on-site child care centers
reflect conditions at the time of data collection (1996 for Action and
1997 for Bell). Information about ESCC at each firm was obtained
from interviews with the directors of the child care centers and the
chief human resource officers, from company literature about the cen-
ters, and from direct observation of each center. The on-site child care
center at Action Industries opened in 1979 and had about 80 children
enrolled at the time of the survey. The owner of the company told us
that he started the day care center in order to attract women employees
in a very tight labor market. He recalled the unemployment rate being
quite low in 1979, when the company began manufacturing the product
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instead of simply wholesaling it. He indicated that it was a fairly
impulsive decision, not one subject to detailed cost-benefit analysis,
but a choice to which he remains committed and to which he attributes
much of his business success.
Action’s child care center charged a set rate per preschool child
(ages six weeks through five years) for full-time care during the work
week, with some discounting for multiple children: $47.50 per week
for the first child, $86.50 per week for two children (a discount of
$4.25 per child, per week), and $112.00 per week for three children (a
discount of $10.17 per child, per week). Part-time care during the work
week was also available. Its hours of operation were from 6:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. These hours straddle the work time
of first-shift workers, who have some degree of flexibility in their indi-
vidual starting and ending times. In addition to providing part-time or
full-time care for preschool children, the center also offered after-
school and “snow day” care for children aged 6 to 13. There are several
indicators of relatively high quality of care at Action Industries com-
pared to other center-based facilities in the area. For example, the ratio
of children to care providers is lower for each age group than required
by state regulations, and the child care providers are paid at a higher
rate than average for such workers in the area. There was a waiting list
for the children of 10 employees for the on-site center at Action at the
time of the survey. Parent fees do not fully cover the operating costs of
the child care center, and the space and maintenance of the facility are
provided by the firm at no cost. Action Industries estimates that it sub-
sidizes almost 50 percent of the total cost of the center, which at the
time of the survey was a subsidy of about $130,000 per year.
 The Bell Manufacturing child care center opened in 1989 and had
60 children under six years of age enrolled at the time of the survey.
There was some sense among administrators with whom we spoke that
Bell’s rationale for opening the center was to better compete with
Action Industries for workers, although the owner of Action was con-
sulted by the owners of Bell during the process of establishing the cen-
ter. According to Action’s owner, “We did help them [Bell] develop it
[the on-site center]; they are good friends of ours. They have expanded
it to the point where it’s about the same size as we have.” The labor
market in the area at the time Bell opened its center was even tighter
than in the late 1970s, with state unemployment rates of 3.6 percent for
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1988 and 3.5 percent for 1989, compared to 5.5 and 5.3 percent nation-
ally for these years (U.S. Department of Labor 2002). The Bell center
charged a set rate per preschool child of $49 for full-time care with a 5
percent discount for the second and third children. Saturday care was
available at the time of the survey. Its hours of operation were Monday
through Friday, 5:45 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. (35 percent of Bell employees
report having flextime, with the first shift beginning between 6:00 and
8:00 a.m.), and also on Saturday while a shift was working. Like that at
Action Industries, the Bell Manufacturing center is a relatively high
quality facility based on lower child/staff ratios than required by law
and a high level of staff education. Child care providers are full-time
employees of the company, receiving higher pay than other providers
in the area and full benefits. At Bell, there was a waiting list for the
children of three employees at the time of the survey. Bell reported
subsidizing the center at about the same percentage rate as Action, or
by as much as $100,000 per year at the time of the survey. The Bell
Center also was receiving $25,000 from the federal food stamp pro-
gram a year and about $20,000 a year over a four-year period from the
state child care quality enhancement fund. The director reported that
the center occasionally enrolled children from the community. These
children were charged $20 more per week, reflecting the firm’s public
statement of the level of subsidy.
The third firm, Central Products, does not have an on-site child
care center. As previously discussed, Central’s benefits package is
somewhat more generous than average among the companies in the
area, but it is similar to that of Action Industries and Bell Manufactur-
ing. At the time of our survey in 1998 (and still today), Central was not
interested in sponsoring a child care center, or in subsidizing child care
more generally. The human resource officer at Central indicated that he
felt very confident that the firm’s benefits dollars are better spent else-
where, such as for short-term disability insurance. Many of his
employees disagreed and spoke about the important benefit that could
be gained from an on-site child care center. Central Products, therefore,
serves as an ideal comparison case to firms with on-site centers for the
analysis of the type of child care selected by working parents and for
the assessment of the value of an employer-sponsored on-site center. 
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DESCRIPTION OF DATA COLLECTION
Data collection took place during the summers of 1996, 1997, and
1998, with the employees of one firm interviewed each year. Inter-
views with individual employees were conducted in person at each
firm on company time, during every work shift and drawing from all
departments. This strategy was selected in order to maximize participa-
tion given budget and time constraints, while achieving a high degree
of representativeness of workers. We interviewed approximately 60
percent of the workforce at Action Industries, 75 percent at Bell Manu-
facturing, and 65 percent at Central Products, which, in each case, rep-
resented our data collection capacity given the time constraints of the
firms, and nearly universal participation of targeted employees.
The survey instrument was highly comparable across firms, with
minimal tailoring by site to take into account firm-specific characteris-
tics, and with slight changes made from one firm to the next in order to
benefit from insights gained at each company. Each survey collected
detailed socioeconomic and demographic information about the
employee, the employee’s spouse or partner (if applicable), and demo-
graphic data about the employee’s household. For those employees
with children under age 13, information was collected on the primary
and secondary child care arrangements during the employee’s normal
work times, as well as on the type of care if the employee worked over-
time on Saturdays. For the purposes of this analysis, we concentrate on
children under six years old. In addition, questions were asked about
alternative sources of child care in the area, including the availability
of relatives and friends to care for one’s child. Cost information was
collected for each type of child care used, and respondents were asked
about anticipated costs of alternative sources of care.
Table 4.1 highlights selected characteristics of respondents at each
of the three firms (more detailed descriptive statistics are provided in
Chapters 5 and 7). The employees at the three firms are quite similar in
terms of being predominantly female, White Caucasian, and without
any college education. They are also of a comparable age and are simi-
lar in the percentage with young children. There are some interesting
differences across firms in the distribution of racial and ethnic groups
and in the percentage of employees who are male. The two are some-
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what correlated given that Central Products has the largest proportion
of Hmong workers, and Hmong men are doing some of the jobs in the
factory that have been traditionally filled by women. The large Hmong
presence also contributes to the somewhat greater percentage of work-
ers at Central Products and Action Industries with children under the
age of six, and the substantially greater mean number of young chil-
dren at these two firms. The Hmong marry quite young, often at 13 or
14 years of age for women, and have very high fertility. We talked with
a number of young Hmong women, aged 18 to 21, with four or five
children already. Excluding the Hmong, the mean number of children
under age six in our three samples is 0.36, 0.29, and 0.22, respectively,
consistent with arguments about the recruitment and retention potential
of ESCC among workers with young children.
The large Hmong presence at Action Industries and Central Prod-
ucts is somewhat problematic for our statistical analysis of child care
arrangements in that Hmong parents have a very strong cultural prefer-
ence for care by relatives for their children. Despite their employment
at Action, no Hmong children (out of 43 under the age of six) are
enrolled in the on-site center. Hmong parents rely almost exclusively
on splitting shifts to provide care for their large families. In most cases,








On-site child care center Yes Yes No
% male 19.6 25.1 32.1
Race/ethnicity
% Hispanic 0.0 4.5 0.0
% African American 4.5 15.1 5.9
% Hmong 9.9 0.0 21.4
% White Caucasian 83.7 80.4 70.7
% other 1.9 0.0 2.0
Mean age (years) 35.7 38.1 37.0
% with children under 6 years old 33.3 24.6 27.0
Mean number of children under
 6 years old
0.45 0.29 0.40
% with college degree 7.1 3.5 2.0
Number of employees in sample 312 199 393
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the father works the first shift, and the mother works the second shift.
This is not the only pattern, but it seems to be the preferred one. Nearly
70 percent of Hmong children of employees at Central and 40 percent
of Hmong children of employees at Action are cared for by their father
while their mother is at work. Most of the remaining Hmong preschool
children are cared for by grandparents and other relatives. Aside from
two Hmong children in center care (but not the on-site center) at
Action, the Hmong children we studied were not cared for at a center
or even by a nonrelative. 
Because of these strong cultural preferences, Chapter 5 analyzes
the child care arrangements of only the non-Hmong employees of all
three firms. However, we include Hmong employees in the analysis in
Chapter 7. They are, of course, employees of the firms and are
expected to have a very different valuation of ESCC as a benefit in
comparison to other employees. The fact that we find the estimated
willingness to pay for an on-site center among the Hmong to be sub-
stantially less than the average for the non-Hmong sample is one piece
of evidence that our contingent valuation methodology is yielding rea-
sonable results. 
A critical part of the survey at each firm was the section that elic-
ited information about the value that employees place on the existing
or hypothetical on-site child care center (the contingent valuation ques-
tions). The structure of this part of the survey is discussed in detail in
Chapter 6. Here we note only that the design of the contingent valua-
tion questions, as well as that of other parts of the survey, was informed
by preliminary fieldwork at each company. The fieldwork consisted of
focus group discussions with a small number of workers, interviews
with representatives of management, and pre-testing of actual survey
questions. In particular, great care was taken both in the construction
and the implementation of the survey to ensure that respondents under-
stood the contingent valuation questions, which are more complex than
most survey questions.
A weakness of the data lies in the relatively small sample size for
multivariate analysis and in the fact that only three firms in one indus-
try and in one local labor market are represented. While we recognize
this limitation, we believe that the unique features of the data are of
sufficient interest to outweigh this drawback. The method we use for
the valuation of on-site child care to employees might be adopted by a
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single firm interested in optimizing benefit dollars. In addition, it is
important to recall that rarely do we have the opportunity to analyze
on-site child care except through a case study approach, given its low
incidence in the general population and the ordinary sample sizes of
representative household surveys about child care. 
Note




Analysis of the Use 
of Employer-Sponsored 
On-Site Child Care
It is good for parents to have kids close by.
Still couldn’t get service for less elsewhere.
Convenience of location.
Trust people.
—Employee comments about the value of the on-site center
This chapter addresses the following question: Does the presence
of an employer-sponsored on-site child care center have an impact on
parental decisions about child care? As such, the analysis focuses on
the child care choices of employees with young children at the three
study sites.1 We see this research as an indirect approach to assessing
the value that workers receive from the availability of an on-site ESCC
center. If parents value the “on-siteness” of the center or its “employer-
sponsoredness,” then they may choose it over other child care options,
including other center settings, of comparable or even lower price. We
know from other sources that parents value convenience and quality of
child care arrangements (Sonenstein 1991). Given the descriptions of
the centers in the previous chapter, and the numerous comments from
employees such as those quoted above, it seems reasonable that parents
would find ESCC to be both convenient and of high quality. 
Our findings show a substantial difference in the usage patterns of
alternative child care modes between the two firms with on-site child
care centers and the one firm without an on-site center. More than 40
percent of the employees with young children at Action Industries and
Bell Manufacturing have children enrolled in the on-site centers. The
child care category receiving many fewer children from Action and
Bell is home-based day care provided by nonrelatives (family day
care). This is in keeping with other research, which shows that family
day care is the category most identified with employment-facilitating
child care, while center care is also viewed as providing education or
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social interaction for young children (Connelly and Kimmel 2003;
Davis and Connelly 2003). We further find that infants are as likely as
older children to be enrolled in the on-site centers. Studies of child care
choice usually find that infants are less likely than older children to be
enrolled in center care (Connelly and Kimmel 2003; Davis and Con-
nelly 2003; Han 1999; Lehrer 1983; Lehrer 1989). Our conclusion is
that these national results are, in part, a reflection of availability rather
than of parental preferences since parents in our study with the option
of enrolling infants in the on-site center do so. The finding that infants
are as likely as older children to be enrolled in the on-site center may
additionally reflect the unique features of on-site centers over commu-
nity-based ones in that parents can more easily see their children dur-
ing the day and that the center has the company “seal of approval.” Our
results also suggest that those using the on-site centers represent a
broad range of workers and are not limited to highly educated, salaried
employees, and that users of the on-site center are less likely to need
secondary child care arrangements.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. We first present a
descriptive analysis of the primary child care arrangements of employ-
ees with young children by firm, comparing the distribution of arrange-
ments to a nationally representative sample and comparing the
employees who work at firms with on-site child care to those who
work at the firm without this benefit. We consider the role of alterna-
tive child care options and the price of such alternatives relative to the
price of the one chosen. This is followed by a discussion of secondary
care arrangements that focuses on differences associated with access to
on-site child care. Systematic information on “back-up” child care
plans is not widely available for the United States; thus, this part of the
descriptive analysis is important even without the consideration of on-
site care. The remainder of the chapter uses a multivariate model to
analyze the determinants of the use of on-site child care by employees
with young children at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing, and
the use of any center-based care by employees at Central Products. We
estimate the model for each firm separately, as well as a model for the
use of any type of center-based child care for the employees at the three
firms combined, controlling for fixed firm effects.
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PRIMARY ARRANGEMENTS
A lot of people don’t have any other choice but Child View [Bell’s on-
site center]. 
The on-site center is more convenient and cost effective for single par-
ents.
—Bell Manufacturing employees’ responses as to why they voted
yes to being willing to help pay for an employer-sponsored on-site
child care center
Like parents throughout the United States, the manufacturing
workers in our study who are parents of young children use a variety of
child care arrangements. Within this range of choices, it is clear that
when an on-site child care center is available to these employees the
distribution of primary child care arrangements looks quite different
than when ESCC is not available. Table 5.1 compares the primary type
of care arrangements used for young children of employed non-Hmong
mothers at the three factories to the national averages we reported on
more fully in Chapter 2.2 This table is limited to children under age five
of women employees to make our data more comparable to national
statistics, which are based on all children under age five with full-time
employed mothers during the spring of 1997.3 
In thinking about the impact of an on-site center on parental choice
of child care, we use Central Products employees as representative of
women factory workers in the area because the vast majority of manu-
facturing workers do not have access to on-site day care. Thus, we
begin our analysis by comparing the child care arrangements of the
children of non-Hmong Central employees (column 3) to the national
averages (column 4).4 That comparison suggests that the distribution of
care arrangements used for children of employees of a manufacturing
firm in a midsized Southeastern city is quite similar to that used for
children of employed mothers nationwide. Non-Hmong mothers at
Central rely slightly more heavily on grandparents and relatives and
less on nonrelatives than do mothers nationally. This difference is, in
part, because of their relatively low incomes, as child care provided by
grandparents and relatives tends to be a less expensive option. It is
also, in part, because of the greater availability of grandparents and rel-
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atives in this area, where most grown children do not move very far
away from their parents.5 
We now compare column 3 with columns 1 and 2, which represent
the distribution of child care arrangements used by employed mothers
at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing, where on-site child care
is available. The most striking difference among these columns is the
use of center care. At Action, 80.5 percent of preschool children of
non-Hmong women employees are enrolled in center care, either at the
on-site day care center or at some other center. The vast majority of
center users (82 percent) are at the on-site center, with 10 more chil-
Table 5.1 Distribution of Primary Type of Child Care Used by 
Non-Hmong Employed Mothers with Children under Age Five
Primary type of 












full-time employed  
mothers
1997








Spouse or child’s other 
parent in your home
3.7 2.6 15.4 15.8
Grandparent 12.2 23.1 20.6 19.1
Relative 0.0 2.6 10.2 8.3
Nonrelative 3.7 5.1 20.5 25.3
At school 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.1
Mother cares for child 
at work
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
Number in sample 82 39 39 —
NOTE: Firm samples for this table are limited to children under age five of employed
mothers to make them comparable with national statistics. For Action Industries, 18
children have been dropped from the sample because their father is the Action Indus-
tries employee. For Bell Manufacturing, 12 children have been dropped for this rea-
son, and at Central Products, 17 children have been dropped. National statistics are
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2002a) and are weighted to be nationally representa-
tive. The national sample does not exclude Hmong mothers, but they constitute a very
small percentage of the total population. Blank cell = not applicable. — = not avail-
able. 
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2002b).
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dren of Action employees in our sample on the waiting list at the time
of our survey.6 Similarly, two-thirds of children of Bell Manufacturing
women employees are enrolled in center care, either at the Bell day
care center or at another center. Again, the majority of center users are
at the on-site facility (61 percent), and there was also a waiting list for
the Bell center. This compares with 30.8 percent of non-Hmong Cen-
tral Products children and 27.0 percent nationally at center-based care.
With such a large percentage of children cared for in the on-site
centers, it is interesting to see which arrangements are less common for
the children of Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing workers.
While the use of other center-based care is still substantial among the
workers of these two firms, it is less heavily relied upon at Action than
at Central Products or nationally. Thus, to some extent, on-site child
care replaces other forms of center-based child care. However, the use
of other center-based care is not the only category of care that is dimin-
ished when on-site child care is available. Grandparent care for Bell
employees is not noticeably diminished compared to Central employ-
ees, but Action employees are less likely to use grandparents as care-
givers. Action and Bell mothers are also less likely to use father care,
relative care other than grandparents, and are much less likely to use
nonrelatives than are Central mothers. These three categories seem to
be less preferred when affordable, convenient center-based care is
available.7
It is important to note that the center care at Action Industries and
Bell Manufacturing, while subsidized by the firms, is not inexpensive.
Table 5.2 shows the mean weekly amount paid for care at both centers.
The average reported weekly expenditure among Action Industries on-
site users is $49.58 and at Bell Manufacturing is $37.51. While this is
less than the weekly expenditures for other center-based care in the
area, non-Hmong parents using child care other than center care pay
substantially less per week. Action parents not using the on-site center
pay $30.57 on average, while Bell parents pay $25.62, and Central
Products parents pay $30.94 per week. This substantial difference in
costs is largely the result of the percentage of non-on-site users who are
using care arrangements with no money cost. Once we omit those not
paying for care, the amount paid is much more similar across columns.
The Bell on-site center seems, at first glance, to be priced “below-mar-
ket,” but this average is somewhat misleading. As will be discussed
48Table 5.2 Characteristics of Child Care for Non-Hmong Employees’ Children under Age Six
Action Industries Bell Manufacturing
 On-site usersa  Non-usersb   On-site usersa Non-usersb Central Products












% paying for care 100.00 59.09 100.00 51.28 60.87
Mean weekly amount paid per child for 

































Satisfaction ranking of parents towards 
their child’s primary care arrangement 
(1 is the best ranking, 5 the worst)









Number of children 63 49 26 39 71
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Children enrolled in primary school are excluded. — = not available.
a In this and subsequent tables, the term “On-site users” refers to users of the on-site child care center.
b “Non-users” refers to those using some form of child care other than the on-site center.
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more fully, many users of the on-site center at Bell Manufacturing
receive a state government subsidy for child care, unlike the case at
Action Industries. Judging from the data, some of the recipients of the
subsidy reported their out-of-pocket cost of child care, net of the state
subsidy, rather than the total charged by the center. When this differ-
ence is taken into account, the average charge per child at the two on-
site centers is almost identical. Thus, the price of the on-site centers is
about equal to the local market rates for paid child care in general but is
somewhat lower than the local rate for other center-based care.8
Because the on-site center is not an inexpensive form of child care,
the question arises as to why so many parents use it. Some of the par-
ents using the on-site center do not have a zero- or low-cost option, and
thus the on-site center offers roughly the same price as other paid
options, a more convenient location, and at minimum, an acceptable
level of quality. On the other hand, some of the parents using the on-
site center do have a zero- or low-cost option but choose the center as
being more convenient, more reliable (in terms of the arrangement not
breaking down), and perhaps of higher quality.9 
Table 5.3 compares employees with young children across firms in
terms of the availability of alternative caregivers and the amount
expected to pay those caregivers. Based on the percentage of employ-
ees with parents or parents-in-law in the area, on-site center users do
not seem to differ from users of other arrangements. In fact, on-site
users at both Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing are slightly
more likely to have parents in the area. Many studies of child care
arrangements use the presence of parents or parents-in-law in the area
as an indicator of a zero-cost child care alternative. Substantially fewer
on-site users at both Action and Bell report having parents or parents-
in-law who are available for child care. This provides some evidence
that many users of the on-site center do not have a zero- or low-cost
option available to them, although one wonders if more grandparents
would be available if the need were greater, i.e., if there were no on-site
center.10 Still, taking the data at face value, 19 percent of the users of
the Action center and 38 percent of the users of the Bell center report
having a zero-cost alternative child care arrangement available to them.
Clearly, some parents are choosing the on-site center over other care
arrangements despite a relatively high price tag. Convenience and reli-
ability are likely to be factors in parents’ choice of the on-site center;
50Table 5.3 Child Care Options of Non-Hmong Employees with Children under Age Six
Action Industries Bell Manufacturing
On-site users Non-users On-site users Non-users Central Products
% with parents in area 83.33 63.33 80.95 71.88 81.82
% of parents available for care
of those in the area
17.14 63.16 35.29 69.57 53.33
% who expect to pay for 
grandparent care
25.00 8.33 16.67 13.33 58.82
Range of expected payments 
per week
$35–45 $25 $40 $40 $25–150
% with other relatives in area 55.26 53.85 80.95 46.88 64.81
% of other relatives available for 
care of those in the area
28.57 35.71 41.18 33.33 48.57
% who expect to pay for relative 
care
20.00 20.00 57.14 0.00 75.00
Range of expected payments 
per week
$65 $25 $35–90 $20–70
% who know others (nonrelatives) 
available for care
24.44 46.67 23.81 28.12 30.91
% who expect to pay for 
nonrelative care
100.00 40.00 50.00 100.00 75.00
Range of expected payments 
per week
$18–75 $45–50 $20–40 $45–60 $20–200
51
% who know of any child care 
centers 
56.25 57.14 71.43 50.00 60.00
% who expect to pay for center 
care
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Range of expected payments $35-92 $25–125 $10–100 $72–155 $58–100
% with zero-cost care option 
(not including spouse)
18.75 37.14 38.10 31.25 18.18
Number of employees 48 35 21 32 55
NOTE: Children enrolled in primary school are excluded. Employees whose grandchild or other relative is enrolled in the on-site center
are excluded.  Two grandparents are excluded from the Action Industries sample, and three employees, two grandparents and an aunt,
are excluded from the Bell Manufacturing sample. Blank cell = not applicable.
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quality or a preference for center care may also be reasons for choosing
the on-site center. 
Thinking further about parental preferences across a set of child
care options, we return to Table 5.2 to see that Bell parents are happier
in general with their arrangements than are Central parents, as indi-
cated by both the median and mean scores.11 There is no difference
between the median level of satisfaction of on-site center users and
other parents at Bell; however, the mean score indicates somewhat
greater satisfaction with the on-site center than with other child care
arrangements. In addition, Table 5.2 shows that the mean age of the
children at the on-site centers is not markedly greater than the mean
age of children in other arrangements. General research on the mode of
child care choice among employed mothers in the United States has
found that parents are more likely to use relative care for very young
children and center-based care for older preschool children (Chaplin et
al. 1996; Connelly and Kimmel 2003; Hofferth and Wissoker 1992;
Waite, Leibowitz, and Witsberger 1991). It has never been clear, how-
ever, whether this lower probability of using center-based care for very
young children represented parental preferences or the lack of infant
care slots in day care centers. Here, at least for on-site center-based
care, there does not appear to be a parental preference for older chil-
dren relative to younger children to be in center-based care, or for
younger children to not be in center-based care. This conclusion is fur-
ther supported by the fact that, among sample users of the Action
Industries and Bell Manufacturing centers combined, there are 19 fam-
ilies with two preschool-aged children including 17 that use the on-site
center for both children. In contrast, 23 percent of a national sample of
center users from the 1994 SIPP data follow the pattern suggested by
other child care researchers of using home-based or relative care for
the younger child and center-based care for the older child. No family
in our samples of on-site center users follows this pattern. There seems
to be no shying away from on-site center care for younger children
among the parents at Action and Bell, nor is there any evidence of a
strong preference for relative or home-based care for younger children
at any of the three firms.12
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SECONDARY ARRANGEMENTS
We also asked questions about a second regular child care arrange-
ment for each of the four youngest children in a family, as the literature
on child care in the United States has emphasized the cobbled-together
plans many parents use to provide sufficient care for their children
while they are at work (see Table 5.4). Again, focusing on children
under age six, at Action Industries, 9.8 percent of children enrolled in
the on-site center have regular secondary child care arrangements,
compared with 28.3 percent of the non-on-site center users. No second-
ary arrangements of on-site center users involve a money transfer,
while 36.4 percent of the secondary arrangements of non-on-site users
involve payment, ranging from $10 to $50 per week. Although the
number of cases is small, the difference suggests that the on-site center
reduces the need to maintain two sets of arrangements.
Table 5.4 Secondary Arrangements for Children under Age Six of Bell 
Manufacturing and Central Products Non-Hmong Employees







% with regular secondary 
care
9.8 28.3 11.5 47.4 46.3
Type of secondary care: — —
% center 0.0 0.0 9.7
% spouse 33.3 27.8 6.5
% grandparent 33.3 38.9 29.0
% relative 33.3 16.7 38.7
% nonrelative 0.0 0.0 16.1
% sibling 0.0 11.1 0.0
% enrolled in primary 
school
0.0 5.6 0.0









% pay for secondary care 0.0 36.4 0.0 29.4 25.8
Number of children 62 38 26 39 71
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses for level of satisfaction. Children
enrolled in primary school are excluded. — = not available.
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At Bell Manufacturing and Central Products, we expanded the data
collection on secondary arrangements to include the type of secondary
arrangement and level of satisfaction. Comparing the on-site center
users and non-users at Bell, we found the same pattern as at Action
Industries, that on-site center users are much less likely to report main-
taining regular secondary arrangements. No secondary arrangements of
on-site center users involve a money transfer, while 29.4 percent of
non-on-site center users who have secondary arrangements report pay-
ing for that arrangement, with payments ranging from $35 to $110 per
week. Secondary arrangements used by Bell workers rely heavily on
the other parent or spouse, grandparents, and other relatives. As was
the case at Action, on-site center care at Bell seems to reduce the need
for secondary arrangements, particularly paid secondary arrangements.
This is beneficial to parents in that it reduces transaction costs and, in
some cases, reduces monetary costs. The feedback from Bell employ-
ees also suggests that they are somewhat more satisfied with their pri-
mary arrangements than with their secondary arrangements. Thus,
reducing the need for secondary care may increase parents’ overall sat-
isfaction with child care arrangements. 
Without the benefit of an on-site center, 46 percent of Central
Products children have a second regular child care arrangement. Cen-
tral children who are in center-based care for their primary arrange-
ment are just as likely as the full Central sample to have a regular
secondary arrangement. This suggests that the on-site centers may be
better than other centers at avoiding the need for a secondary arrange-
ment. Of the secondary arrangements at Central, 74 percent are unpaid.
Secondary arrangements used by Central employees are mainly with
relatives, with about 7 percent of the secondary care provided by the
employee’s spouse, 29 percent provided by grandparents, and 39 per-
cent provided by another relative. 
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS
I didn’t really visualize how important a role that [the on-site child care]
would play in the company in terms of attracting management....You can
look at the company now and I would think that the great majority of
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middle level managers that we have today in accounting, marketing,
human resources are women in their late twenties to early forties who
are either continuing or just completing the child building part of their
lives and I would think that many of them would have worked in other
places if this benefit hadn’t been available.
—Owner of Action Industries
Tables 5.5a and 5.5b compare employee users of the on-site center
with other employees who have young children and with employees
with no children under the age of six for Action Industries and Bell
Manufacturing, respectively. Table 5.5c compares the sample of Cen-
tral employees with and without young children. 
At both Action and Bell, users of the on-site child care center are
overwhelmingly first-shift workers and are more likely than non-users
to be married and female. On-site center users are also less likely to be
hourly production workers than are non-users, being more heavily con-
centrated among child care workers. At Action, on-site center users
also have a higher mean level of education, which reflects the fact that
all 11 college graduates with young children whom we interviewed use
the on-site center. These patterns notwithstanding, it is also important
to note that almost all types of worker categories at Action and at Bell
are represented among the users of ESCC. 
A substantial difference appears between employees with children
enrolled in the child care center and noncenter users in the number of
years they have worked at Action Industries or at Bell Manufacturing.
This may be indicative of reduced turnover of parents of young chil-
dren who have access to on-site child care, or may simply reflect the
fact that new employees often have to wait for a slot in the on-site cen-
ter.13 The mean job tenure of the parents of children on the waiting list
at Action is 2.2 years, which is much more similar to the noncenter
user group than the user sample. The job tenure of those on the waiting
list at Bell is quite low, two-thirds of a year. Children on the waiting list
are also a whole year younger than the average child at the center.
Their recent birth may be the explanation of their waiting list status
rather than their parent’s job tenure.14
Another possible explanation for the difference in job tenure is
that length of employment is related to shift. The child care center is
overwhelmingly used by first-shift workers. If first-shift jobs, when
they become open, are filled by second-shift workers, then first-shift
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Table 5.5a Characteristics of Action Industries Non-Hmong Employees 
by Care Status of Children under Age Sixa
Employees with 




children who are 











Mean number of children 






















% hourly office workers 14.58 0.00 15.09
% hourly production 
workers
12.50 40.00 33.49
% pieceworkers 52.08 54.29 32.08
% salaried workers 14.58 2.86 13.68
% child care workers 6.25 2.86 5.66
Time of day employed
% 1st shift 93.75 71.43 70.75
% 2nd shift 0.00 2.86 4.72
% 3rd shift 6.25 25.71 24.53
Marital status
% married 87.50 71.43 64.90
% widowed 0.00 0.00 1.92
% divorced 4.17 11.43 12.02
% separated 2.08 5.71 3.85
% never married 6.25 11.43 17.31






% female 87.50 77.14 80.66
Race/ethnicity
% White 93.75 94.29 92.92
% African American 2.08 5.71 5.19
% other 4.17 0.00 1.89
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Employees with 




children who are 

















Number of employees 48 35 212
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Children enrolled in primary school are
excluded. NA = not applicable.
a Two employees have grandchildren at the center.  The characteristics of these two
grandparent employees are excluded from the users column and included in the col-
umn. Blank cell = not applicable.
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Table 5.5b Characteristics of Bell Manufacturing Non-Hmong 
Employees by Care Status of Children under Age Sixa
Employees with 
children who are 
on-site center 
users
Employees with  
children who are 





Mean number of children 





Mean number of children 






















% hourly office workers 10.00 9.68 10.56
% hourly production 
workers
30.00 38.71 39.13
% pieceworkers 50.00 48.39 37.89
% salaried workers 0.00 3.23 8.07
% child care workers 10.00 0.00 4.35
Time of day employed
% 1st shift 95.24 75.00 85.28
% 2nd shift 0.00 25.00 9.20
% 3rd shift 4.76 0.00 5.52
Marital status
% married 76.19 71.88 57.67
% widowed 0.00 0.00 6.13
% divorced 9.52 12.50 11.04
% separated 9.52 0.00 1.84
% never married 4.76 15.62 23.31






% female 85.71 65.62 75.32
Race/ethnicity
% White 65.22 76.67 83.33
% African American 34.78 10.00 12.96
% Hispanic 0.00 13.33 3.70
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Employees with 
children who are 
on-site center 
users
Employees with  
children who are 

















Number of employees 23 30 162
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Children enrolled in primary school are
excluded. Blank cell = not applicable.
aThree of the children enrolled at the center are grandchildren or the employee’s sib-
ling’s child.  Those employees are included in the last column of this table.
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Table 5.5c Characteristics of Central Products Non-Hmong Employees 
with and without Children under Age Six
Employees with children 
under age 6
Employees without 
children under age 6



















% hourly office workers 10.91 15.53
% hourly production workers 27.27 44.70
% pieceworkers 56.36 34.09
% salaried workers 5.45 5.68
Time of day employed
% 1st shift 74.55 67.80
% 2nd shift 16.36 15.91
% 3rd shift 9.09 16.29
Marital status
% married 61.82 59.09
% widowed 1.82 3.79
% divorced 12.73 12.88
% separated 9.09 3.79
% never married 14.55 20.45




% female 72.22 66.15
Race/ethnicity
% White 85.45 89.77
% African American 10.91 6.44
% other 3.64 3.79












Number of employees 55 264
NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Children enrolled in primary school are 
excluded. Blank cell = not applicable.
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workers will have longer job tenure at the firm than second-shift
workers, on average. However, not all second-shift workers want to
work first shift. Third shift appears to be quite different from first and
second; it is much more common among the sample of workers with-
out young children.
At Bell Manufacturing, there were no Hmong workers. Instead, the
ethnic composition of the entire sample of Bell employees includes
Latin American migrants and is more heavily African American and
slightly less White than at Action Industries. No Hispanic workers with
young children at Bell use the on-site center, but African-American
workers with young children do (Table 5.5b). One-third of the employ-
ees with children at the on-site center are African American; this per-
centage is much greater than their representation among employees as
a whole. In part, this is due to the fact that 30 percent of the African-
American employees have young children compared with only 23 per-
cent of the non-African-American employees. In addition, two-thirds
of African-American employees with children under age six have a
child enrolled in the on-site center compared to 34 percent of the non-
African Americans.
There are also interesting differences between employees at the
three firms with and without young children. Comparing these samples
we find that employees without young children are, on average, older
than those with young children.15 They are more likely to work third
shift and they have substantially longer job tenure than the younger
employees with small children; many have been with their company
for more than 10 years. Workers without young children are much less
likely to be piece-rate workers at all three firms. This is probably due to
their longer job tenure as some may have moved into supervisory posi-
tions. Workers without young children are more likely to be widowed
or never married, but many are married and have older children. Eighty
percent of Action Industries workers overall have had children, com-
pared with the 32 percent who currently have young children. The
comparable numbers at Bell Manufacturing are 82 and 25 percent, and
at Central Products, 75 and 27 percent. These numbers are important
because they point to the potential for grandchildren who may cur-
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rently be enrolled or may be enrolled in the future in the on-site center.
As Action’s owner explained, 
I guess that the way the company has grown, almost everybody
has experienced it [the on-site child care center] in one form or
another whether it be having their own child in there or having a
relative’s child in there. We have a lot of inbred families in this
company. Everybody’s got a niece or a nephew that’s been
through the child care center. We do allow grandchildren to be in
there and you know that is where I qualify; my grandchild is there
right now. 
DETERMINANTS OF ON-SITE CENTER USE
The variables reported in Tables 5.5a, 5.5b, and 5.5c represent, in
part, our expectations of the factors that might influence the choice to
enroll one’s child in an on-site center. Because many of these variables
are related to one another, we estimate a multivariate model to predict
the usage of the on-site center for families with young children from
the two factories with on-site centers.16 Sample sizes are small; thus we
interpret the results with caution. Sample size is especially a concern in
the case of Bell Manufacturing, making the results of that analysis sug-
gestive at best. 
Characteristics of the employee parents included in the analysis are
the number of years with the company, whether the individual is an
hourly production worker or a piece worker (salaried or hourly office
worker is the omitted category),17 whether the person works first shift,
hours worked per week, miles the employee lives from the factory,
race/ethnicity dummy variables, whether a relative is available for
child care, the proportion of life the employee has lived in the area,
years of schooling, and age, sex, and marital status dummy variables
(currently married is the omitted category). At Bell Manufacturing we
included two race/ethnicity dummies, African American and Hispanic,
based mainly on the differences observed in Table 5.5b, while at Cen-
tral Products we included a single African-American indicator.18 
Our expectation is that first-shift workers are more likely to use the
on-site center because the center’s hours of operation more closely
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match that schedule.19 The number of years a worker has been with the
company is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of
enrolling in the on-site center, as previously discussed. We expect
hourly production workers and piece workers to be less likely to enroll
their child because they tend to have lower incomes than salaried and
office workers.20 We anticipate that the greater the distance from home
to the factory, the less likely the employee will be to use the on-site
center because it would mean a longer commute for the child.
Whether the employee indicated that a relative is available for
child care and the proportion of years the employee has lived in the
area are both expected to lower the probability of center enrollment
because they both increase the probability of alternative care opportu-
nities. Years of schooling is included to test whether workers with
higher education prefer center-based care. Education may also pick up
effects of income. At Action, this variable is entered as a set of thresh-
olds because the descriptive analysis suggests that college education is
strongly correlated with the use of the on-site center. At Bell and Cen-
tral, there were too few college graduates with young children in the
sample to include an indicator for college graduation. Instead, for these
firms we enter education as a continuous variable.
We had no prior expectation about the age of the worker, but we
control for age in order to be able to observe the independent effect of
job tenure on the dependent variable. We expect the probability of
enrollment to be lower for male employees because there is a greater
potential for a stay-at-home spouse. Controlling for sex, divorced and
never-married employees may be less likely to enroll their child at the
center because family income is potentially lower than for married
employees. On the other hand, married employees have their spouse
and potentially two sets of parents and relatives who are possible child
care providers.21 The net result of marital status is thus theoretically
ambiguous.
We also include three characteristics specific to the child: the
child’s age, the presence of preschool siblings, and the presence of pri-
mary school-aged siblings. The inclusion of the child’s age allows us to
test the hypothesis that parents prefer center-based care for older pre-
school children. The presence of preschool siblings is included to test
the hypothesis that greater child care cost encourages parents to seek
forms of care that are less expensive than the on-site center. The pres-
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ence of primary school-aged siblings may also increase the total finan-
cial burden of child care, perhaps leading to a lower probability of
using center-based care.
The dependent variable for Action Industries and Bell Manufactur-
ing is whether the child is enrolled at the on-site center. The analysis
sample is limited to those children who are not categorized as “in
school” given that eligibility for “in school” status is institutionally
determined and not within the parents’ choice set. The sample size for
Action is 100 non-Hmong children of employees. At Bell Manufactur-
ing, the sample includes 59 children of employees. Of these, six are
dropped because they are Hispanic and that characteristic is a perfect
predictor of non-on-site center arrangements. 
Table 5.6, column 1, shows the results of the probit estimation for
the non-Hmong children of Action Industries workers, while column 2
shows the results for the non-Hispanic children of Bell Manufacturing
workers. Despite the small sample sizes, a substantial number of the
variables are statistically significant. We focus our discussion of results
here on those of greatest interest to the provision of on-site child care.22
Considering first the variables related to the child’s characteristics,
most importantly, the age of the child does not significantly affect
enrollment in the on-site center at either firm. This is consistent with
the descriptive results and provides further evidence that parents do not
necessarily prefer relative and home-based care for younger children,
even after controlling for the presence of such relatives. 
In terms of the employee characteristics, job tenure is a significant
positive predictor of on-site center use at both firms. This indicates that
the availability of this benefit lowers attrition of users and/or that the
limited number of slots available in the center tends to favor those who
have worked at the firm longer.23 Controlling for job tenure, being a
first-shift worker is not a significant predictor of center use for workers
at either firm. This is somewhat surprising given the time of day that
on-site care is provided, but suggests a value to the on-site center that
extends beyond its ability to facilitate employment.
Other employee variables that are significant negative predictors of
enrollment in the Action Industries on-site center include being an
hourly production worker or a piece worker, having some high school
or some college, and being never married. Each of these variables, as
expected, reduces the probability that the employee’s child is enrolled
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Some high school –5.278* 
(3.111)
 
High school graduate –4.716 
(3.141)
































































































Central Products –1.092 **
(0.269)
Number of children in 
sample
100 53 64 222
Log-likelihood –40.96 –11.12 –13.11 –99.57
Chi-squared 53.46** 50.76** 49.84** 105.57**
NOTE: Probit coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 0.10 level, **significant at the 0.05 level.
Blank cell = not applicable. The children of Hispanic workers at Bell Manufacturing are excluded from the Bell sample, but are
included in the combined sample. Children enrolled in primary school are excluded.
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in the on-site center. The results for the pay type and education vari-
ables indicate that even though the on-site centers are used by a broad
range of workers (indeed, the number of college educated workers at
these firms is too small to warrant an on-site center), there is a greater
tendency to use ESCC among those with higher education and in man-
agerial and administrative positions. Again, this may reflect income
effects as well as attitudes and preferences about nonfamily care and
early childhood education. Notably not significant at Action is the vari-
able representing the availability of relatives, suggesting that the on-
site center may be preferable to relative care even though relative care
is a lower-cost option. 
At Bell Manufacturing, the level of education of the parent also has
a positive effect on the probability of using the on-site center. How-
ever, being divorced increases the probability of enrolling one’s child
in the on-site center, while there was no effect of this variable at Action
Industries. We return to a discussion of the effects of marital status
when we consider the results for Central Products. Also in contrast to
Action, having a relative available reduces the probability of using the
on-site center at Bell. Thus, the qualities of the on-site center do not
appear to be sufficiently valued at Bell to systematically outweigh the
availability of no-cost family care. 
DETERMINANTS OF ANY CENTER USE
At Central Products, where there is no on-site center, we estimate a
model of the determinants of the choice to enroll a child in any center-
based care. Based on the preceding descriptive analysis, we expect the
determinants of center-based care to be different from the determinants
of on-site center care. We hypothesize that the convenience of the on-
site center and its “employer-sponsoredness” make it a very different
choice from center care in general. Table 5.6, column 3, shows the
determinants of enrolling a preschool non-Hmong child in center care
for the children of Central employees. As for the other two firms, the
sample is limited to children under six who are not enrolled in school.
The explanatory variables are the same as in column 2.24
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The age of the child, again, is not a significant determinant of the
use of center care. The community child care centers in this area seem
to have sufficient infant care slots, which is not the case in many other
child care markets. In terms of the characteristics of the employee,
first-shift workers are more likely to use center-based care, as
expected, because of the time of day that most center-based care is
available. Job tenure has no impact on the use of center care, a result
which is important in its difference from the positive result at the other
two firms. Neither of the arguments in support of a positive effect of
job tenure on ESCC use—reduced turnover and waiting time—are
applicable to other center-based care.25 The other variables that are sig-
nificant determinants of center-based care for the children of Central
Products employees include the availability of a relative, which has a
negative effect on center use, and whether the employee is divorced,
which is a positive predictor of center care. The negative effect of the
relatives variable is particularly important in contrast to the lack of any
such effect at Action Industries. This suggests that, in general, for cen-
ter-based care that is not on-site and employer-sponsored, its qualities
are not sufficiently valued to outweigh the advantages of no-cost fam-
ily care.
For both Bell Manufacturing and Central Products, the large posi-
tive effect of being divorced may be related to the availability of state-
provided child care subsidies. At the time of the surveys, these state
subsidies, which target low-income families, were available in only
some counties. The subsidies are not exclusively for center-based care,
but they seem heavily weighted toward such care.26 Likewise, they are
not limited to unmarried mothers, but, again, in our data they are
heavily weighted toward unmarried mothers. We experimented with
replacing the marital status variables with a variable indicating that the
family receives these state subsidies. That variable is significantly pos-
itive at Central Products and Bell Manufacturing, and significantly
negative at Action Industries, with all other results unchanged. These
findings are consistent with those for the marital status variables.
Twelve children in our sample at the Bell center receive the state subsi-
dies compared with one at Action Industries. This is largely attribut-
able to location, as Action draws a greater percentage of its workforce
from a county not covered by the subsidy program at the time of our
interviews. Taken together, these results suggest that there are negative
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effects of being never married or divorced on center use, almost cer-
tainly related to lower income, but that at Bell and Central these effects
are offset by the increased likelihood of eligibility for county-specific
child care subsidies.
The final column of Table 5.6 reports the estimation of a model of
the determinants of using any center-based care arrangement for our
entire sample. Here we have combined the data from the non-Hmong
workers of all three firms to gain the advantage of larger numbers and
to look at the effect of working for an employer with an on-site center.
The dependent variable, the use of any center-based care arrangement,
is the same variable that is used in column 3 for Central Products only.
Because all the workers in these three firms live in the same general
area, they face the same price for “market” child care. The actual price
of child care each family faces differs in three ways: by the availability
of a relative who is willing to care for their child, by the availability of
a subsidized employer-based on-site child care center, and, for low-
income employees, by whether they live in a county included in the
state child care subsidies program. The model in column 4 controls for
the first two effects through the inclusion of the availability of relatives
variable and the firm dummies, and for the last effect, imperfectly,
through the marital status dummies.
Not surprisingly, given the large differentials we saw in Table 5.1
in the use of center care across the three firms, the multivariate results
in Table 5.6 show that non-Hmong workers at Central Products are sig-
nificantly less likely to use center-based arrangements. With Action
Industries as the omitted category, the variable indicating employment
at Bell Manufacturing is not significant, meaning that the workers at
Action and Bell are equally likely to use center-based care, all else held
constant. 
Families with relatives available are less likely to use center-based
arrangements, consistent with the firm-specific results for Central
Products and Bell Manufacturing. Higher education, again, whether
entered with thresholds or continuously, is positively related to center
use.27 The other significant variables in the full sample are whether the
parent works first shift, whether the parent is African American, miles
from home to work, and the sex of the employee. First-shift workers,
African Americans, and women employees are more likely to use cen-
ter-based care, as are those workers who live close to their place of
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employment. Interesting for their nonsignificance are job tenure
(where, again, the hypothesized effects are relevant only for ESCC),
whether the worker is a production worker (suggesting that, in this
industry and child care market, center-based care overall is not system-
atically more likely to be selected by salaried administrative and mana-
gerial workers), marital status (where the opposing effects have
negated one another), and child’s age (again, important for its differ-
ence from the finding of many national studies that child’s age has a
positive effect on the use of center-based child care). 
Comparing columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, we have further suggestive evi-
dence to support the hypothesis that on-site ESCC is a different option
from other types of center-based care. The on-site center at Action
Industries is not less likely to be used by families with other relatives
available in comparison to Central Products where relatives have a
negative effect on center use. At both firms with on-site centers, job
tenure is positively related to the use of the center. In contrast, at Cen-
tral Products, job tenure is not related to use of center-based care. In
general, higher education is positively related to on-site center use at
both firms with on-site centers, but it is unrelated to center-based care
among Central Products employees. The lack of an effect at Central is
counter to results from most national studies and suggests that either
the perceived differences between center-based care and other forms of
care among the more educated are not as great in this area as nationally,
and/or that differences by education (e.g., in income or preferences)
among this group of workers are not as large as in national studies.
Finally, column 4 shows directly that employees at Central Products
are less likely to use center-based care even after controlling for a host
of other characteristics.
DISCUSSION
Many researchers have considered patterns of child care arrange-
ments used by parents in the United States. One of the issues of con-
cern is to what extent the pattern we observe represents preferences
and to what extent it represents constraints due to low income, high
child care prices, and/or nonavailability of alternatives. These studies
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have not included employer-based child care arrangements explicitly.
The analysis presented here indicates that a substantial number of par-
ents will choose on-site care when it is available or will choose to be
employed at a firm that has on-site child care. This may be, in part,
because the on-site center is somewhat less expensive than other cen-
ter-based care. However, the average weekly expenditure for the on-
site centers is comparable to that for paid options in general. In addi-
tion, some of the children enrolled in the on-site centers could have
been in relative care arrangements, most of which are unpaid. In the
multivariate analysis, we control for the availability of a relative. Hav-
ing a relative available does not affect the choices of Action Industries
parents, but it does reduce the probability of on-site center care for Bell
Manufacturing workers, and the probability of center-based care for
Central Products employees. The location, convenience, “employer
sponsorship,” and reliability of the arrangement are characteristics of
the on-site center valued by its users. This is in keeping with Sonen-
stein (1991), who found, in a study of parental attitudes toward child
care, that the best predictor of a mother’s satisfaction with her child
care arrangement was her rating of the convenience of the hours and
the location and reliability of the arrangement.
At the two firms with on-site centers, job tenure is positively
related to the use of the center, whereas at Central Products, job tenure
does not have a significant effect. One explanation for this finding is
that workers who use the on-site center are less likely to quit or to have
to leave due to attendance issues related to child care. This supports the
claims of other researchers of ESCC, particularly Milkovich and
Gomez (1976) and Roth and Preston (1989). It is also consistent with
the qualitative evidence from these firms, in which a number of
employees spoke about reductions in turnover and absenteeism as
sources of value attributable to ESCC. Alternatively, some queuing
may be taking place within the firm for access to the on-site center
slots.
The data also provide evidence about secondary arrangements,
information not typically available in child care research. Users of the
on-site centers are less likely to have secondary arrangements. When
secondary arrangements are employed they are almost always unpaid
and with relatives. Not having to arrange two types of child care during
the workweek seems to be an added value of on-site ESCC. Thus, the
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on-site centers appear to provide more reliable primary care, relieving
parental concern about child care breakdown.
Finally, we have seen that the child’s age is not a significant char-
acteristic in the prediction of the use of center-based or on-site center
care. This is true at Central Products as well, but in studies based on
national samples, children’s age is often a significant predictor of cen-
ter care, with very young children less likely to be in center-based care.
This suggests that the national results may be largely driven by institu-
tional constraints rather than by parental preferences, or that the on-site
location and reliability overcome any parental preferences not to use
center-based care for very young children.
The greater use of center care by employees who have an on-site
option provides substantial evidence of the value to employees of on-
site center care. In the two firms studied here, on-site center care is not
merely substituting for other center care by employees with higher
education. Instead, on-site center care is used by a broad range of
employees, including those with infants, those with two or more pre-
schoolers, and at Action those who report having relatives available to
care for their children at no cost. The positive relationship between job
tenure and center use is also suggestive of benefits accruing to the firm
beyond the value to employees, if this relationship is a signal of
reduced turnover among child care center users.
Notes
1. This analysis is also reported on in Connelly, DeGraff, and Willis (2002).
2. The national data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation as
reported in U.S. Census Bureau (2002b). Hmong are not excluded from the
national data, but their proportion of the entire U.S. population is so small that
their inclusion should not be an issue. National data presented are for preschool
children’s mothers who are employed full-time since the vast majority of the
employed mothers at the three firms work full-time.
3. The remaining tables in this chapter are not limited to women employees and also
use an age cut-off of under six for preschool children, as this is more appropriate
for this location. Comparable statistics, which include children under age six of
both male and female employees from the three firms, are quite similar to those in
Table 5.1 as the workforce is overwhelmingly female (see Table 4.1).
4. As described in Chapter 4, Hmong families use a very different mix of child care
arrangements than other employees. They are reluctant to use any caregiver other
than a relative and most often work alternating shifts so that the child is usually
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with one of his or her parents. This chapter focuses exclusively on the child care
arrangements of the children of non-Hmong employees at the three firms included
in our analysis.
5. In fact, Table 5.3, which we discuss more fully below, shows that more than three-
quarters of the workers at the three firms combined who have young children live
within 60 minutes of their parents or parents-in-law and the majority say that their
parents or parents-in-law would be available to act as child care providers.
6. In the sample of Action employees, 10 employees each had one child on the list;
while waiting, 3 of these children were at other centers, and 7 were in nonrelative
care arrangements in the care provider’s home. In the sample of Bell employees, 3
employees each had 1 child on the list; while waiting, 2 were cared for by their
grandparents and one was enrolled in another day care center.
7. Alternatively, one could argue that employees looking for center care are more
likely to choose Action or Bell as employers. Under this alternative explanation,
preferences rather than availability determine the differences between the sam-
ples.
8. Bell Manufacturing charges non-employees $20 a week more, giving an indicator
of the difference between the market rate and the employee rate.
9. Because center care is usually more expensive than other forms of care, one might
ask why anyone uses center care over other care choices or any care that is not the
least expensive. The answer is clearly that child care has value other than simply a
parking place for children while the parents are working. Parents care about the
quality of care that children receive and often see center care as more educational
than other forms of care. Sonenstein (1991) found that parents also valued conve-
nience and dependability of child care arrangements. Finally, zero-cost child care
may not be free. Parents receiving “free” child care from a relative may be obli-
gating themselves to pay back in kind. The cost of “free” child care may well be
higher than the money cost of market child care.
10. None of the grandparents who are providing regular care for the children in the
sample receive a money payment. A few parents report that they would expect to
pay the children’s grandparents for child care if that option were used. However,
most of those reporting that grandparents would be available for care report that
they would not expect to pay the grandparents for their time.
11. Action Industries was the first firm sampled, and we made use of knowledge
gained from that experience at the other two firms. An example is the addition of
questions about satisfaction with child care arrangements, which was prompted
by comments made by Action workers.
12. As noted previously, both Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing centers offer
modest discounts for the second child enrolled in the center, which could possibly
counterbalance a weak preference for noncenter care for very young children.
13. The waiting list at both firms operates on a first-come, first-served basis. The first
person on the list with a child the age of the opening is offered the slot. Employ-
ees may put their names on the list while they (or their spouse) are pregnant. New
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employees with young children may put their names on the list as soon as they
begin working.
14. In the Action Industries sample, 20 employees are on the waiting list. Ten
employees have a child under age six and comprise the group of parents on the
waiting list discussed earlier. Of the remaining 10, 6 are grandparents (not living
with the children) and 4 are soon-to-be parents of a new baby. The mean job ten-
ure of the grandparents is 9.2 years, of the parents is 2.2 years, and of the soon-to-
be parents is 1.2 years.
15. This might seem obvious to some readers, but the employees without young chil-
dren could have been pre-children or post-young children. While there are
undoubtedly some of both, the older mean age, the large percentage in categories
other than never married, and the longer job tenure of the sample without young
children indicate that most of the sample is post-young children.
16. The sampling unit is the child, and in a few cases more than one child from a fam-
ily is included as a separate observation. In theory, this can lead to correlation
among the error terms across observations, which can result in biased estimates.
However, the number of such cases is small enough that this would not have an
appreciable effect on the results.
17. The omitted category at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing for the type of
worker also includes the on-site child care center workers.
18. The number of African Americans at Action Industries was too small to include
an indicator of race in the Action model.
19. At Action Industries, all employees work flextime so that the traditional concept
of shifts is less relevant. We have coded a broad band of morning start hours as
first-shift workers for this firm.
20. We do not have data on individual or family income. It became clear early in our
work that this question is too sensitive to ask of many of the workers, and the
group dynamics of surveying on site required that we drop the question rather
than ask it but offer the option of not answering.
21. Although we have controlled for having a relative available for child care, other
relatives and one’s spouse serve as backup providers when the child is sick or
when the primary arrangement fails. Thus, we might still expect some residual
effect of marital status on choice of child care mode to come from the presence of
a spouse and spouse’s family, even having controlled for availability of relatives
for regular care.
22. For a discussion of the full set of multivariate results, see Connelly, DeGraff, and
Willis (2002).
23. It is also possible that at least part of this effect is spurious in that some factors
that lead to a longer job tenure, such as being responsible, are also likely to cause
a parent to prioritize reliable child care.
24. The number of college graduates in the Central Products sample is much too small
to allow us to use thresholds.
25. Because the positive effect of job tenure at Action Industries and Bell Manufac-
turing is likely to reflect, in part, reduced turnover, we were concerned about
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introducing endogeneity bias by including this explanatory variable. The samples
are too small to address this issue using statistical techniques, however, we reesti-
mated each model omitting the job tenure variable in order to check for sensitivity
of the other results. The estimates for Action Industries and Central Products are
quite robust to this change in specification, with the results for Bell Manufactur-
ing less so. This is not surprising given the even smaller sample size at Bell.
26. The national statistics on child care arrangements by subsidy recipiency discussed
in Chapter 2 also show a bias in favor of center care for subsidy recipients.
27. When entered as thresholds as for Action Industries, it is those employees who
did not complete high school who are significantly less likely to use center-based
arrangements in the combined sample.
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A Direct Method for Valuing 
Employee Benefits from 
ESCC Using a 
Contingent Valuation Approach
We now turn to a more direct method for determining the value to
employees of employer-sponsored on-site child care to complement the
indirect analysis of the previous chapter. This chapter presents a sum-
mary of the contingent valuation method (CVM) used to derive esti-
mates of the value of ESCC to employees. We first discuss the theory
underlying CVM and why it is a useful tool in the context of evaluating
ESCC. We then briefly outline the empirical application of CVM to the
case of employer-sponsored on-site child care. These two sections pro-
vide sufficient information for understanding the analysis presented in
Chapter 7. For readers with particular interest in the methodology, we
then present a more detailed discussion of issues in the CVM literature
and the implications thereof for elements such as survey design and
question format in the context of this case study. Other readers may
find it preferable to go directly to the results of the contingent valuation
analysis presented in Chapter 7. 
THE THEORY OF CONTINGENT VALUATION
In order to measure the value of ESCC empirically, one could
potentially estimate a hedonic wage model for a cross section of work-
ers in which the presence of an ESCC is included as an explanatory
variable for wages, in addition to standard human capital measures and
other individual characteristics. The coefficient on this variable would
measure the compensating wage differential (or value) attributable to
on-site child care. However, this approach is not appropriate for our
purposes due to a number of reasons. First, the model is based on the
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assumption of the existence of compensating wage differentials, which,
as argued in Chapter 3, may not be valid. In contrast, CVM is not
dependent on this assumption. Second, the empirical application of
hedonic wage models has often resulted in nonrobust estimates. Third,
the attributes of ESCC programs vary dramatically across employers;
thus, the ESCC variable in a hedonic wage model is not a comparable
attribute across individuals. This problem is avoided in our study
because respondents are employed at the same firm. Finally, given the
small percentage of employers who provide on-site child care, the sam-
ple size required in a representative cross section to obtain enough
information for reasonably efficient estimates would be financially
prohibitive. This problem is, in fact, why we know so little about
ESCC.
Instead, we propose to estimate the value of employer-sponsored
on-site child care to the employee using the contingent valuation
approach. CVM has its origins in welfare economics and has most
often been used in environmental economics.1 Here, the concept of
compensating or equivalent surplus was developed to represent the
amount of money necessary to equate an individual’s indirect utility
across two states, one with more of some commodity or benefit and
one with less. When the commodity in question is a typical private
good, traded in a market, one can derive an estimate of this monetary
valuation by observing purchasing behavior and prices. However, if the
commodity is a public good for which purchasing behavior with prices
cannot be observed, it is not possible to derive such estimates. Contin-
gent valuation is a technique that allows the derivation of this money
value in the absence of standard market-generated information. Herein
lies its appeal within the context of environmental economics and,
more generally, in the area of welfare economics.2 Indeed, as Sen has
noted, “. . . once we give up the assumption that observing choices is
the only source of data on welfare, a whole new world opens up, liber-
ating us from the informational shackles of the traditional approach”
(Sen 1977, pp. 339–340).
A child care benefit offered as part of one’s employment compen-
sation package is clearly not a pure public good (i.e., there is usually
some rationing with not enough slots for all employee children, and
there is always some user payment). However, neither is it a pure pri-
vate good. We cannot simply observe the market price and correspond-
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ing consumption levels of an ESCC. While we can observe a market
price for center-based care offered outside the firm, the results pre-
sented in Chapter 5 show that parents respond quite differently in their
choice of type of child care arrangement depending on the availability
of on-site child care. Instead, the child care benefit must be viewed as
collectively provided, not traded within a typical market context, not
paid for in full at an observed price, and competing in the consumer’s
utility function with nonmarket substitutes such as care by relatives.
These characteristics render it highly suitable for analysis using contin-
gent valuation.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF CVM 
TO ESCC: AN OVERVIEW
The empirical application of CVM involves eliciting, through
some sort of survey instrument, individuals’ responses to direct ques-
tions about their monetary valuation of a particular good. Examples of
CVM questions include, “How much would you be willing to pay to
eliminate groundwater contamination in your area?” or “Would you
allow the placement of a toxic waste dump in your neighborhood in
return for a payment of $500 in compensation?” The former is an
example of an open-ended (no dollar amount specified), “willingness
to pay” CVM question. The latter is an example of a closed-ended,
“willingness to accept” question, in which the respondent simply
replies yes or no. 
In our analysis, we use a closed-ended, “willingness to pay” ques-
tion, in which the outcome of the vote hypothetically applies to all
employees (referendum format). We also remind respondents of their
budget constraint and of potential substitute goods, as recommended in
the CVM literature, to encourage them when formulating their
response to take these into account as if in a real market setting (Arrow
et al. 1993; Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory 1994). The full text
of our question appears in Appendix A with the firm-specific language
eliminated for confidentiality reasons. The focus of the question is as
follows: “Would you VOTE YES to a payroll deduction of $__ per
two-week pay period in order to keep the child care center open?” The
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amount of money that would be hypothetically collected in the form of
a payroll deduction was varied systematically by the researchers across
respondents, thereby creating the needed variation in “price.” Informa-
tion on the distribution of prices used is provided in Table 7.1. The val-
uation information thus derived is then used as an explanatory variable
in the estimation of a dichotomous choice, probit model of the decision
to accept the offered child care benefit. Other covariates in this multi-
variate analysis include basic socioeconomic and demographic charac-
teristics of the respondent and a control for the order in which the CV
question was asked in the survey. The specification of the probit model
is discussed in full in Chapter 7. 
After the parameters of the probit model have been estimated, we
calculate the price elasticity of the child care benefit.3 Because the pro-
bit model is nonlinear, we must choose a point at which to calculate the
elasticity. We have chosen several points that correspond to the differ-
ent populations in which we are interested: all workers, newly hired
workers, workers with young children, and workers with children
already enrolled in the on-site center (for the two firms that had on-site
centers at the time of the survey). In addition, we solve for the value of
willingness to pay (WTP) for each respondent. The WTP is the amount
which leads to an estimated probability of voting yes (and of voting no)
of 50 percent, thus indicating indifference between the benefit and the
payment offer. This is the estimate of the value of the child care benefit
to the respondent. After calculating the value of the child care benefit
for each respondent, we compare the average valuation of the benefit
across groups of workers in each of the three firms. The value of the
child care benefit to workers not using the ESCC, or to workers with-
out young children, provides estimates of two alternative concepts of
the “non-use” or existence value of the benefit, or of the indirect value
of working at a firm where fellow employees have access to ESCC.4
The value to workers with young children can be considered the sum of
the direct use value and the “non-use” value. The value of the benefit to
recent hires can be thought of as the value to the marginal worker. We
also compare the valuation across the two firms that currently have
ESCCs and the one that does not have an ESCC. The results of these
comparisons are reported in Chapter 7.
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A DETAILED LOOK AT THE APPLICATION 
OF CVM TO ESCC5 
While contingent valuation certainly has its critics, it is generally
considered a useful tool that can be quite powerful if applied within the
appropriate context and if the survey instrument is well designed.6
Because of the increased use of the technique in legal cases that poten-
tially involved substantial monetary compensation based on estimates
of the value of environmental amenities (such as the Exxon Valdez oil
spill), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency of the federal
government established a panel of experts to review the technique in
the early 1990s. The results of the review are summarized in Arrow et
al. (1993). That study and several others provide useful insights on
how to construct a CVM survey in order to reduce various forms of
potential bias to which CVM is subject. One such bias, referred to as
hypothetical bias, may arise precisely because of the conjectural nature
of CVM questions. The more abstract and less familiar the good being
valued and/or the nature of the question asked, the more likely it is to
obtain meaningless and, perhaps, biased responses. The application of
CVM to ESCC is less likely to be subject to this form of bias than are
many other scenarios in which CVM is commonly applied. The good
in question in our research, a form of child care, is familiar to almost
all respondents and may have already been considered by the individ-
ual within a market context (given that private markets for child care
do exist). In addition, because the data collection is on-site, respon-
dents in the firms that already have an ESCC are familiar with the spe-
cifics of the child care being valued. 
In order to further reduce the possibility of hypothetical bias, we
have employed a closed-ended CVM question. Closed-ended valuation
elicitation techniques are generally viewed as being less susceptible to
hypothetical bias than are open-ended questions because they create a
scenario that is more similar to a real market setting (Arrow et al. 1993;
Kealy and Turner 1993; Freeman 1993).7 In a closed-ended question,
respondents are asked to choose between the good, in our case, the
ESCC, or a monetary payment. To further reduce bias, the hypothetical
payment should be clearly explained, and the compensation mecha-
nism should be familiar to respondents. We offer a payroll deduction of
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a specified amount per pay period as most employees are used to think-
ing of compensation in terms of the pay period, and, in fact, other ben-
efits such as health insurance are co-paid through the use of payroll
deductions.
Two other forms of bias often discussed in the CVM literature are
strategic bias and starting point bias. Strategic bias arises if respon-
dents believe it is in their interest to misrepresent their true valuation of
the good. This would occur if they think their answers will influence
either the provision of the good or their own financial situation, and
that a more favorable result will be achieved through misrepresenta-
tion. Although we cannot guarantee against strategic behavior on the
part of the employees, we explained to the respondents that while their
answers will be useful to the analysis of ESCCs in general, and may be
used to inform policy discussion on this topic (so that there would be
an incentive to respond thoughtfully), their responses would not affect
the provision of child care or their compensation in their current
employment.8 Closed-ended questions that allow only one opportunity
to respond provide less opportunity for strategic behavior than iterative
bidding techniques, in which a series of options is offered until the
respondents will go no higher or lower in their valuation, or to payment
card techniques, in which a menu of dollar valuations from which to
choose is presented to the respondents. Furthermore, from among the
alternative closed-ended CVM elicitation techniques, we chose to use a
referendum-style question format. This format is generally regarded as
being less prone to strategic bias than are other closed-ended formats
because it introduces majority voting to require all to pay for the pro-
posed change (Arrow et al. 1993; Freeman 1993; Mitchell and Carson
1989). A referendum question presents the respondent with a choice
between an increase (or decrease) in the benefit and a specified dollar
amount, with the majority response or “vote” hypothetically being
applied to all voters (employees). 
Referendum-style dichotomous choice methods such as the ques-
tions used here are also considered less subject to starting point bias (or
anchoring) than are iterative bidding or payment card techniques
(Arrow et al. 1993; Freeman 1993; Mitchell and Carson 1989). As the
term suggests, starting point bias arises when responses are influenced
by the values presented. Both of these alternatives to the referendum
are subject to the problem that the final result is sensitive to the bid
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structure—to the initial bid in the first case, and to the distribution of
bids in the second. For example, for an iterative bidding technique to
be free of starting point bias, it should yield the same final results
regardless of the initial bid offered. This has been shown not to be the
case in a number of studies.
A final issue in the CVM literature relevant to our research concerns
the difference between a “willingness to pay” (WTP) measure and a
“willingness to accept” (WTA) measure. The following parallel exam-
ples clarify the conceptual difference between the two. For WTP, the
wording is “Would you be willing to pay $X to prevent . . . (something
undesirable)?” or “Would you be willing to pay $X to get . . . (something
desirable)?” For WTA, the wording is “Would you allow . . . (something
undesirable) to occur in return for compensation of $X?” or “would you
be willing to forgo . . . (something desirable) in return for compensation
of $X?” Although, theoretically, the difference between the two (which
arises through income and substitution effects) should typically be
small, empirical comparisons often indicate otherwise. The evidence
suggests that WTA measures are more likely to be overestimated
(biased upwards) than are WTP measures, perhaps because respondents
are more comfortable with the concept of paying for something for
which they receive utility and are, thus, more accurate in their responses.
Therefore, a WTP measure is used in the majority of CVM studies
(Arrow et al. 1993; Mitchell and Carson 1989). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONTINGENT 
VALUATION LITERATURE9 
Finally, we discuss issues that have come to the forefront of the
CVM literature during the time since our survey was developed and
implemented, with the objective of assessing our research design in
light of more recent analysis of CVM. 
Since the development of the survey instrument used here, the
CVM literature has focused considerable attention on the empirical
reality that dichotomous choice CVM (such as the referendum ques-
tion) often yields higher estimates of WTP than do open-ended CV
questions.10 There is not a consensus in this literature as to whether the
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alternative approaches yield statistically significant differences in esti-
mates and, if so, which approach is less subject to bias. The discussion
focuses largely on the estimation of the non-use value of environmental
amenities and repeatedly raises three concerns about the dichotomous
choice method within this context: “yea-saying” or the “warm glow”
effect, the “protest no,” and the embedding or scope effect.
The first of these, “yea-saying,” arises, it is argued, because the
respondent wants to be cooperative or “do the right thing,” or simply
wants to expedite the interview. Because the payment is hypothetical,
the respondent may simply say yes even if that is not a true reflection
of preferences. Such distorting forces, it is argued, may be more likely
to occur in the dichotomous choice scenario. This potential biasing
effect is argued by Kanninen (1995) to be greater for bids in the upper
tail of the true WTP distribution. Accordingly, she recommends incor-
porating into the bid structure only a relatively small number of high-
bid offers. For this reason, as well as to obtain better information more
generally, when using a closed-ended elicitation technique it is impor-
tant to conduct preliminary fieldwork to get some sense of the underly-
ing value distribution (Elnagheeb and Jordan 1995). In our case,
preliminary focus group discussions and interviews were conducted in
each of the three firms, and the bid structure used is concentrated in the
lower and middle ranges of values suggested by the pre-testing. 
The problem of the protest no is in some sense the opposite of yea-
saying. It is typically the case for CV questions in environmental and
natural resource studies that the payment vehicle mechanism is pre-
sented as, or interpreted to be, an increase in government taxation. It is
argued that respondents may vote no because of an objection to gov-
ernment taxation that is entirely unrelated to the value of the good in
question. If so, in contrast to yea-saying effects, this would result in a
negative bias in estimates of WTP. While it is becoming increasingly
common to follow no responses with a question intended to ascertain
whether the vote is a protest no, there is not a consensus as to whether
such responses should be excluded from statistical analysis (Bennett,
Morrison, and Blamey 1998; Boyle et al. 1996; Haab 1999; Jorgensen
et al. 1999; Morrisson, Blamey, and Bennett 2000; Olsen 1997; Ready,
Buzby, and Hu 1996). This issue is of less concern to our analysis
because the payment technique is not in the form of a tax.
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The embedding or scope issue pertains to whether respondents
adjust their valuations in a rational way when the scope of the benefit
or commodity in question changes. For example, do responses vary in
the expected way between a small benefit (e.g., cleaning up one section
of a polluted water system) that is embedded within a larger one (clean-
ing up the entire water system)? This issue had begun to receive atten-
tion prior to the development of our survey instrument (see, for
example, Harrison 1992 and Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), but has
become a central focus of debate in recent years. Again, the evidence
suggests that lack of a scope effect may be more of a problem for
dichotomous choice CV questions than for open-ended CV questions.
While some authors are skeptical of CVM because of this empirical
phenomenon, others argue that an absence of observed scope effects
may be consistent with economic theory in some cases and may result
from lack of clarity in defining the scope of the benefits being valued
in others rather than being a weakness of the methodology itself (Harri-
son 1992; Smith 1996; Whitehead, Haab, and Huang 1998). Scope
effects may be less problematic in our situation because the benefit
under consideration was very clearly defined and is more likely to be
viewed as a distinct entity rather than as a part of a larger benefit. 
These concerns about the dichotomous choice CV elicitation tech-
nique, along with its potential statistical inefficiency relative to other
approaches because of the limited information collected, must be
weighed against its advantages and the problems associated with the
alternatives. Our preliminary fieldwork suggested that the greater sim-
plicity and concreteness of a dichotomous, closed-ended elicitation
technique would yield more reliable information than would an open-
ended design or a more complex closed-ended design (Burton 2000;
Cameron and Huppert 1991; Herriges and Shogren 1996; Johannesson
et al. 1999; Scarpa and Bateman 2000; Swallow, Opaluch, and Weaver
2001). Thus, this was the strategy adopted at the outset of the study.
Given the numerous alternative CV elicitation techniques, and the
ongoing analysis of their pros and cons as touched upon in this review,
one can always question such decisions. The good news is that the
results presented in the next chapter are, we believe, encouraging as to
the value of the approach for this type of application.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Arrow et al. (1993), Bishop and Heberlein (1979), Freeman
(1993), Herriges and Kling (1999), Mitchell and Carson (1989), O’Connor and
Spash (1999), and Portney (1994) for more detailed discussion of the economic
theory underlying CVM.
2. See Cavalluzzo (1991) and Gerking, de Haan, and Schulze (1988) for examples of
CVM applied to labor market issues.
3. The price elasticity of the child care benefit is a measure of the sensitivity of the
respondents’ “votes” on the contingent valuation question regarding the continua-
tion (or establishment) of the on-site child care center to an increase in the amount
the respondent is asked to pay. The method for calculating the price elasticity is
described in Chapter 7.
4. In environmental applications, the non-use value of a wilderness area, for exam-
ple, would be the utility value the taxpayer gets from simply knowing that the wil-
derness area exists. Here non-users may receive that type of utility enhancement
or they may benefit indirectly from the decreased absenteeism or higher produc-
tivity of their fellow employees.
5. This section can be skipped without loss of continuity.
6. In particular, see Hausman (1993) or Diamond and Hausman (1994) for a critical
perspective on contingent valuation. Also see Hanemann (1994) for a review and
rebuttal of criticisms of the technique.
7. Americans are typically not very experienced at offering bids for the goods they
purchase, unlike residents of some countries where prices for many goods are rou-
tinely negotiated.
8. A recent paper by Carson, Groves, and Machina (1999) suggests that CV ques-
tions are less likely to be subject to hypothetical bias and, thus, more likely to
elicit meaningful results if the outcome of the vote has a real and direct impact on
the respondent. This is in contrast to the conventional wisdom in the CV literature
that such a scenario would be prone to strategic bias.
9. This section can be skipped without loss of continuity.
10. See, for example, Bennett, Morrison, and Blamey (1998); Bjornstad, Cummings,
and Osborne (1997); Blumenschein et al. (1998 and 2001); Boyle et al. (1996);
Carlsson and Martinsson (2001); Cummings et al. (1997); Frykblom and Shogren
(2000); Halvorsen and Soelensminde (1998); Herriges and Shogren 1996);
Holmes and Kramer (1995); Kanninen (1995); Loomis, Traynor, and Brown
(1999); O’Connor, Johannesson, and Johansson (1999); Ready, Buzby, and Hu
(1996); Smith (1996); Smith and Osborne (1996); Svedsater (2000); Taylor et al.





On-Site Child Care 
I was told yesterday that they [one of the firm’s competitors] called up
one of our programmers, probably our best programmer, who has two
children in the child care center and said, “We would like to hire you,”
and she said (well, the way she relayed the story was she said), “Well,
do you have day care?” Of course, she knew they didn’t, but it was her
way of saying she would never leave Action because of the day care
issue.
—Action owner talking about the value of the on-site child care
center to his employees
This chapter presents the results of the contingent valuation analy-
sis of the employees of the three manufacturing firms in our study.1 We
argued in Chapter 6 that CVM is an appropriate strategy to employ in
order to derive a direct measure of the value of the ESCC benefit to
employees. Our analysis of the closed-ended referendum style CV
question allows us to estimate a willingness to pay (WTP) for the bene-
fit for each employee interviewed. We then consider the average WTP
values for meaningful groups of employees and calculate the total ben-
efit to the employer based on employee WTP. The results presented in
this chapter support the usefulness of CV models in estimating the
value of the ESCC benefit to employees. For each firm, the price vari-
able in the multivariate CV model is significantly negative, indicating
that employees could answer CV questions consistently and rationally.
The results also support our hypothesis, based on the framework for
understanding the value of employee benefits to the firm presented in
Chapter 3, that newly hired workers would value the ESCC more
highly than longer-term workers. In fact, non-Hmong new hires value
the ESCC at more than $14 per two-week pay period at Action Indus-
tries and Central Products, and at more than $12 at Bell Manufacturing,
compared with values of $5 or less for longer-term workers.
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Beyond the value new hires place on the benefit as indicated by the
CV estimates, we find a substantial value of ESCC to employees who
do not currently have young children, with little evidence of resent-
ment from workers not presently enrolling children in the on-site cen-
ter. Employees not directly benefitting from the on-site center may get
indirect benefits because they care about their co-workers, or they may
gain from the increased productivity of their co-workers or from the
economic health of the company in general. Regardless of the reason,
the company can offer lower monetary wage payments if its employees
value the ESCC. If one takes the value to new hires as an estimate of
cost savings to the firm in terms of wage increases avoided, as shown
later in this chapter, the firms are saving between about one-half and
twice the cost of their reported subsidy to the on-site center. In addi-
tion, recall that this estimate does not include the other expected cost
savings to the firm of on-site child care arising from reduced turnover
and absenteeism and increased worker productivity. 
The next section describes the CV data and the estimation proce-
dure, with a brief summary of the overall model results. We then focus
special attention on the price variable, analyzing the results of the mul-
tivariate estimation to understand the determinants of WTP. Finally, the
WTP estimates are used to calculate the potential value to the firm of
the on-site center. Throughout the chapter, the statistical analysis is
supplemented with qualitative responses from the employees about the
value received from ESCC that deepen our understanding of the think-
ing behind the votes. 
THE CONTINGENT VALUATION VOTES 
AND MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Children are the future. 
—A 33-year-old never-married male material handler with no
children employed by Bell Manufacturing explaining why he
voted yes to pay to maintain the on-site center
I took care of my kids.
—A 50-year-old woman finisher at Bell Manufacturing explain-
ing why she voted no
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CVM, as described in the preceding chapter, was applied to each of
the three study sites, with slight differences in the CV questions for the
two firms with an on-site center versus the one without a center (see
Appendix A). Unlike the analysis in Chapter 5 that focuses on the use
of ESCC and, thus, must exclude the Hmong employees, this analysis
includes the Hmong. Before discussing the results of the multivariate
analysis and the estimates of WTP, we first briefly consider the CV bid
responses themselves. Table 7.1 summarizes the bid (“price”) distribu-
tion for each firm and bid response according to category. Two points
to note are the relatively wide range of the bid structure and the
decreasing percentage of yes responses as the bid value increases. The
wide range of the bid structure is a product of the survey design and
our pre-testing, and it is important for creating the needed variation for
multivariate analysis. The aggregate response pattern is important
because it is consistent with price theory and rational consumer behav-
ior, providing evidence in support of the CV approach and the validity
of this set of data. It is also interesting to note that the overall percent-
age of yes votes for Central Products, the firm without an on-site child
care center, is similar in magnitude to that for Action Industries. Bell
Manufacturing employees voted yes somewhat more frequently, which
is consistent with the fact that the bid distribution at Bell is more highly
concentrated at the lower end of the price distribution.
Using the employees’ responses to “Would you vote for . . .?” as
the dependent variable and the price read by the interviewer as one of a
set of independent variables, we estimate a multivariate probit equation
for each firm separately. Descriptive statistics for the dependent vari-
able and the explanatory variables are provided in Table 7.2. The probit
results are shown in Table 7.3. The results in Table 7.3 indicate that the
“price” of the benefit consistently has a significant negative effect on
the probability that the employee votes yes. Recall that voting yes is
voting to pay an amount per pay period to have an on-site center. The
price elasticities across the three firms are reported in Table 7.4 and
show a limited sensitivity of voting probabilities to the price. Statistical
tests for differences across firms find that Action employees have a
lower mean price elasticity (in absolute value) than either Bell or Cen-
tral employees, indicating that the responses at Action are less strongly
influenced by the price offered. The difference between the average
90Table 7.1 Distribution of CV Bids Offered to Employees for Payment for On-Site Child Care, and Percent Agreeing 
to Paya
Bid statistics Action Industries Bell Manufacturing Central Products
Mean $14.27 $11.03 $13.46
Standard deviation $14.48 $10.96 $11.32
Minimum $2.00 $2.00 $2.00
Maximum $60.00 $60.00 $60.00






















$1–10 197 61.76 49.24 152 72.38 57.24 258 64.02 45.74
$11–20 62 19.44 43.55 31 14.76 29.03 81 20.10 40.74
$20 + 60 18.81 21.67 27 12.86 18.52 64 15.88 23.44
Totala 319 100.00 42.99 210 100.00 48.36 403 100.00 40.99
NOTE: The sample sizes vary slightly across tables in this chapter due to missing data for the selected variables.
a The CV bid offers are used in the following question at Action and Bell (the wording is slightly different at Central), with employees
responding yes or no: “Would you VOTE YES to a payroll deduction of $__per two-week pay period in order to keep the child care cen-
ter open?”
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% voting yes 42.4 49.2 40.5
Mean number of children under 
age 6
0.45 0.29 0.40
% with children under age 6 and 
who also have relatives in the area
12.5 11.6 15.0
Mean number of children aged
 6 to 18
0.65 0.52 0.62
Mean hours worked per week 40.5 45.4 41.7
College graduate (%) 7.1 3.5 2.0
Category of worker:
% hourly office workers or 
salaried
27.2 22.6 17.0
% hourly production workers 32.4 37.2 37.2
% pieceworkers 40.4 40.2 45.8
% 1st shift 67.6 84.4 59.5
Marital status:
% married, widowed 69.3 62.8 62.4
% divorced 14.7 16.6 18.3
% never married 16.0 20.6 19.3
Mean age (years) 35.7 38.1 37.0
% male 19.6 25.1 32.1
Race/ethnicity:
% White 83.7 80.4 70.7
% Hispanic 0.0 4.5 0.0
% African American 4.5 15.1 5.9
% Hmong 9.9 0.0 21.4
% other (other Asian at Central) 1.9 0.0 2.0
Mean years with firm 5.4 7.6 5.8
Mean years lived in area as % of age 86.1 77.9 62.1
Miles from home to work 11.5 9.0 14.6
Number of employees surveyed 312 199 393
NOTE: The sample sizes vary slightly across tables in this chapter due to missing data
for the selected variables.
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Table 7.3 Marginal Effects on Employees’ Probability of Voting Yes to 
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Table 7.4 Elasticity of a Yes Vote by Employees with Respect to the 




















Number of employees 312 199 393
Log likelihood –186.03 –117.64 –224.74
Chi-squared 54.23*** 40.55*** 80.93***
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significantly different at the 0.10 level,
**significantly different at the 0.05 level, ***significantly different at the 0.01 level.







All employees –0.165 –0.246 –0.235
Newly hired employees –0.171 –0.261 –0.277
***
Non-newly hired employees –0.162 –0.233 –0.194




Non-newly hired non-Hmong 
employees
–0.166 –0.233 –0.209







 under age 6
–0.148 –0.257 –0.197 





Employees with young children 
who currently do not use 
on-site center
–0.114 –0.212
NOTE: The bracket indicates that a statistical test for difference was performed using a
pairwise t-test with unequal variance. **Significantly different at the 0.05 level,
***significantly different at the 0.01 level. Blank cell = not applicable.
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values for Bell and Central is not statistically significant.2 This result is
maintained if we limit our analysis to non-Hmong employees. 
Of greater interest are the price elasticities for particular subsets of
employees. Table 7.4 also reports a set of average elasticities calculated
for different groups of employees from each firm. Looking at groups of
workers within firms, there is not a significant difference in elasticities
of demand between newly hired (job tenure of two years or less) and
longer-term employees at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing,
but at Central Products new hires are more price elastic. This statement
holds for both the entire sample of employees and the non-Hmong
sample. The result may be due to the fact that the question about an on-
site center is more hypothetical at Central than at Action or Bell as
Central is the firm without an on-site center.
There are statistically significant differences in the elasticities of
employees with and without young children at Action and Central, and
between users of the on-site center and employees with young children
who do not use the on-site center at Action. Employees with young
children and employees whose children use the center are more elastic
in their demand than are other employees. Recall that these elasticities
come from the multivariate analysis, so age and education are con-
trolled for in the calculation. Wages are not completely controlled for,
but the regression does contain a variable indicating if someone is paid
by the piece or hourly, or is salaried, which, in these firms, is a good
proxy for variations in wages. One explanation for the smaller price
elasticity among those without young children might be that a higher
percentage of them simply consider on-site child care irrelevant so they
vote no regardless of the price. Consequently, the elasticity is low not
because they must have it, but because they always buy zero. In con-
trast, some of those with young children may consider it a viable option
for themselves at a lower price, but not at a higher price. Thus, their
demand would be more elastic. Alternatively, the difference in elastici-
ties may be the result of some self-consciousness on the part of parents
with young children regarding imposing their choices on others as
costs. 
While our primary interest is the effect of price, and the corre-
sponding WTP estimates discussed in the next section, it is useful to
briefly consider some of the other results of the probit models in Table
7.3.3 Other than price, surprisingly few of the coefficients are statisti-
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cally significant. For example, we expected that employees with young
children would be more likely to vote yes, but the coefficients for that
variable are statistically insignificant for all three firms. This is inter-
esting because it suggests that whether or not employees have young
children does not systematically affect the value they place on on-site
child care. In addition, variables that are significant at one firm do not
necessarily imply significance across firms.4 One interesting finding is
that at both Action Industries and Central Products, the length of time
the respondent has been employed by the company is negatively corre-
lated with a yes vote. This implies that new employees value the bene-
fit more highly, which is in keeping with our theory of firms seeking to
attract marginal labor force participants. Because we have controlled
for age, this result is not merely an age effect. Also, at both Action and
Central, Hmong workers are significantly less likely to vote yes (with a
liberal interpretation of significance in the case of Action). We believe
this result is related to the Hmong’s strong cultural beliefs against non-
familial child care. Not only will the individual Hmong worker not use
the center, she knows that her Hmong friends and co-workers will not
use it either.
DETERMINANTS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY (WTP) 
FOR AN ON-SITE CENTER
Convenience of location, trust people here, inexpensive.
—An Action Industries employee whose child was enrolled at the
on-site center explaining why she voted yes
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present two ways to compare employee valua-
tions of the child care benefit by selected characteristics. Table 7.5 cal-
culates the mean WTP for the on-site center. This is an amount per
biweekly paycheck and is above and beyond the user fee for the cen-
ter.5 The mean values for the full samples at Action Industries and Bell
Manufacturing indicate that the average WTP (in nominal terms) for an
on-site center is between about $150 and $225 a year. This is a fairly
substantial amount given the small proportion of employees benefiting
directly from the center, but it is in keeping with the rhetoric we heard
on the factory floor that Action and Bell employees believe that the
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Table 7.5 Mean Willingness to Pay (Biweekly Amount) for Employer-
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NOTE: The total number of employees in the “voted yes” and “voted no” categories may not
equal the total number of employees in the full sample because of missing data. The “on-
site users” category may include some grandparents who are not included in the “with chil-
dren” category. The bracket indicates that a statistical test for difference was performed
using a pairwise t-test with unequal variance. *Significantly different at the 0.10 level;
**significantly different at the 0.05 level; ***significantly different at the 0.01 level. Blank
cell = not applicable.
child care center increased their companies’ abilities to compete in a
highly competitive market. For example, a 30-year-old female salaried
employee at Action voted yes saying, “It is important beyond the cost,
it reduces turnover, and enhances our productivity.” Several other
employees at Action and Bell made comments similar to this. However,
lest we attribute it all to good public relations on the part of the person-
nel office, we find that employees at Central Products are also willing
to pay, on average, about $125 a year to fund an on-site center at their
plant and additionally describe benefits to ESCC beyond those to indi-
vidual workers’ children. A 26-year-old male shipping clerk at Central
said that an on-site center would “save the company in the long run,”
and a 47-year-old administrator at Central voted yes saying, that it
“would help with recruitment.”
Treating the WTP values as sample observations, we can test for
statistical differences across firms.6 In terms of the full sample means,
we find that Bell Manufacturing employees are willing to pay signifi-
Employee Valuation of Employer-Sponsored On-Site Child Care 99
cantly more than either Action Industries or Central Products employ-
ees, controlling for changes in the cost of living over time. The
difference between Action and Central is not statistically significant.
This pattern led us to question whether the result was the effect of the
strong Hmong presence at Action and Central. Rows 2 and 3 of Table
7.5 compare the WTP of the Hmong at Action and Central and the non-
Hmong employees at all three firms.7 Comparing WTP for the non-
Hmong sample across the three firms, we find remarkably similar WTP
(no statistically significant differences). Given that for employees at
one of the firms an on-site center was pure fiction, while at the other
firms it was a reality, the similarity of results is encouraging in terms of
the ability of CV questions to elicit meaningful responses in hypotheti-
cal situations.
Similarly, Table 7.6 shows that at least 50 percent of employees at
each of the three firms can be expected to vote yes at a price of $5 per
pay period (which corresponds to $130 per year). Bell Manufacturing
employees are the most likely to vote yes at a price of $5, with Action
Industries and Central Products employees voting almost identically.
The probability of voting yes follows similar patterns to the mean
WTP. These results are in keeping with a 1996 Gallup Poll, which
asked workers how they would respond if their employer asked them to
contribute a percentage of their income towards an on-site center.
Almost 60 percent said that they would contribute, with little differ-
ence between those with and without children. In fact, 54 percent of the
childless employees in that poll said that they would contribute some-
thing (McIntyre 2000).
It is also interesting to note in Table 7.5 that the mean WTP for
those who voted yes is substantially larger than for those who voted no
for each of the three firms.8 This is consistent with expectations and
increases our confidence that respondents’ answers to the CV ques-
tions are meaningful. 
The remainder of Tables 7.5 and 7.6 highlights differences across
selected groups of employees in their WTP and in their probability of
voting yes. We had expected that employees with young children
would have a significantly higher WTP than those without young chil-
dren, but that is not the case at Action Industries or Bell Manufactur-
ing. We believe that there are two explanations for this finding. The
first is that the category of employees with young children is made up
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Table 7.6 Probability of Voting Yes to Help Pay for an Employer-
Sponsored On-Site Child Care Center at a Price of $5 
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NOTE: The bracket indicates that a statistical test for difference was performed using a
pairwise t-test with unequal variance except for job type, which was tested using a
one-way analysis of variance. **Significantly different at the 0.05 level; ***signifi-
cantly different at the 0.01 level. Blank cell = not applicable.
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of two very different groups, users of the center and non-users. Individ-
uals may be non-users because they do not like the center, either from
experience or in principle, because they have relatives who are willing
to care for the child at less cost to the family, or because the employee
is on the waiting list for child care center slots.9 For example, a 27-
year-old male supervisor at Bell with one young child and one “on the
way” voted no, saying that “I don’t like how they do children, the child
care center is low quality.” He and his wife had both worked at Bell
and had enrolled their child in the on-site center for six months. At that
point, his wife quit her job to stay home with their son. Also at Bell,
one 19-year-old woman with a 3-year-old child voted no, saying, “I
don’t think everyone should pay. Some people are on the waiting list,
so what’s the point of making them pay when they can’t even get their
children into it [the on-site center].” She was on the waiting list herself.
Any members of these groups may have reason not to ascribe much
value to the center. Consistent with this explanation, employees with
young children at Central Products, who have no experience with on-
site child care and therefore include no workers who have chosen not
to use it or who have not been able to get a slot, have a significantly
larger mean WTP than do those without young children.
Center users at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing can be
expected to derive substantial benefits from the facility, although we
cannot assume that the benefits are greater than the parental cost of
approximately $50 per week. Indeed, Table 7.5 shows that users of the
on-site center at Action have a greater mean WTP than non-users as a
whole and non-users who have children under age six. At Bell, the
mean WTP does not differ significantly across these three groups.
Employees with children under age six at Action and Bell who report
having relatives available to care for their child also reveal a much
lower WTP than those without relatives available. Thus, part of the
explanation of the comparison of employees with and without young
children can be attributed to substantial heterogeneity in the population
of employees with young children. In a tight labor market, a firm may
need to reach the woman who does not have a relative willing to care
for her child because the one who has such a relative is probably
already employed. As one 32-year-old female employee of Action
Industries who had two children enrolled at the on-site center said in
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explaining why she voted yes, “If I didn’t have day care I couldn’t
work.”
The second potential explanation for the lack of difference in WTP
between employees with and without young children derives from
comments we heard repeatedly in conjunction with our questions.
Employees without young children talked about their friends and co-
workers struggling with child care. For example, one non-user at Bell
Manufacturing voted yes in order to “Keep it [the on-site center] open
for my coworkers.” Similarly, a non-user at Action voted yes saying,
“The benefit is important to mothers who have no other alternatives.”
Because the location of decision making is the individual firm, the vot-
ing was much less abstract than it usually is in the case of CV measures
of environmental amenities. In economic terminology, we might say
that because the employees are friends or long-time acquaintances,
they internalize some of the externalities. 
Internalizing the externalities operates in the other direction as
well. Users of the on-site center were sometimes reluctant to burden
their co-workers with extra costs, even though they themselves
received benefits from the on-site center greater than their user costs.
They knew, for example, that Sheila, who worked in their unit, was
barely managing as the single mother of two teenage boys, and they
were reluctant to burden her with their needs. A 40-year-old male
employee with two children aged 6 and 4 said he was not sure how to
vote because “It would help me but would hurt others who did not have
kids.” Similarly, a 30-year-old female employee of Action Industries
with a 4-year-old child enrolled in the on-site center voted no, saying,
“It is not fair. I don’t think everyone should have to pay for it.” Further
probing of respondents indicated that almost all employees supported
the payroll deduction if it only applied to users of the center. Repeat-
edly, workers indicated to the interviewer that they were willing to pay
(even among those without young children) but not willing to expect it
of others. 
Of course, not all responses were altruistic in their motivation. For
example, some center users talked about the importance of the child
care to themselves. A 30-year-old woman with one young child voted
yes because “It is hard to find good day care.” Some non-users who
voted yes, such as one 21-year-old woman with no children said, “You
never know. I might have a baby someday.” Similarly, a 44-year-old
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woman pieceworker voted yes, saying, “I might use it for my grand-
children.” Other non-users voted no, saying, “We paid when we had
children.” 
Some workers cited concern for the company’s well-being as the
reason why they voted yes. If lower absenteeism and higher productiv-
ity are correlated with the provision of on-site day care, and if all
employees’ jobs depend on their firm’s productivity in light of the
extremely competitive market in which these companies operate, then
even non-users receive a “use value” from the child care benefit. Such
arguments are echoed in the qualitative responses of many of the man-
agers with whom we spoke. To illustrate, at Action Industries, a 30-
year-old woman manager with children enrolled in the center voted
yes, saying, “It is important beyond the cost. The center reduces turn-
over and increases productivity.” Similarly, a 46-year-old woman man-
ager at Central voted yes, saying, “It would be worth it to keep the
workforce.” While a number of managers at all three firms cited this
type of reason for their vote, this rationale was not confined to manag-
ers. For example, a 26-year-old man employed in shipping at Central
Products voted yes, saying, “A day care center could save the company
in the long run.” At Action, a 50-year-old female pieceworker voted
yes, saying, “It stops absenteeism.”
These quotations provide a sampling of respondents’ thinking
about their votes. We asked all respondents specifically why they voted
the way they did, and Table 7.7 shows some of the results for that ques-
tion. For example, in row 1 we see that at each firm, about 40 percent
of the respondents voted no because they thought that not everyone
should be forced to pay for the child care center. While this might be
seen as a denial of a non-use value on the part of non-users, we are hard
put to assign that meaning to the result given that 40 percent of the
users of the Action Industries center and 33 percent of the users of the
Bell Manufacturing center also give this reason for voting no (row 2).
Instead, we would argue that these results represent evidence of work-
ers internalizing the externalities. Similarly, row 3 shows the percent-
age who claim that they voted yes because they felt the benefit was
important to all. Fewer of the on-site center users were willing to vote
yes for this reason, although the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant given the small sample of on-site users. Still, the on-site users
seem to be unwilling to foist the support of the child care center on
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Table 7.7 Percentage of Employees Voting Yes or No to Help Pay 
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their fellow employees. In contrast, older employees who are much
less likely to be present or future child care center users were often
willing to vote yes because they felt the benefit was important to all
employees. At Bell and Central the differences between the age groups
were statistically significant at the 10 percent level with a two-tailed
test, suggesting that the motivation to vote yes to benefit all employees
was more widespread among younger workers.
Does caring behavior on the part of employees for their co-workers
mean that this methodology for valuing an ESCC is flawed? We argue
that it does not, because firms can reduce wage payments to workers if
the employees value the ESCC regardless of the source of the valua-
tion. Indeed, the results demonstrate that the expectation of on-site cen-
ters generating substantial value to most employees is a reasonable
one. At Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing we find no evidence
of substantial employee resentment of the on-site center, a concern
raised by a recent popular book by Burkett (2000). Instead, we find
evidence that about 50 percent of employees without young children
(60 percent at Bell) would vote yes to taxing themselves $5 per pay
period to support an on-site center (Table 7.6). Caring behavior may,
however, bring into doubt the referendum style of asking the question
under which the majority vote applies to all. In a context where survey
respondents know each other fairly well, the referendum style CV
question may underestimate the value of the benefit.10 Further analysis
of this issue in future research would be useful to the broader applica-
tion of the CVM.
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 include selected additional comparisons relating
to issues that often arise in discussions of on-site child care centers.
Some studies have noted that such centers are so expensive that sup-
port and production staff cannot afford to use them unless the firm has
a sliding-fee scale. This is not the case at Action Industries and Bell
Manufacturing because the on-site centers could not survive with man-
agers’ children only: there are not enough managers in this production
industry for that to be the case. However, hourly office staff and sala-
ried staff at all three firms value the on-site center highly, substantially
more so in most cases than do hourly production workers and piece-
rate workers (Table 7.5). Consistent with this, we also see in both
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 that college graduates value the on-site center much
more highly than do those with less education. This suggests that on-
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site child care may be an attractive way to recruit and retain managers
and other more highly educated workers, a point also made by several
of the firms’ managers with whom we spoke. 
Top management at Action Industries noted that the unintended
consequence of the on-site center has been increased attractiveness of
administrative jobs to women with young children. Action’s president
said, “I think it [having a child care center] really sets the company cul-
ture.” The interviewer then asked, “Does it do more than set company
culture? Does it make people stay? Does it make people more produc-
tive?” Action’s president responded,
I think it helps. I think it has helped us attract more white-collar
people, younger white-collar people that might not be working or
just started. They also have some options about how they want to
work and where they want to work. They probably want to work
in our industry and for our company because they have access to
the day care.
Action’s owner recalled his decision to open the on-site center this
way, 
I first saw it, as I said, as basically a way to attract line employees,
reduce absenteeism, and reduce turnover. Those remain important
benefits, although the absentee issue probably was never effec-
tively encountered because, rightly so, the state laws don’t allow
day care centers to keep sick children. But the turnover rates [are
affected], and more importantly probably than the turnover rates
themselves, is its usefulness in attracting people. Some of the best
line employees say that I want to work at Action specifically
because they have a child care center and I don’t want to be sepa-
rated physically from our children. It’s important. In addition to
that though, I didn’t really visualize how important a role that it
would play in the company in terms of attracting management. It’s
probably had a more dramatic effect in attracting management in
the 25 years that we have been down here.
Another concern in the literature on child care centers is the corre-
spondence between the time of day of care and the time of day of
employment. All three firms were running three shifts at the time of
our interviews. Second- and third-shift workers are less likely to be
able to use the on-site center to facilitate their employment and thus
might be expected to value it less. This does seem to be the case at
Employee Valuation of Employer-Sponsored On-Site Child Care 107
Action Industries, but it is not the case at Bell Manufacturing, where
the opposite holds, or at Central Products, where the difference by shift
is not statistically significant. The analysis presented in Chapter 5
shows that users of the on-site centers at Action and Bell are predomi-
nantly, though not exclusively, first-shift workers. Thus, the sizeable
valuation of the center by non-first-shift workers at Bell and the mod-
erate valuation of a hypothetical center by such workers at Central pro-
vide further evidence of employee value beyond that accruing to
parents of children enrolled in the on-site center.
WTP AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE POTENTIAL WAGE 
SAVINGS TO FIRMS
Based on the theoretical discussion of the firm’s motivation in pro-
viding ESCC, one of the categories of greatest interest to the firm should
be the valuation of the ESCC by newly hired employees. Table 7.5
shows that new hires have a substantially higher average WTP than
longer-term workers. At Action Industries, newly hired workers are
willing to pay an average of about $10 per pay period compared to only
about $4 for employees who have been with the company for more than
two years. Bell Manufacturing and Central Products also show large dif-
ferentials across these employees. It is instructive to consider how this
compares to the firm providing the equivalent value to new employees
directly through higher wages. If a $15 wage increase per pay period
would be needed to achieve a $10 increase in after-tax take-home pay
(value to the worker), and if the wage increase had to be made across-
the-board, an estimate of Action savings from the wage bill portion of
the total benefits of having an on-site center would be about $234,000
per year.11 This may even be a low estimate because of the presence of
a substantial number of Hmong workers at Action. The mean WTP of
Hmong employees is negative at both Action and Central. Because
many of the new hires are Hmong, we recalculate the mean WTP of new
hires at Action, excluding the Hmong, to be $14.87 per pay period.
Using this number as the WTP of a new hire, we derive a wage bill sav-
ings using the same methodology of about $351,000 per year. Of course,
the firm might choose instead to actively recruit Hmong workers. This
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strategy also involves costs, including perhaps larger premiums for
health insurance, given that Hmong fertility is so high. 
At the time of our visit, Central Products did seem to be actively
recruiting Hmong employees, which is in keeping with the stance of its
human resource manager against a child care center. If we look at the
WTP at Central of non-Hmong new hires, we find it is $14.22, as com-
pared to $7.79 for all new hires, corresponding to an estimated savings
in wages (calculated as before) of about $355,000 and $195,000 per
year, respectively. The mean WTP of new hires at Bell Manufacturing,
where there are no Hmong workers, is $12.36. This corresponds to an
estimated wage bill savings of about $145,000 per year.
If one preferred to base wage savings estimates on the average
WTP for all employees instead of newly hired employees, the esti-
mates would be $122,000 per year for Action, $177,000 per year for
Bell, and $99,000 per year for Central. Even these figures are above the
estimated cost of approximately $130,000 at Action and $100,000 at
Bell supporting the on-site center. Recall too that the full benefit to the
firm of ESCC includes reductions in turnover and recruiting costs and
increases in productivity as well as wage savings. While we have no
estimates of the size of the cost savings for turnover and recruiting,
management at Action and Bell was convinced that these cost savings
did exist. On this topic, Action’s owner said, 
When we first started in child care we tried to, when we were
asked to talk about it and make speeches, come up with actual cost
paybacks and we found they were generally manipulative and
arguable. So we sort of just got into the habit of saying, “Well, we
feel it works and makes our company, our atmosphere, better.”
For what it costs, we seem to enjoy a better turnover rate than our
competitors in the area and so we accept it. I feel there is a bottom
line payback for all of this. 
DISCUSSION
We believe that the results presented in this chapter support the use
of CV models to estimate the value of employer-sponsored on-site
child care to employees. Consistent and rational results are obtained
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from the employees of each medium-sized firm in that those offered
higher prices were systematically less likely to vote yes, and that indi-
viduals who were using the on-site center at Action Industries had a
higher WTP than other employees. Our findings provide evidence
(albeit limited to three firms) that ESCC is valued by a broad spectrum
of employees beyond those whose children are enrolled in the center,
and beyond those in management. The results also support our hypoth-
esis that newly hired personnel would value the ESCC more highly
than longer-term workers. Non-Hmong new hires valued the ESCC at
more than $12 per two-week pay period at each of the three firms,
compared with values of $5 or less for longer-term workers. If one
takes the value to new hires as an estimate of cost savings to the firm in
terms of wage increases avoided for all employees, the firms are saving
between about one-half and twice the cost of their reported annual sub-
sidy to the on-site centers. 
In addition to the value for new hires, we find a substantial value of
ESCC to employees not directly benefitting from the on-site center,
with little evidence of resentment from workers without young chil-
dren. Caring among employees may explain part of the value that non-
users of the on-site center receive and may also explain why some
users were unwilling to “tax” their coworkers although they them-
selves received substantial benefits from the ESCC. Finally, as argued
in the preceding chapter, the estimates of “non-use” value derived here
are less likely to be subject to a variety of biasing effects that may arise
in the estimation of the non-use value of environmental amenities.
Overall, the results suggest that this methodology would be a useful
tool for the analysis of employer-provided benefits more generally.
Notes
1. This analysis is also reported on in Connelly, DeGraff, and Willis (2003).
2. The elasticities were derived for each individual in the sample by calculating the
percentage change in his or her probability of voting yes caused by a simulated 1
percent change in the price offered. The table reports the mean elasticity for the
individuals in that sample group. The statistical tests for significance across
groups were standard t-tests conducted as if the calculated individual elasticities
were observed data.
3. In addition to controlling for the “price” of the on-site center and demographic
characteristics of employees, we also control for when the CV child care question
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was asked in the survey. We randomized the location of the CV question for on-
site child care relative to the CV question(s) for other benefits because of our
interest in multiple benefits and our concern that the order of the CV questions
might systematically affect responses (Kartman, Stalhåmmar, and Johannesson
1996; Mitchell and Carson 1989). Our results show that asking the question sec-
ond reduces the probability of the vote being yes. Perhaps the rigor of the hypo-
thetical referendum question is annoying the second time through, and thus
respondents register their annoyance by voting no more often. Alternatively, per-
haps people understand the question better the second time. This result, whatever
its cause, suggests that, in general, if asking multiple CV questions it is important
to randomize their order and to control for ordering in modes estimation.
4. We experimented with alternative specifications of the CV probit equation with
very little effect on the basic outcomes shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. For Bell
Manufacturing and Central Products (but not for Action Industries) we have
employee wage information and included wages as an additional explanatory
variable. Comparison of coefficients with and without wages included shows
almost no change in the price elasticity and no change in which variable are or are
not significant. Because all of the respondents represented in each estimation
work for the same firm, our occupation dummy variables are capturing most of
the wage differentials. For Central, the wage variable itself is significantly nega-
tive. For Bell, the wage variable is not significant. We also experimented with
including a control variable indicating whether the respondent is an on-site center
user. As one might expect, center users are more likely to vote yes for a general
payroll deduction to maintain the on-site center. The price elasticities were not
much changed by the inclusion of this variable. Because this variable has the
potential of introducing endogeneity bias, we calculate the WRP estimates based
on the results without the center-user dummy variable.
5. For each respondent, the WTP is the price that would make the respondent
equally likely to vote yes or no, based on the estimated model and the employee’s
characteristics.
6. By treating the WTP as sample values we are ignoring the fact that the WTP value
was calculated from the estimated coefficients of the probit model. Given the
complicated nonlinear calculation formula for WTP it is not possible to solve for
the standard error of each WTP estimate.
7. Recall that Bell Manufacturing had no Hmong employees at the time.
8. Recall that a no vote is in response to a particular price; the model’s results allow
us to estimate at what lower price (if any) those who voted no would have voted
yes.
9. Both Action and Bell had waiting lists at the time of our survey.
10. This relates to the discussion of the “protest nos” presented earlier. In our case, as
opposed to arising out of an objection to government taxation, many no responses
arose out of concern for co-workers. When such no responses are removed from
the statistical analysis, the probit results regarding the significance and magnitude
of the price effect are essentially unchanged. However, as expected, estimates of
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the mean WTP are larger with this sample exclusion. We present the results of the
full sample, both because of concern about the robustness of results when sample
size is reduced, and because of the conceptual difference between the scenario
encountered here and that discussed in the CV literature.
11. $15 per pay period × 600 employees × 26 pay periods = $234,000. This methodol-
ogy provides an upper-bound estimate of wage bill savings because it assumes




Discussion and Policy Implications 
The discussion of the last two chapters has concentrated on directly
estimating the value employees receive from working for a firm that
provides employer-sponsored on-site child care. Earlier we focused on
usage of the on-site center as an indirect measure of value. Both the
indirect method of analyzing child care use patterns and the direct
method of applying contingent valuation to calculate the WTP for the
benefit lead to the conclusion that employees with young children
derive substantial advantages from ESCC, which go beyond simply
having a slot at a day care center. The convenience and reliability of
child care at one’s place of employment, hours of operation that corre-
spond to periods of work, proximity to the job so that visits during
breaks are possible, and quality that is “certified” by the employer are
additional benefits derived from an on-site center. Also important is the
availability of center slots for infants. Parents at the two firms that pro-
vide on-site child care are as likely to use center care for infants as for
older preschoolers, whereas national child care usage data consistently
show that center use increases with the age of preschool children. This
difference between the parents we interviewed and the national data
suggests that the lower use of center care for infants may be the result
of a lack of infant care slots at child care centers, or due to differences
in the characteristics of infant care where it is provided. 
The contingent valuation approach also provides evidence of bene-
fits from employer-sponsored on-site child care beyond those attained
by parents of young children. Indeed, our analysis yields results that
counter the argument that non-users have a negative attitude towards
ESCC, as implied by Burkett (2000). On the contrary, we find that
users and non-users display a positive WTP to maintain the firm’s on-
site center at Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing or, in the case
of Central Products, to open an on-site center. In fact, based on our
results, almost half of employees without young children at each of the
three firms would be expected to vote yes at a price of $5 per pay
period ($130 per year) in support of ESCC. The existence of substan-
tial value accruing to most employees from ESCC, along with evidence
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of caring of employees for one another, indicates that employers gain
benefits from many employees in addition to the users when on-site
child care is available. This is in keeping with Grover and Crooker’s
(1995) finding that family-friendly benefits increase the attachment of
all employees, regardless of their use of the benefit.
The benefits of employer-sponsored on-site child care that we
demonstrate through the quantitative analysis in this book are in addi-
tion to any gains the firm may derive from improvements in worker
productivity, or from reductions in absenteeism, turnover, or recruit-
ment costs. Ideally, one would study these effects directly as well, but
we were unable to gain access from the firms to the necessary person-
nel data. In terms of productivity gains, many Action Industries and
Bell Manufacturing workers, including those not using the child care
facility, indicated that they felt the on-site center helped the firm main-
tain a competitive position in the industry. In addition, qualitative evi-
dence from interviews with workers and supervisors ascribes some
reduction in absenteeism to the regularity of center care. We also know
from other studies that the breakdown of child care arrangements is a
source of stress for many parents and leads to a number of lost work
days per year (Floge 1985; Maume 1991; Meyers 1997). Hofferth and
Collins (2000) show that one-third of all women with some child care
arrangement have more than one such plan, and that 23 percent of all
women with some child care arrangement terminated a child care
arrangement during the year. They also find that ending a child care
arrangement was weakly positively correlated with leaving a job.
Whether overall turnover is reduced by the presence of an on-site cen-
ter remains an important research question. The qualitative evidence
from managers at Action and Bell suggests that the availability of
ESCC was important to their own tenure at those firms and to the ten-
ure of other managers. Because of the production focus of the firms we
studied and its implications for the composition of employees, the child
care centers at these two firms are not just an executive perk. Nonethe-
less, administrators with young children all used the center and men-
tioned how important it was to their own work/family balancing act.
Employee responses to why they voted the way they did also provide
evidence that employees with children in the on-site center are very
loyal to the center and to the firm. 
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In Chapter 3, we discussed a model of employer decision making
about the level and type of employee benefits to offer. That model
implicitly assumes that firms have the necessary information and
expertise to evaluate the expected costs and benefits of alternative
packages. If firms are not providing on-site child care because of the
difficulty of measuring the costs and the benefits of doing so, it is
hoped that the contingent valuation approach we demonstrate will help
individual firms to make the “right” choice. Appendix B contains the
full questionnaire except for the CV questions used in one of the com-
panies with an on-site center, while Appendix A contains the CV ques-
tions for firms with and without an on-site center (they differ slightly,
but importantly, in their wording). The questions could be easily
adapted to another firm or even to another benefit that the firm would
like to assess. The only caution is that the probit analysis requires a
sample size of more than 100 to produce robust results (a size of 200 to
300 is probably preferred). 
Simply offering the CV approach and making clear the full set of
benefits available to the firm from ESCC will not lead every employer
to offer on-site child care as a benefit. As suggested by the theoretical
model, for many companies, even with the proper accounting, the costs
may still outweigh the benefits that accrue to the firm. However, the
benefits to society as a whole may be expected to be greater than those
to the individual firm. For the remainder of this chapter, we consider
whether the government should play a role in the decision of firms to
offer ESCC as a benefit. Of course, that question is somewhat naive
given that government tax policy already affects the optimal trade-off
for firms between wage compensation and benefits, and among the
choice of benefits. For example, the tax-exempt status of both
employer and employee contributions to health insurance makes such
insurance a “good deal” for firms in that the value of the firm’s money
spent on the benefit is greater than the dollar expenditure. While such
policies undoubtedly have a relevant impact on firm behavior, we
focus here on policy that specifically targets child care. First we review
current government policy on child care, and then return to the issue of
the government’s role vis-à-vis ESCC.
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CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICY REGARDING 
CHILD CARE
There are currently four main strands of government policy related
to child care: 1) policies that acknowledge that there are work-related
expenses generated by child care and aim to reduce the impact of such
expenses on the taxable income of those in the labor force; 2)
approaches that specifically encourage low-income mothers to partici-
pate in the labor market by subsidizing the price of child care, with the
aim of increasing family income and building economic independence;
3) strategies that make early childhood education of good quality avail-
able to low-income families, both for its own benefits and also, in so
doing, providing child care that can serve to facilitate employment; and
4) policies that are aimed at increasing the quality of child care (or
early childhood education) for all children, by setting standards such as
group size, child/caregiver ratios, and minimum caregiver training
requirements.1 This last type of policy is different from the others in
that it would have the effect of raising the cost of child care if the min-
imum standards were a binding constraint. However, if parents gener-
ally opt for standards that are higher than those imposed by the
government, or if government requirements are largely unenforced,
then policy that sets standards would have no effect on costs. Because
these four types of policies have very different goals, it is not surpris-
ing that they often seem to be inconsistent with one another. We briefly
review each of them as background for considering the role of the gov-
ernment in supporting employer-sponsored on-site child care.
Child Care as a Work-Related Expense
The two primary policies that are based on the concept of child
care as a work-related expense each focus on one side of the employer/
employee relationship. Employers that provide child care benefits to
their employees may deduct from their federal taxable income the cost
of providing such benefits (Employee Benefit Research Institute 1990).
To qualify for tax-free status, the program must be equally available to
all employees (Internal Revenue Service 2001). In addition, in 1997
(which is the midpoint of the range of time over which our data were
collected), 19 states provided tax incentives in the form of deductions
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and, in some cases, liberal tax credits for the employer cost of ESCC.
For example, California offered a credit of 30 percent of the cost
“incurred for establishing a child care program or constructing a child
care facility in California for use primarily by the children of your
employees or the children of your tenant’s employees or both” (State of
California 1998, p. 1). In addition, California offered a 30 percent
credit for the ongoing costs the employer paid for employee children’s
care. States offering credits were not limited to the high income, tradi-
tionally more liberal, ones. Southern states, including Mississippi,
Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida, also offered employer tax credits
related to child care. For example, Georgia offered employers “who
provide or sponsor child care for employees . . . a tax credit of up to 50
percent of the direct cost of operation to the employer” (State of Geor-
gia 1998, p. 1). 
On the employee side, workers who receive in-kind child care ben-
efits may exclude the value of the employer-provided child care from
their federal taxable income for the first $5,000 worth of those benefits.
In addition, all two-earner families have been able to deduct part of
their employment-related child care expenses since 1954. In 1976, the
deduction was replaced with a tax credit known as the Dependent Care
Tax Credit (DCTC), and the subsidy rate and maximum allowable
expenses were raised. In 1983, the DCTC was added to the “short
form” for filing income tax returns, making it available to many more
taxpayers. The maximum size of the credit varies with adjusted gross
income (AGI) from 30 percent of expenses (with a maximum of
$4,800) for up to two children for a family with AGI less than $10,000,
to 20 percent of expenses for families with AGI above $28,000. To be
eligible, both parents, if married (or the only parent if the taxpayer is a
single head of the household), must be employed, and each must have
earnings greater than the child care expenditure. The federal credit is
nonrefundable, meaning that if the credit is larger than the tax liability,
the tax liability limits the size of the credit. If the tax liability is zero,
then the household gets no benefit from the credit.
Just as some states offer tax credits on the employer side, states
also offer tax credits on the employee side. These credits tend to mirror
the federal DCTC in eligibility requirements and in its nonrefundable
nature. Many scholars and child care advocates have criticized the
DCTC as targeting middle-income families because the credit is not
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refundable; thus, low-income families with little or no tax liability
receive little or no benefit from the tax credit. (See Robins [1990] who
proposes that the credit be made refundable.) For example, the “Green
Book” for 1997 reported that, in 1995, 13 percent of the benefit from
the credit accrued to families with adjusted gross income of less than
$20,000, 47 percent to families with AGI between $20,000 and
$50,000, and about 40 percent to families with AGI greater than
$50,000 (U.S. House of Representatives 1997, p. 874). However, given
its origins as a tax equity measure to allow for a deduction of work-
related expenses rather than with the purpose of alleviating poverty, it
is not surprising that this policy is targeted at middle-class taxpayers.
Many middle-class taxpayers have another alternative for reducing
the financial impact of child care expenses that are related to employ-
ment: a dependent credit flexible spending account. Like the medical
care flexible spending account, employees who work for firms that
offer this option can set aside pre-tax earnings to be used to pay antici-
pated dependent care expenses. A maximum of $5,000, but with no
refunds if not fully utilized, can be placed in a dependent care spending
account per year. Taxpayers with access to the dependent care spending
account option (which does not have to be offered by employers) must
choose between a flexible spending account or the DCTC (one cannot
use both). The financially best choice will depend on the individual cir-
cumstances of the taxpayer, but, in general, flexible spending accounts
are a “better deal” for higher-income households while the DCTC is
better for lower-income households. 
Child Care to Facilitate Employment for Low-Income Families
Beginning in the late 1980s, policymakers in Washington began to
create programs aimed at moving welfare recipients with young chil-
dren into the labor force. These included various plans that subsidize
the cost of child care for low-income families. The Family Support Act
of 1988 created two new programs, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children-Child Care (AFDC-CC) and Transitional Child Care (TCC).2
With the aim of moving families off welfare, AFDC-CC offered child
care subsidies for adults receiving AFDC so that they could attend
employment and training programs. TCC provided child care subsidies
for up to one year after families left welfare. 
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With two programs aimed at AFDC recipients, policymakers wor-
ried about low-income families strategically taking up welfare to
become eligible for the transitional benefits. Therefore, in 1990, two
new programs, At-Risk Child Care (ARCC) and Child Care and Devel-
opment Block Grant (CCDBG), were created that focused on “at risk”
families, that is, families at risk of moving onto AFDC. In addition to
giving child care subsidies to low-income families, the CCDBG had
the goal of improving the quality of child care and providing consumer
education about child care, including subsidizing resource and referral
services. 
While one can understand the multiplicity of programs aimed at
serving different populations, the result was a bureaucratic rat’s nest.
As employment and welfare status changed, families would have to
switch between programs, which was confusing and seemed to be
fairly capricious in terms of who was eligible and who was not. The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 consolidated the four programs into a single child
care block grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The
primary goal of CCDF is to facilitate the transition off welfare. The
other goal for the CCDBG of improving the quality and accessibility of
child care remains, with a minimum of 4 percent of funds set aside for
these activities. 
States are encouraged to supplement federal child care dollars with
their own matching funds, and they may also transfer up to 30 percent
of their federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
funds to pay child care expenses. States are given a great deal of flexi-
bility in determining eligibility for and regulations of the child care
facilities they support. The result is less fragmentation for individual
recipients as their circumstances change, but substantial variation
among the 50 states in the level of support for child care for low-
income families. 
Improved Access to Early Childhood Education
for Low-Income Families
Witte and Queralt (2002) discuss the trade-off that government-
funded child care subsidies are making between facilitating employ-
ment and improving the school readiness of poor children. State sub-
120 Connelly, DeGraff, and Willis
sidy programs differ substantially in their emphasis between these two
policy goals. For example, Witte and Queralt argue that the Illinois
program is mainly aimed at facilitating parental employment while
Minnesota’s program places a larger emphasis on the education of the
children of the recipients. 
Along with the child care subsidy programs, federally funded Head
Start, which was instituted in 1965, has as its goal increasing the school
readiness of children from low-income families. Head Start is, in fact,
the largest federal program in terms of expenditure that is related to
child care, with an allocation in 1997 of about $4 million nationally
(Blau 2000). Historically, it was clearly not the goal of Head Start to
facilitate employment by providing child care; Head Start programs
have until recently been only part-day, and serving only children aged
three to five. 
In addition to Head Start, some Title 1A monies have lately been
allocated for preschool programs that comply with Head Start perfor-
mance standards. More generally, Title 1A is directed at educationally
disadvantaged elementary and secondary school children. These pro-
grams, along with some full-time Head Start and kindergarten ones,
while focusing on early child education, provide as a by-product child
care that can facilitate employment for low-income mothers.
Increasing the Quality of Child Care
The federal government has chosen not to set federal standards for
child care quality proxies such as caregiver training, group size, and
caregiver/child ratios, leaving those regulatory duties to the states.
However, some federal block grant money is earmarked for improving
quality. Most states have some child care regulations in place, both
related to safety and to the quality of care. Some state and federal dol-
lars are devoted to the enforcement of these regulations, and other
monies are used to help centers and family day care homes upgrade to
meet state standards. Blau (2001) questions whether state regulations
are, in fact, binding constraints because, on the one hand, enforcement
efforts are minimal and, on the other hand, many centers choose levels
above the state minimums. 
If regulations are binding, they are expected to increase the price of
child care that is covered by the regulations. Hotz and Kilburn (1996),
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using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School
Class of 1972, and Hofferth and Chaplin (1998), using data from the
National Child Care Survey, found evidence that stricter regulations
increase the price of care. Hotz and Kilburn (1996, p. 134) also found
that “stricter regulations are weakly associated with reduced availabil-
ity and reduced availability lowers use.” Thus, they conclude that, at
least in the case of requiring provider training in centers, the regulation
reduces the use of centers and increases the use of home-based care
(which is not regulated).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE VALUE OF ESCC 
TO EMPLOYEES
What does our analysis of employer-sponsored on-site child care
imply about the government’s role in child care policy and in ESCC
more specifically? Should ESCC be in the policymakers’ choice set?
There are several economic reasons (as opposed to political reasons)
why the government might choose to try to influence firms in terms of
offering on-site child care. 
• There may be an information problem on the part of firms. Firms
may have difficulty measuring the benefit to their employees and
to the firm itself of having an on-site child care center. In addi-
tion, managers may worry about the irreversibility of benefit
decisions (it is far easier to give than to rescind), which leads
firms to be particularly risk averse when it comes to experiment-
ing with new benefits. Thus, a process of trial and error to arrive
at the optimal level of benefits for the firm (and, particularly, the
benefit of on-site child care) is unlikely to occur without either
more information or a cost reduction in the benefit.
• There may be an information problem on the part of parents.
There is an overwhelming consensus among child development
researchers who study the child care alternatives in the United
States that the average level of quality is low. Economists such as
Walker (1991) and Mocan (2001) have argued that the prevalence
of low quality derives from information asymmetries. Parents
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have trouble judging the quality of care, both because they do not
spend enough time in child care centers and they do not necessar-
ily know what to evaluate. Because it costs more to provide
higher quality, caregivers have no incentive to do so unless they
can charge higher fees. However, parents appear to be unwilling
to pay for something they cannot see. Mocan (2001) likens the
problem to the “market for lemons.”3 On-site ESCC is particu-
larly well positioned to mitigate this informational asymmetry
because its location renders it subject to much more frequent
interaction with parents. Furthermore, its affiliation with the com-
pany name and its potential role in the recruitment and retention
of employees create additional incentives for providing high-
quality care.
• There may be positive externalities in the selection of quality
child care by parents. One reason that parents may not choose
high quality child care is that some of the advantages accrue to
others beyond themselves. For example, we have argued through-
out this volume that the benefits of on-site child care go not only
to the users of the center, but to other employees and to the firm
as a whole. In addition, if we think of child care as early child-
hood education, it is not hard to argue convincingly that, as with
other aspects of education, there are “public good” and/or “merit
good” aspects to child care that benefit society as a whole. With
that perspective in mind, consider briefly the difference between
the funding of early childhood education and higher education in
the United States. In child care and early childhood education, the
family on average pays 60 percent of the cost of care, the govern-
ment funds 39 percent, and business and philanthropy cover 1
percent. In higher education, families on average pay 35 percent,
the government pays 45 percent, and private gifts, grants, con-
tracts and income from endowment cover 20 percent. Similarly,
based on median income statistics in 1998, families are expected
to spend 15 to 18 percent of their annual income on child care per
year, but only 5 to 7 percent of their annual income on college per
year (Mitchell, Stoney, and Dichter 2001). 
• There may be positive externalities in the provision of quality
child care by employers. Even if employers are able to overcome
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the informational and analytical challenges of assessing the value
to the firm of on-site child care, their cost/benefit analyses are
still likely to result in a suboptimal level of funding because of
the external benefits to society of high quality care. Indeed, some
of the qualitative responses of the employees we interviewed sug-
gested their recognition of benefits to ESCC that extended
beyond the firm to society as a whole.
• There is the potential for cost savings in terms of other govern-
ment expenditures. Enrolling children in high-quality child care
facilities today may lead to cost savings later on in the public
school system. In this case, subsidizing child care could result in
a net savings of government expenditure. The same argument can
be made in terms of the employment-facilitating aspects of child
care, potentially reducing both welfare and wage subsidies to
low-income families. Implementing such an effort, in part,
through government support of ESCC has the potential to be even
more cost effective because of the ability of employers to carry
some of the expense.
• There are equality issues in terms of our tax code. Children are
not welcome in the modern workplace, and it is not desirable (or
allowed) for parents to leave young children alone. Thus, nonpa-
rental child care is truly a work-related expense for the majority
of parents, and the principle of horizontal equity would support
the exclusion for tax purposes of all work-related child care costs.
Under the current tax system, only $5,000 of costs per year may
be excluded.
All of these reasons legitimize some role for the government in the
provision of child care, and several specifically support the encourage-
ment of employer-sponsored on-site child care. Furthermore, our anal-
ysis of both Chapters 5 and 7 shows that parents value the on-site
aspect of ESCC so that encouraging employee-sponsored on-site child
care centers would seem a reasonable policy prescription to address all
of the concerns that have been listed. Availability of infant slots and the
convenience of hours and location seem to be attributes that parents
value, along with the quality of care. In addition, as shown in Chapter
7, because the firm also gains from the provision of ESCC, the amount
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of government funding necessary to encourage this should be less than
for community-based child care. 
Given the substantial values we find both to parents and to all
employees, and the difficulty firms have in measuring those benefits,
we believe that the current level of ESCC is suboptimal. Increasing
government spending in this area should have substantial benefits
given that only a marginal push is needed. Recall that the on-site child
care at these firms was not provided to users for free. In fact, the
weekly cost of ESCC to parents was about equal to the average cost of
all paid care used by employees in the three firms, although it was
somewhat less than center care from alternative providers. Thus, we
conclude that it is not necessary for the government to provide free
care in order to promote the use of higher-quality options, but that
attributes of availability, reliability, and convenience must be linked
with high-quality care and moderate prices. Promoting on-site child
care through providing strong tax incentives to firms should be one of a
menu of ways to accomplish that goal. Managers and human resource
officers whom we interviewed revealed that they find it very difficult
to ascertain the value of their own benefits packages. They also have
trouble measuring the cost of turnover, much less the effect of a given
benefit on turnover. The difficulty of assessing the effects of increasing
the level of benefits and the political difficulty of taking away a benefit
if cost savings are needed in the future lead most managers to shy away
from any experimentation with benefits. 
While the preceding statement is true for any changes in benefits,
these for child care differ from many others provided by firms due to
the small percentage of a company’s workforce that is directly affected.
In the firms we studied, between 27 and 35 percent of the workforce
had young children. This may be greater than in many other industries
because of the high representation of relatively young female produc-
tion workers. While our research shows that non-users receive benefits
from ESCC, there is still the problem of numbers. Small firms or even
a big firm with multiple locations may find that they are not large
enough to establish their own on-site center. In view of this, govern-
ments could do more to encourage a group of geographically proxi-
mate firms to operate a center nearby. Similarly, tax abatements to
encourage the location of a firm in a given community could be offered
with the provision that a child care facility would be constructed in the
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vicinity. Such policy interventions already take place in cases of real
estate development tied to the construction of elementary schools and
community centers. 
Sometimes, zoning rules must be changed to allow child care cen-
ters to operate near homes or workplaces. This, too, is an area for gov-
ernment intervention. In addition, because the insurance liability of
running a child care center is often cited as a concern by companies,
the government could help by facilitating the creation of larger risk
pools. 
Where a lack of information is part of the problem, the government
could fund more studies of ESCC. As we argued in the introduction to
this book, nationally representative household-based studies, although
useful for many other aspects of the analysis of child care in the United
States, will not capture enough users of on-site child care for a research
focus on ESCC. Funding a group of linked case studies on ESCC, or
providing tax incentives and information for firms to undertake such
research themselves, would be effective ways of convincing risk-
averse human resource officers to take the plunge. 
We do not believe that all (or even most) government support for
child care should be aimed at on-site centers. In many cases, even
when all benefits are taken into account, the costs of such centers will
outweigh the benefits. In addition, community-based programs are
needed for those who work far from home, who are self-employed,
who work for companies not providing on-site centers, or who are not
in the labor force but use center-based child care on a part-time basis.
Employer-based child care may also tie workers to the firm in a nega-
tive way, reducing the possibility of upward mobility through job
change. These same arguments, importantly, are often made about
employer-provided health insurance. However, based on the findings
of this study, we believe that encouraging employer-sponsored on-site
child care is a worthwhile endeavor. Offering parents quality care that
is also convenient, reliable, and affordable is likely to increase the use
of high-level care. Moreover, on-site child care provides external bene-
fits to both companies and our society, benefits for which they and we
should be willing to pay.
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Notes
1. There are other programs that also impact child care costs peripherally such as the
child and adult care food program that provides cash subsidies for food served in
day care centers and family day care homes for low-income children. This pro-
gram is part of the National School Lunch Program.
2. This discussion relies heavily on Blau (2000).
3. The market for lemons refers to Akerlof’s 1970 article discussing the problems of
asymmetric information in the used car market.
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Appendix A.1
Contingent Valuation Questions 




Contingent Valuation Questions for On-Site Center 
for Action Industries and Bell Manufacturing, 
Which Already Had On-Site Centers 
6.10C DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I MEAN WHEN I 
SAY THAT THE NEXT FEW QUESTIONS ARE 
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS? 
INTERVIEWER NOTES:
USE THE WORD “PRETEND” OR “MAKE BELIEVE” IF 
NECESSARY. BE SURE THAT THE EMPLOYEE 
UNDERSTANDS THE HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF 
THE QUESTION.
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6.11C Do you know that normally, the costs of employee benefits
are partly paid for by the company
and partly paid for by the worker.
When the costs of benefits go up,
sometimes benefits change,   Yes, I knew
and sometimes the cost to the workers goes up,
sometimes a little bit of both happens. _ No, I didn’t know
Did you know this? _ Knew somewhat
_____________________________________________________________________
6.12C Okay, now we are going to ask you about some possible imaginary changes
in your benefits.
We will describe a possible change in your benefits and then we will ask you to
VOTE on whether or not you want it.
The way the voting works is like this:
THE MAJORITY RULES --
whatever the majority of workers vote for is what happens for EVERYONE!
IF YOU VOTE “YES”--
this means everyone has to pay the NEW cost to keep a benefit like it is.
IF YOU VOTE “NO”
that means the benefit will change in the way that I am going to describe.
DO YOU UNDERSTAND HOW THE VOTING WORKS?
_____________________________________________________________________
Imagine that the company needs to cut costs.
One way to cut cost is to keep the benefits the same and have ALL employees pay some
of the costs that Action Industries currently pays.






until they understand 
or indicate here ___ 
that you have doubts, 
then continue.
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So if the majority of employees vote YES to accept the new payroll deductions, ALL
employees will pay - whether or not they use the benefits.
Another way to cut costs would be to eliminate the benefits.
So, if the majority vote NO, there would be no new payroll deductions and the benefits
will be eliminated or changed as described in a few minutes.
_____________________________________________________________________
6.13C
Now, here is the first hypothetical or imaginary situation, that I want you to vote on.
One way to cut costs would be to eliminate the child care center.
OR to keep the center open ALL employees would pay some of the new costs __Yes
that Action currently pays.                        __No 
                                                                                                                                                 
This would be done through a payroll deduction, with ALL employees paying part of
the new cost.
Remember, if the majority of employees vote YES to accept the new cost as a payroll
deduction, ALL employees will pay - whether or not they use the center.
In addition, users of the child care center would continue to pay their current tuition per
child per week and the child care center would remain open.
If the majority vote NO, there would be no new payroll deduction and the child care
center would shut down. Now here's the vote:
Would you VOTE YES to a payroll deduction of  $________per two-week pay
period in order to keep the child care center open?
_________________________________________________________________
6.14C Can you tell me briefly why you answered Yes or No?
     1 ___ Yes, benefit important to all 4___No, too expensive
2 ___ Yes, worth it 5___No, don't think everyone should pay
3 ___ Yes, other  6___No, rather change some other aspect









Contingent Valuation Questions for On-Site Center 
for Central Products, Which Did Not Have an On-Site Center
6.12 DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I MEAN WHEN I SAY THAT
THE NEXT FEW QUESTIONS ARE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS? 
INTERVIEWER NOTES:  
USE THE WORD “PRETEND” OR “MAKE BELIEVE” IF NECESSARY.
BE SURE THAT THE EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDS THE 
HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF THE QUESTION.
REPEAT THE INSTRUCTIONS until they understand or 
indicate here _____ that you have doubts and then continue.    ___ Yes
     ___ No  
_________________________________________________________________
6.13 Do you know that normally, the costs of employee benefits 
are partly paid for by the company 
and partly paid for by the worker. 
 
When the costs of benefits go up, 
sometimes the benefits change, __Yes, I knew 
and sometimes the cost to the workers goes up,
sometimes a little bit of both happens.  __No, I didn’t know
Did you know this? __Knew somewhat 
_________________________________________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6.14 Okay, now we are going to ask you about some possible imaginary changes in
your benefits.
We will describe a possible change in your benefits and then we will ask you to VOTE
on whether or not you want it.
The way the voting works is like this:
THE MAJORITY RULES — 
whatever the majority of workers vote for is what happens for EVERYONE!  
IF YOU VOTE “YES” 
this means everyone has to pay to keep a benefit that you already have or pay to
get a new benefit.
IF YOU VOTE “NO” 
that means an existing benefit will change in the way described or a new benefit
will be voted down. 
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DO YOU UNDERSTAND HOW THE VOTING WORKS?
REPEAT THE INSTRUCTIONS until they understand or 
indicate here _____ that you have doubts and then continue. ___ Yes 
___ No 
_________________________________________________________________
As you know companies today need to be aware of costs and employee benefits
cost money.
One way to keep costs down would be to simply not offer a particular benefit
or eliminate a benefit the company currently has.
OR the company could offer a benefit but have ALL employees pay a share of
the costs.  
This would be done through a new payroll deduction, with ALL employees
paying part of the costs.  
Remember, if the majority of employees vote YES to accept the new payroll
deductions, ALL employees will pay - whether or not they use the benefits.  
If the majority vote NO, there would be no new payroll deductions and no ben-
efit.
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Before we begin, remind me:
do you have a child or grandchild currently living with you who is
under the age of 6?           Child/grandchild under 6
          No child/grandchild under 6
_________________________________________________________________
6.15 Now, here is the first hypothetical or imaginary situation that I want you to vote
on.
Suppose that Central Products was considering having a child care center nearby
for employees’ children and grandchildren.  One way to do this but keep costs
down would be to have employees cover part of the cost.   
Central would pay some of the costs, ALL employees would pay some of the
costs, and users of the center would also pay an amount per child enrolled.  The
employee contribution would be through a new payroll deduction, with ALL
employees paying part of the cost.
 
Remember, if the majority of employees vote YES to accept the new payroll
deduction, Central would operate a child care center but ALL employees will
pay - whether or not they use the center.  In addition, users of the child care cen-
ter would pay tuition per child per week.  
If the majority vote NO, there would be no new payroll deduction and the child
care center would not be opened.  
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Now here’s the vote: 
Would you VOTE YES to a new payroll deduction of  
$_____ per weekly paycheck  __Yes
in order to open a Central employees’ child care center? __No
_____________________________________________________________________   
6.16 Can you tell me briefly WHY you answered Yes or No?
 ___ Yes, benefit important to all ___No, too expensive
 ___ Yes, worth it ___No, don't think everyone should pay
 ___ Yes, other  ___No, rather change some other aspect









Bell Manufacturing Survey Excluding CV Questions
Thank you very much for helping.
We are studying how worker benefits help people at work and at 
home.
The questions are easy.
Your answers are important.
Everything you say is confidential.
Bell Manufacturing will not see your responses.
Bell Manufacturing is not changing your benefits.
Bell Manufacturing has unusual benefits.
We are interested in how they might affect workers at home and at 
work.
We are trying to help other companies know how to design good 
benefits.
If there is any question that you don’t want to answer, please just 
tell me and we will skip it.
Again, my name is _______________________.
We want to only use numbers - not names - on the survey.
Please tell me your name so I can look up the number.
While I look it up, can you please write your name and 
number on this entry for the drawing for the $100 bill.
Look up the employee name, have them sign their consent 
next to it, and then write down their employee ID number 
only on the survey.
This survey was announced last week: Did you see the 
announcement?
Interviewer Note: Read section headings!
The survey has two parts.
The first part asks some questions about you, your family, your job, 
and your background. Your answers help us understand your 
situation better.
The second part asks you to vote on different benefits.
Remember, we are not changing benefits here at Bell 
Manufacturing.
We just want your opinion on what is important to you.
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Section 1: First, I will ask about you and your family.
1.1 Please tell me all the people who live in your home with you, including children 
who are away at school for part of the year or live with you part-time.
For each of these people, please tell me how they are related to you (for example, 
spouse, partner, child, mother, friend, boarder, etc.), their age and sex.
Let’s start with you.           Code Birth to 11 months as 0 years.
Relationship to YOURSELF Age (yrs) Sex 
(Circle)




All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
2. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
3. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
4. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
5. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
6. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
7. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
8. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
9. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
10. Male
Female
All Year or Part Year 
Full Time or Part Time
1.2 Do you have any children who do NOT live with you?
__ Yes
__ No-SKIP to 1.4
1.3 Please tell me their ages.
Record ages:
1.4 What is your current marital status:








1.4a How many times have you been married?
1.5What year did you first get married? Record year:
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1.6 Which race do you consider yourself:
Hispanic __Hispanic
African-American (not Hispanic) __African-American
White (not Hispanic) __White
Asian __Asian
or Other (please specify)?
__Other (specify)
_________________
1.7 Were you born in the United States?
__Yes=>SKIP to 1.9
__No
1.8 How old were you when you came to live in the United
States?
Record age:
1.9 How long have you lived in your current home? Record years:
1.10 How many years have you lived in this area, say within
a one-hour drive of Bell Manufacturing
Record years:
1.11  Did you graduate from high school?
__Yes=> SKIP to 1.14
__No
1.12  What is the highest grade you completed? Record grade:
1.13  Do you have a GED?
__Yes
__No=> SKIP to 
section 2




1.15  Which of the following schools have you attended:
the Tech Training Center,
other vocational training,
some college but no degree,
2 year college degree,
4 year college degree,
some graduate courses,
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Section 2-Now I am going to ask you some questions about your job here.
2.1When were you hired by Bell Manufacturing most 
recently?
If you have worked here more than once, give the date
of your most recent hire?
Please give us both the month and the year.
(Interviewer Note: If they can’t remember the month, 




2.2 What is your job title: Record title:
2.3 How many miles do you drive to work one-way? Record no. of miles:
2.4 What county is your home located in? Record the county:
2.5 How many hours per week do you usually work at this 
job?
Record hours:
2.6 How many days per week do you usually work? Record days:
2.7 Are you permitted flexible time scheduling on your job?
Record any comments on the desire for flex time here.
__Yes
__No
2.8 What time of day do you usually begin work?
 Be sure to record am or pm - also you can check if it 





2.9 How are you paid? Hourly wage? Piece-rate? Salary? __Hourly
__Piece Rate
__Salary
2.10 Do you have another job? __Yes
__Occasionally
__No=> SKIP to 
Section 3
2.11 What do you do in your second job? Record Position:
2.12 How many hours a week do you work your second job? Record weekly hours:
2.13 How are you paid? Hourly wage? Piece-rate? Salary? __Hourly
__Piece Rate
__Salary
2.14 If you don’t mind telling, how much do you get paid in
 your second job?







Section 3 3.1 Remind me, do you have children and/or grandchildren LESS THAN 13 YEARS OLD 
LIVING WITH YOU NOW? Circle CHILDREN or GRANDCHILDREN or BOTH
__Yes __No SKIP NEXT 2 PAGES TO 
SECTION 4
3.2 Now I want to ask you some questions about childcare (cc) for your kids while you 
 are at work.
__Yes __No - SKIP to 3.4
3.3 How much Smart Start money do you receive?    RECORD AMOUNT 
 AND INTERVAL
Interviewer Note: Ask the next set of questions for the FOUR YOUNGEST children
ONLY.
Use one column for each child, putting the youngest child on the far left.
Record completed years only. For example, a 3 month old is age 0. A 20 month old 












3.4 How old is this child?
3.5 Who most often watches this child when you work on regular weekdays (M-F)? 
Use Childcare CODES
3.6 Tell me how many miles away (one-way) this cc is from your home. Record 0 if 
at the same location
3.7 Tell me how many miles away (one-way) this cc is from here. Record 0 if 
at the same location
3.8 How many hours per week is this child usually with a caregiver? RECORD NUMBER
 OF HOURS
3.9 How much do you pay per week for this child care for this child? 
RECORD DOLLAR AMOUNT
3.10 How do you feel about this cc arrangement:
1=v.happy,2=hap,3=good,4=ok,5=unhap,6=very unhap
3.11 Is there someone else who also watches this child while you are at work M-F? 
YES or NO-Skip to 3.16
1443.12 What is the 2nd childcare arrangement? RECORD CHILDCARE CODE FROM 
LIST BELOW
3.13 How many hours per week is this child usually with this 2ND caregiver? RECORD
NO OF HOURS
3.14 How much do you pay per week for this 2nd childcare for this child? RECORD
 AMOUNT
3.15 How do you feel about this cc arrangement?
 1=v.happy,2=hap,3=good,4=ok,5=unhap,6=very unhap
3.16 Who most often watches this child on Saturday if you need to work? Use Childcare
CODES or Z
3.17 How do you feel about this cc arrangement?
 1=v.happy,2=hap,3=good,4=ok,5=unhap,6=very unhap
3.18 Would you consider using A Child’s View for this child on Saturdays that you need
 to work? 1=Yes definitely, 2=Maybe, depends on charge (price), 3=Once in 
a while,4=Probably Not, 5=No
CODES FOR CHILDCARE ARRANGEMENTS: I - AT HOME WITH OLDER CHILDREN
A - BELL’S CENTER/A CHILD’S VIEW J - HOME ALONE
B - YOUR SPOUSE OR CHILD’S OTHER PARENT K - OTHER CENTER
C - GRANDPARENT IN YOUR HOME L - AT SCHOOL. This is usual primary care for school age children
D - GRANDPARENT IN THEIR HOME M - OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY)_________________________
E - ADULT RELATIVE IN YOUR HOME N - DON’T KNOW
F - ADULT RELATIVE IN THEIR HOME Z - NEVER WORKS ON SATURDAY-Skip to next pg
G - NON-RELATIVE IN YOUR HOME comments here re: CC AVAILABILITY
H - NON-RELATIVE IN THEIR HOME
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Section 3 cont.
Only for people with children or grandchildren under
 age 13 living at home.
START HERE FOR 
ANYONE WITHOUT 
CHILDREN UNDER 13!
Now we would like to ask you some questions about other 
types of childcare that might be available to you.
DO NOT include the child care arrangements that you are 
currently using in your answers.
3.50 Do you know of any daycare center, other than
Bell’s, that your children could attend while 
you are at work?
__Yes
__No=> SKIP to 3.52
3.51 How much would you expect to pay per week per 
child for the one you would most likely use?
Record amount:
3.52 Do you have a parent or parent-in-law, who is not
currently caring for your child(ren), who does not 
live with you but lives within 30 minutes of you?
__Yes=>SKIP to 3.54
__No
3.53 Within 60 minutes? __Yes
__No=>SKIP to 3.56
3.54 Would any of these parents or in-laws be available to




3.55 How much would you expect to pay your parents or
 in-laws per week per child?
(Interviewer Note: If they would not expect to pay anything, 
please record 0. Record “G” if they help buy groceries, 
record “H” if they help around the house/yard, etc.)
Record amount:
3.56 Do you have any other relatives, who are not currently
 caring for your children, who do not live with you, but
 live within 30 minutes of you?
__Yes=>SKIP to 3.58
__No
3.57 Within 60 minutes: __Yes
__No=>SKIP to 3.60
3.58 Would any of these relatives be available to care for
your children on a regular basis while you are at work?
__Yes
__No=>SKIP to 3.60
3.59 How much would you expect to pay these relatives 
per week per child?
(Interviewer Note: If they would not expect to pay anything, 
please record 0. Record “G” if they help buy groceries, 
record “H” if they help around the house/yard, etc.)
Record amount
3.60 Do you know of anyone else who might be available 
to care for your children in your home or their home on
a regular basis while you are at work:
__Yes
__No=>SKIP to 3.62
3.61 How much would you expect to pay this other person
per week per child?
(Interviewer Note: If they would not expect to pay anything, 
please record 0. Record “G” if they help buy groceries, 
record “H” if they help around the house/yard, etc.)
Record amount
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Section 4–Remind me, are you currently married? __Yes
__No=>SKIP to
Section 5
4.1 We would like to ask some questions about your 
spouse. Did your spouse graduate from high school?
__Yes=>SKIP to 4.4
__No
4.2 What is the highest grade he/she completed Record grade:
4.3 Does your spouse have a GED?
__Yes
__No=>SKIP to 4.6




4.5 Which of the following best describes your spouse’s 
highest level of education:
tech training,
other vocational training,
some college but no degree,
2 year college degree,
4 year college degree,
some graduate courses,








4.6 Is your spouse currently employed?
__Yes=>SKIP to 4.8
__No
4.7 Please tell me which of the following most accurately 





unable to work because of health problems
not employed and looking for a job





__Looking for a job=>
__Not looking for a job=>
SKIP to Section 5
4.8 Does your spouse have more than one job?
__Yes
__No
4.9 How many hours per week does he/she usually work?
(with all jobs together)?
Record hours:
4.10 Would you say that your work times are
the same as your spouse
nearly the same
overlap about half the time
very different
completely opposite
__the same as your spouse
__nearly the same




4.11 If you don’t mind telling, what is your spouse’s annual   
 gross income from wages, salary and bonuses from all




Section 5.  Now I am going to ask you questions about your family when you were 
growing up. These answers are really important to understanding your situation 
growing up and what you think about different benefits. We can skip anything that 
you don’t want to answer. No problem:
5.1 In what state in the US or in what foreign country were your 
parents born?
(Interviewer Note: If they do not know where either parent was 






5.2 When you were a child did you grow up in the city, the 
suburbs, a small town, or in the country?
(Interviewer Note: If more than one type of place, where did they 






5.3 Which of the categories I am about to list comes closest to 
describing your living situation for most of the time as a child:
lived with both own mother and father
lived with own mother and stepfather
lived with own father and stepmother
lived with own mother only
lived with own father only
or other (please specify for other)?
Interviewer Note: If two situations are offered record the longest 
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5.8 Which of the following best describes the income of your
family when you were growing up: (very low, low, average,






5.9 Did your mother work before you started first grade? __Yes
__No
__Don’t know
5.10 Which of the following categories best describes your
mother’s level of education: (did not complete high school,
high  school but no college, some college but no degree, 
2-year degree, 4-year degree, Masters of Ph.D.)?
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5.11 Which of the following categories best describes your 
father’s level of education: (did not complete high school,
high school but no college, some college but no degree,
2-year degree, 4-year degree, Masters of Ph.D.)?








5.12 How many brothers and sisters did you have including
 stepbrothers, stepsisters, children adopted by your parents,
and siblings who have died?
Record #:
NOW WE ARE GOING TO GO TO THE “VOTING” PART OF 
THE SURVEY. READY? LET’S START.
Section 6: CV Questions—See Appendix A.1 and A.2
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Section 7 – I really appreciate your time in answering these questions. We are almost 
finished. 
The next set of questions asks about the most recent job you held before this one and 
about total years of work experience.
7.1 Have you worked at Bell Manufacturing before?
Interviewer Note: be sure that they totally left the company
and then came back before you check YES. Internal job
 changes within the company code as NO
__Yes
__No
7.2 Have you worked at other companies before? __Yes
__No - SKIP to 
section 9
7.3a Was this job also in the same industry? __Yes
__No
7.3b What was your previous job title? Record Title:
7.4 When did you start that job? Please give me both the month
 and the year.
(Interviewer Note: If they can’t remember the month, prompt for 









7.6 While you were working at this previous job, did you have 
any children less than 6 years old?
__Yes
__No=> SKIP to 
7.8
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7.7 What was the primary type of child care you used while you
were at work for that job?
Interviewer Note: If they say “center care,” prompt for whether it 
was the firm’s center. Also you may have to prompt for location - 



























7.8 In what year did you first start working most of the year at a
regular job?
Record year:




7.10 How many times have you stopped working for more than
 three months since the first year that you started working 




Section 8 – This is the last section. Thank you again for your patience.








8.3 Does anyone in your household currently receive AFDC?
__Yes
__No
8.4 Does anyone in your household currently receive any other
 type of assistance?
__Yes
__No=>SKIP to 8.6
8.5 What type of assistance? Record type:




8.7 How much child support is usually received per month? Record amount:
8.8 Does anyone in your household currently pay child support?
Record any notes about differences between what child 




8.9 How much child support is usually paid per month? Record amount:
8.10 Remind me, other than yourself (and your spouse), are there




8.11 Finally, which of the following best describes how household
 expenses are shared with these adults other than your spouse:
• all household expenses are shared 
• some are shared 




THAT’S IT! Thank you very much for your time and your careful answers to our 
questions. Your help was important! WE APPRECIATE IT A LOT!
Please tell the folks who work around you how much we need their opinions too.
Get them to sign up or let me know they are willing to help out, too.
I will be sure to put your name in the drawing for the $100 bill.
Good luck and thank you again.
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Note
1.  The questionnaires for Action Industries and Central Products are almost identical
to those for Bell Manufacturing, differing only due to firm-specific tailoring of
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